Predicates of being/non‑being and truth/falsity have their phenomenological origin in higher‑level intentional syntheses—verifying and nullifying syntheses—in which, relative to an initial intending, the object is evidently constituted as existing or as non‑existing (its being ‘canceled’), making these syntheses acts and correlates of ‘reason’.
By Edmund Husserl, from Cartesian Meditations
Key Arguments
- Building on his earlier account of synthetic multiplicities, Husserl reminds us that ‘the multiplicities of modes of consciousness that belong together synthetically and pertain to any meant object, of no matter what category, can be explored as to their phenomenological types.’ Among these types he now singles out those relevant to reason/unreason.
- He identifies a special class of syntheses: ‘Among such multiplicities are included those syntheses that, with regard to the initial intending, have the typical style of verifying and, in particular, evidently verifying syntheses — or else, on the contrary, that of nullifying and evidently nullifying syntheses.’
- He specifies the correlates on the side of the object‑sense: ‘When such a synthesis takes place, the meant object has, correlatively, the evident characteristic existing, or else the evident characteristic non-existing (the characteristic of annulled, of “canceled” being) .’ This shows how being/non‑being, as phenomenologically accessible, arise only in and through such higher‑order syntheses.
- He characterizes these synthetic occurrences as a distinct stratum of intentionality: ‘These synthetic occurrences are intentionalities of a higher level, which, as acts and correlates of “reason”, essentially producible by the transcendental ego, pertain (in exclusive disjunction) to all objective senses.’ This makes clear that reason is constituted in, and exercised through, these verifying/nullifying syntheses that confer the evident status of existence or non‑existence upon objective senses.
Source Quotes
These predicates are not given ipso facto as phenomenological data, when the subjective meaning processes, or correlatively the meant objects as meant, are given; yet they have their “phenomenological origin”. As we have said, the multiplicities of modes of consciousness that belong together synthetically and pertain to any meant object, of no matter what category, can be explored as to their phenomenological types. Among such multiplicities are included those syntheses that, with regard to the initial intending, have the typical style of verifying and, in particular, evidently verifying syntheses — or else, on the contrary, that of nullifying and evidently nullifying syntheses.
As we have said, the multiplicities of modes of consciousness that belong together synthetically and pertain to any meant object, of no matter what category, can be explored as to their phenomenological types. Among such multiplicities are included those syntheses that, with regard to the initial intending, have the typical style of verifying and, in particular, evidently verifying syntheses — or else, on the contrary, that of nullifying and evidently nullifying syntheses. When such a synthesis takes place, the meant object has, correlatively, the evident characteristic existing, or else the evident characteristic non-existing (the characteristic of annulled, of “canceled” being) .
Among such multiplicities are included those syntheses that, with regard to the initial intending, have the typical style of verifying and, in particular, evidently verifying syntheses — or else, on the contrary, that of nullifying and evidently nullifying syntheses. When such a synthesis takes place, the meant object has, correlatively, the evident characteristic existing, or else the evident characteristic non-existing (the characteristic of annulled, of “canceled” being) . These synthetic occurrences are intentionalities of a higher level, which, as acts and correlates of “reason”, essentially producible by the transcendental ego, pertain (in exclusive disjunction) to all objective senses.
When such a synthesis takes place, the meant object has, correlatively, the evident characteristic existing, or else the evident characteristic non-existing (the characteristic of annulled, of “canceled” being) . These synthetic occurrences are intentionalities of a higher level, which, as acts and correlates of “reason”, essentially producible by the transcendental ego, pertain (in exclusive disjunction) to all objective senses. Reason is not an accidental de facto ability, not a title for possible accidental matters of fact, but rather a title for an all-embracing essentially necessary structural form belonging to all transcendental subjectivity.
Key Concepts
- As we have said, the multiplicities of modes of consciousness that belong together synthetically and pertain to any meant object, of no matter what category, can be explored as to their phenomenological types.
- Among such multiplicities are included those syntheses that, with regard to the initial intending, have the typical style of verifying and, in particular, evidently verifying syntheses — or else, on the contrary, that of nullifying and evidently nullifying syntheses.
- When such a synthesis takes place, the meant object has, correlatively, the evident characteristic existing, or else the evident characteristic non-existing (the characteristic of annulled, of “canceled” being) .
- These synthetic occurrences are intentionalities of a higher level, which, as acts and correlates of “reason”, essentially producible by the transcendental ego, pertain (in exclusive disjunction) to all objective senses.
Context
Middle of §23, where Husserl explains how ontic and epistemic predicates originate in specific types of higher‑level intentional syntheses, thereby enriching the concept of constitution through the notions of verification, nullification, and reason.