Key Arguments

• Husserl defines a specific kind of combination among acts of consciousness, naming it synthesis and claiming its exclusivity to consciousness: “The sort of combination uniting consciousness with consciousness can be characterized as synthesis, a mode of combination exclusively peculiar to consciousness.”
• Using the example of perceiving a die, he notes that the manifold of appearances is not an incoherent sequence of subjective processes but a unified synthetic flow: “These, in their temporal flow, are not an incoherent sequence of / subjective processes. Rather they flow away in the unity of a synthesis, such that in them ‘one and the same’ is intended as appearing.”
• He shows that each particular mode of appearance (e.g., ‘the die here, in the near sphere’) is itself a synthetic unity of a multiplicity of perspectives: “Furthermore, each continued manner of appearance in such a mode (for example: ‘the die here, in the near sphere’) shows itself to be, in turn, the synthetic unity pertaining to a multiplicity of manners of appearance belonging to that mode.”
• The same synthetic structure holds at the level of features (shape, color, particular face): “Always we find the feature in question as a unity belonging to a passing flow of ‘multiplicities’.”
• He generalizes that what phenomenology discloses are “facts of synthetic structure, which give noetic-noematic unity to single cogitationes, in themselves (as concrete synthetic wholes) and in relation to one another.”
• Husserl explicitly claims that only by elucidating this peculiarity called synthesis can the notion of intentionality become methodologically fruitful: “Only elucidation of the peculiarity we call synthesis makes fruitful the exhibition of the cogito (the intentional subjective process) as consciousness-of…”.

Source Quotes

Inquiry into consciousness concerns two sides (for the present we are leaving out of consideration the question of the identical Ego); they can be characterized descriptively as belonging together inseparably. The sort of combination uniting consciousness with consciousness can be characterized as synthesis, a mode of combination exclusively peculiar to consciousness. For example, if I take the perceiving of this die as the theme for my description, I see in pure reflection that “this” die is given continuously as an objective unity in a multiform and changeable multiplicity of manners of appearing, which belong determinately to it.

For example, if I take the perceiving of this die as the theme for my description, I see in pure reflection that “this” die is given continuously as an objective unity in a multiform and changeable multiplicity of manners of appearing, which belong determinately to it. These, in their temporal flow, are not an incoherent sequence of / subjective processes. Rather they flow away in the unity of a synthesis, such that in them “one and the same” is intended as appearing. The one identical die appears, now in “near appearances”, now in “far appearances”: in the changing modes of the Here and There, over against an always co-intended, though perhaps unheeded, absolute Here (in my co-appearing organism).

The one identical die appears, now in “near appearances”, now in “far appearances”: in the changing modes of the Here and There, over against an always co-intended, though perhaps unheeded, absolute Here (in my co-appearing organism). Furthermore, each continued manner of appearance in such a mode (for example: “the die here, in the near sphere”) shows itself to be, in turn, the synthetic unity pertaining to a multiplicity of manners of appearance belonging to that mode. Thus the near-thing, as “the same”, appears now from this “side”, now from that; and the “visual perspectives” change — also, however, the other manners of appearance (tactual, acoustic, and so forth), as we can observe by turning our attention in the right direction.

Then, if we pay particular heed to any of the die’s features that shows itself in the die-perception (for example: the die’s shape or color, or one of its faces in particular, or the square shape or particular color of that face), the same is again the case. Always we find the feature in question as a unity belonging to a passing flow of “multiplicities”. Looking straightforwardly, we have perhaps the one unchanging shape or color; in the reflective attitude, we have its manners of appearance (orientational, perspectival, and so forth), following one another in continuous sequence.

Once we have laid hold of the phenomenological task of describing consciousness concretely, veritable infinities of facts —never explored prior to phenomenology — become disclosed. They can all be characterized as facts of synthetic structure, which give noetic-noematic unity to single cogitationes, in themselves (as concrete synthetic wholes) and in relation to one another. Only elucidation of the peculiarity we call synthesis makes fruitful the exhibition of the cogito (the intentional subjective process) as consciousness-of — that is to say, Franz Brentano’s significant discovery that “intentionality” is the fundamental characteristic of “psychic phenomena” — and actually lays open the method

They can all be characterized as facts of synthetic structure, which give noetic-noematic unity to single cogitationes, in themselves (as concrete synthetic wholes) and in relation to one another. Only elucidation of the peculiarity we call synthesis makes fruitful the exhibition of the cogito (the intentional subjective process) as consciousness-of — that is to say, Franz Brentano’s significant discovery that “intentionality” is the fundamental characteristic of “psychic phenomena” — and actually lays open the method

Key Concepts

• The sort of combination uniting consciousness with consciousness can be characterized as synthesis, a mode of combination exclusively peculiar to consciousness.
• These, in their temporal flow, are not an incoherent sequence of / subjective processes. Rather they flow away in the unity of a synthesis, such that in them “one and the same” is intended as appearing.
• each continued manner of appearance in such a mode (for example: “the die here, in the near sphere”) shows itself to be, in turn, the synthetic unity pertaining to a multiplicity of manners of appearance belonging to that mode.
• Always we find the feature in question as a unity belonging to a passing flow of “multiplicities”.
• They can all be characterized as facts of synthetic structure, which give noetic-noematic unity to single cogitationes, in themselves (as concrete synthetic wholes) and in relation to one another.
• Only elucidation of the peculiarity we call synthesis makes fruitful the exhibition of the cogito (the intentional subjective process) as consciousness-of

Context

Central argument of §17, where Husserl introduces ‘synthesis’ as the primitive structural form of conscious life using the perception of a die and its features, and then generalizes this to all cogitationes.