Key Arguments

• Husserl states that what is ‘acquired there straightforwardly, though it is a system of the Apriori, becomes philosophically intelligible and (according to what was said just now) an Apriori related back to the ultimate sources of understanding, only when problems of constitution, as problems of the specifically philosophical level, become disclosed and the natural realm of knowledge is at the same time exchanged for the transcendental.’
• He draws the methodological implication: ‘This implies that everything natural, everything given beforehand in straightforward intuition, must be built up again with a new originariness and not interpreted merely sequaciously as already definitive.’ Thus pre‑given natural objects and structures must be re‑constituted from transcendental sources.
• He then justifies the term ‘phenomenological’ and its philosophical claim: ‘That a procedure drawing insight from eidetic intuition is called phenomenological and claims philosophical significance is justified only by the circumstance that every genuine intuition has its place in the constitutional nexus.’ So eidetic work is philosophical only insofar as it is integrated into constitution theory.
• Accordingly, ‘every intuitive ascertainment, in the attitude of positivity, concerning the sphere of eidetically necessary (axiomatic) fundamentals serves as preliminary work and is even indispensable a priori. It furnishes1 the transcendental clue for discovery of the full constitutive concretion, as having both a noetic and a noematic aspect.’ This assigns eidetic ontology a preparatory but necessary role in guiding transcendental-constitutive analysis.
• He adds that such work ‘uncovers hidden horizons of sense on the ontic side (the overlooking of which seriously restricts the value of apriori ascertainments and makes their application uncertain)’, indicating that without attention to these horizons, even eidetic aprioris risk misapplication and incompleteness.

Source Quotes

As regards this, nothing prevents starting at first quite concretely with the human life-world around us, and with man himself as essentially related to this our surrounding world, and exploring, indeed purely intuitively, the extremely copious and never-discovered Apriori of any such surrounding world whatever, taking this Apriori as the point of departure for a systematic explication of human existence and of world strata that disclose themselves correlatively in the latter. But what is acquired there straightforwardly, though it is a system of the Apriori, becomes philosophically intelligible and (according to what was said just now) an Apriori related back to the ultimate sources of understanding, only when problems of constitution, as problems of the specifically philosophical level, become disclosed and the natural realm of knowledge is at the same time exchanged for the transcendental. This implies that everything natural, everything given beforehand in straightforward intuition, must be built up again with a new originariness and not interpreted merely sequaciously as already definitive.

But what is acquired there straightforwardly, though it is a system of the Apriori, becomes philosophically intelligible and (according to what was said just now) an Apriori related back to the ultimate sources of understanding, only when problems of constitution, as problems of the specifically philosophical level, become disclosed and the natural realm of knowledge is at the same time exchanged for the transcendental. This implies that everything natural, everything given beforehand in straightforward intuition, must be built up again with a new originariness and not interpreted merely sequaciously as already definitive. That a procedure drawing insight from eidetic intuition is called phenomenological and claims philosophical significance is justified only by the circumstance that every genuine intuition has its place in the constitutional nexus.

This implies that everything natural, everything given beforehand in straightforward intuition, must be built up again with a new originariness and not interpreted merely sequaciously as already definitive. That a procedure drawing insight from eidetic intuition is called phenomenological and claims philosophical significance is justified only by the circumstance that every genuine intuition has its place in the constitutional nexus. For this reason every intuitive ascertainment, in the attitude of positivity, concerning the sphere of eidetically necessary (axiomatic) fundamentals serves as preliminary work and is even indispensable a priori.

That a procedure drawing insight from eidetic intuition is called phenomenological and claims philosophical significance is justified only by the circumstance that every genuine intuition has its place in the constitutional nexus. For this reason every intuitive ascertainment, in the attitude of positivity, concerning the sphere of eidetically necessary (axiomatic) fundamentals serves as preliminary work and is even indispensable a priori. It furnishes1 the transcendental clue for discovery of the full constitutive concretion, as having both a noetic and a noematic aspect. Regardless of the fact that it / uncovers hidden horizons of sense on the ontic side (the overlooking of which seriously restricts the value of apriori ascertainments and makes their application uncertain), the significance and complete novelty of this going

It furnishes1 the transcendental clue for discovery of the full constitutive concretion, as having both a noetic and a noematic aspect. Regardless of the fact that it / uncovers hidden horizons of sense on the ontic side (the overlooking of which seriously restricts the value of apriori ascertainments and makes their application uncertain), the significance and complete novelty of this going

Key Concepts

• But what is acquired there straightforwardly, though it is a system of the Apriori, becomes philosophically intelligible and (according to what was said just now) an Apriori related back to the ultimate sources of understanding, only when problems of constitution, as problems of the specifically philosophical level, become disclosed and the natural realm of knowledge is at the same time exchanged for the transcendental.
• This implies that everything natural, everything given beforehand in straightforward intuition, must be built up again with a new originariness and not interpreted merely sequaciously as already definitive.
• That a procedure drawing insight from eidetic intuition is called phenomenological and claims philosophical significance is justified only by the circumstance that every genuine intuition has its place in the constitutional nexus.
• For this reason every intuitive ascertainment, in the attitude of positivity, concerning the sphere of eidetically necessary (axiomatic) fundamentals serves as preliminary work and is even indispensable a priori. It furnishes1 the transcendental clue for discovery of the full constitutive concretion, as having both a noetic and a noematic aspect.
• Regardless of the fact that it / uncovers hidden horizons of sense on the ontic side (the overlooking of which seriously restricts the value of apriori ascertainments and makes their application uncertain), the significance and complete novelty of this going

Context

Later part of §59, where Husserl situates ontological–eidetic work within transcendental phenomenology as indispensable but preliminary, and insists on the need to rebuild the natural world from transcendental origins via problems of constitution.