Key Arguments

• Husserl says the first and lowest level of communalization is between ‘me, the primordial monad for myself, and the monad constituted in me, yet as other and accordingly as existing for himself but only appresentationally demonstrable to me’, grounding the being of the other in my constitution of him as other.
• He states that ‘The only conceivable manner in which others can have for me the sense and status of existent others, thus and so determined, consists in their being constituted in me as others’, making constitution in my intentionality the necessary condition for their being-for-me.
• If this constitution is continually confirmed, he grants their existence but only with the sense thus constituted: ‘If they get that sense and status from sources that yield a continual confirmation, then they do indeed exist (as I am compelled to say), but exclusively as having the sense with which they are constituted: as monads, existing for themselves precisely as I exist for myself, yet existing also in communion, therefore … in connexion with me qua concrete ego, qua monad.’
• He sharply distinguishes real separation of monads at the level of inherent contents: ‘To be sure, they are separate from my monad, so far as really inherent constituents are concerned, since no really inherent connexion leads from their subjective processes to my subjective processes or from anything included in their peculiar ownness to anything included in mine.’
• This separation corresponds to mundane separation between psychophysical individuals: ‘To that separation there corresponds, after all, the “real”, the mundane separation of my psychophysical existence from someone else’s, a separation that shows itself as spatial, owing to the spatial character of our Objective animate organisms.’
• Yet he insists that the intentional relation is a genuine connectedness, not mere fiction: ‘On the other hand, this original communion is not just nothing. Whereas, really inherently, each monad is an absolutely separate unity, the “irreal” intentional reaching of the other into my primordiality is not irreal in the sense of being dreamt into it or being present to consciousness after the fashion of a mere phantasy.’
• He characterizes this as an ‘essentially unique connectedness, an actual community and precisely the one that makes transcendentally possible the being of a world, a world of men and things’, thereby making intermonadic intentional community the transcendental condition for world-being.

Source Quotes

§ 56. Constitution of higher levels of intermonadic community With these considerations we have clarified the first and lowest level of communalization between me, the primordial monad for myself, and the monad constituted in me, yet as other and accordingly as existing for himself but only appresentationally demonstrable to me. The only conceivable manner in which others can have for me the sense and status of existent others, thus and so determined, consists in their being constituted in me as others.

Constitution of higher levels of intermonadic community With these considerations we have clarified the first and lowest level of communalization between me, the primordial monad for myself, and the monad constituted in me, yet as other and accordingly as existing for himself but only appresentationally demonstrable to me. The only conceivable manner in which others can have for me the sense and status of existent others, thus and so determined, consists in their being constituted in me as others. If they get that sense and status from sources that yield a continual confirmation, then they do indeed exist (as I / am compelled to say), but exclusively as having the sense with which they are constituted: as monads, existing for themselves precisely as I exist for myself, yet existing also in communion, therefore (I emphasize the expression already used earlier) in connexion with me qua concrete ego, qua monad.

The only conceivable manner in which others can have for me the sense and status of existent others, thus and so determined, consists in their being constituted in me as others. If they get that sense and status from sources that yield a continual confirmation, then they do indeed exist (as I / am compelled to say), but exclusively as having the sense with which they are constituted: as monads, existing for themselves precisely as I exist for myself, yet existing also in communion, therefore (I emphasize the expression already used earlier) in connexion with me qua concrete ego, qua monad. To be sure, they are separate from my monad, so far as really inherent constituents are concerned, since no really inherent connexion leads from their subjective processes to my subjective processes or from anything included in their peculiar ownness to anything included in mine.

If they get that sense and status from sources that yield a continual confirmation, then they do indeed exist (as I / am compelled to say), but exclusively as having the sense with which they are constituted: as monads, existing for themselves precisely as I exist for myself, yet existing also in communion, therefore (I emphasize the expression already used earlier) in connexion with me qua concrete ego, qua monad. To be sure, they are separate from my monad, so far as really inherent constituents are concerned, since no really inherent connexion leads from their subjective processes to my subjective processes or from anything included in their peculiar ownness to anything included in mine. To that separation there corresponds, after all, the “real”, the mundane separation of my psychophysical existence from someone else’s, a separation that shows itself as spatial, owing to the spatial character of our Objective animate organisms.

To be sure, they are separate from my monad, so far as really inherent constituents are concerned, since no really inherent connexion leads from their subjective processes to my subjective processes or from anything included in their peculiar ownness to anything included in mine. To that separation there corresponds, after all, the “real”, the mundane separation of my psychophysical existence from someone else’s, a separation that shows itself as spatial, owing to the spatial character of our Objective animate organisms. On the other hand, this original communion is not just nothing.

To that separation there corresponds, after all, the “real”, the mundane separation of my psychophysical existence from someone else’s, a separation that shows itself as spatial, owing to the spatial character of our Objective animate organisms. On the other hand, this original communion is not just nothing. Whereas, really inherently, each monad is an absolutely separate unity, the “irreal” intentional reaching of the other into my primordiality is not irreal in the sense of being dreamt into it or being present to consciousness after the fashion of a mere phantasy.

Something that exists is in intentional communion with something else that exists. It is an essentially unique connectedness, an actual community and precisely the one that makes transcendentally possible the being of a world, a world of men and things. After the first level of communalization and (this being almost equivalent) the first constitution of an Objective world, starting from the primordial world, have been sufficiently clarified, the higher levels offer relatively minor difficulties.

Key Concepts

• the first and lowest level of communalization between me, the primordial monad for myself, and the monad constituted in me, yet as other and accordingly as existing for himself but only appresentationally demonstrable to me.
• The only conceivable manner in which others can have for me the sense and status of existent others, thus and so determined, consists in their being constituted in me as others.
• If they get that sense and status from sources that yield a continual confirmation, then they do indeed exist (as I / am compelled to say), but exclusively as having the sense with which they are constituted: as monads, existing for themselves precisely as I exist for myself, yet existing also in communion, therefore (I emphasize the expression already used earlier) in connexion with me qua concrete ego, qua monad.
• they are separate from my monad, so far as really inherent constituents are concerned, since no really inherent connexion leads from their subjective processes to my subjective processes or from anything included in their peculiar ownness to anything included in mine.
• the “real”, the mundane separation of my psychophysical existence from someone else’s, a separation that shows itself as spatial, owing to the spatial character of our Objective animate organisms.
• this original communion is not just nothing.
• It is an essentially unique connectedness, an actual community and precisely the one that makes transcendentally possible the being of a world, a world of men and things.

Context

Opening of §56, where Husserl recapitulates the first, ‘lowest’ level of communalization established in §55 and clarifies how the other monad is both really separate and intentionally in community with my monad, a structure that underlies the transcendental possibility of a world.