Key Arguments

• After the analogy with ideal objectivities, Husserl explicitly returns ‘to our case, the experience of someone else’, and claims that ‘with its complicated structure, it effects a similar connexion mediated by presentiation: namely a connexion between, on the one hand, the uninterruptedly living self-experience (as purely passive original self-appearance) of the concrete ego — accordingly, his primordial sphere — and, on the other hand, the alien sphere presentiated therein’, so the self’s primordial sphere and the alien sphere are temporally linked through presentiations.
• He specifies that this connection is achieved, ‘first, by its identifying synthesis of the primordially given animate body of someone else and the same animate body, but appresented in other modes of appearance’, which unifies the other’s body as one and the same across presentive and appresentative modes.
• Secondly, he says that, ‘spreading out from there, by its identifying synthesis of the same Nature, given and verified primordially (with pure sensuous originality) and at the same time appresentationally’, so the same Nature is constituted as common, both originally given to me and appresented as given to the Other.
• On this basis he concludes that ‘In that way the coexistence of my ‹polar› Ego and the other Ego, of my whole concrete ego and his, my intentional life and his, my “realities” and his — in short, a common time-form — is primally instituted’, indicating that these syntheses institute a primordial coexistence in one shared temporal form.
• He immediately adds a reinterpretation of each monad’s time: ‘and thus every primordial temporality automatically acquires the significance of being merely an original mode of appearance of Objective temporality to a particular subject’, so the time-form proper to each ego is only a subjective originary appearance of one Objective temporality.
• He then draws the conclusion that ‘In this connexion we see that the temporal community of the constitutively interrelated monads is indissoluble’, asserting that, at the transcendental level, the monads form an inseparable temporal community grounded in these intersubjective syntheses.

Source Quotes

Thus the contrast between them and Objective realities, as spatiotemporally individuated structures, becomes understandable. If we return now to our case, the experience of someone else, we find that, with its complicated structure, it effects a similar connexion mediated by presentiation: namely a connexion between, on the one hand, the uninterruptedly living self-experience (as purely passive original self-appearance) of the concrete ego — accordingly, his primordial sphere — and, on the other hand, the alien sphere presentiated therein. It effects this, first, by its identifying synthesis of the primordially given animate body of someone else and the same animate body, but appresented in other modes of appearance, and secondly, spreading out from there, by its identifying synthesis of the same Nature, given and verified primordially (with pure sensuous originality) and at the same time appresentationally.

If we return now to our case, the experience of someone else, we find that, with its complicated structure, it effects a similar connexion mediated by presentiation: namely a connexion between, on the one hand, the uninterruptedly living self-experience (as purely passive original self-appearance) of the concrete ego — accordingly, his primordial sphere — and, on the other hand, the alien sphere presentiated therein. It effects this, first, by its identifying synthesis of the primordially given animate body of someone else and the same animate body, but appresented in other modes of appearance, and secondly, spreading out from there, by its identifying synthesis of the same Nature, given and verified primordially (with pure sensuous originality) and at the same time appresentationally. In that way the coexistence of my ‹polar› Ego and the other Ego, of my whole concrete ego and his, my intentional life and his, my “realities” and his — in short, a common time-form — is primally instituted; and thus every primordial temporality automatically acquires the significance of being merely an original mode of appearance of Objective temporality to a particular subject.

It effects this, first, by its identifying synthesis of the primordially given animate body of someone else and the same animate body, but appresented in other modes of appearance, and secondly, spreading out from there, by its identifying synthesis of the same Nature, given and verified primordially (with pure sensuous originality) and at the same time appresentationally. In that way the coexistence of my ‹polar› Ego and the other Ego, of my whole concrete ego and his, my intentional life and his, my “realities” and his — in short, a common time-form — is primally instituted; and thus every primordial temporality automatically acquires the significance of being merely an original mode of appearance of Objective temporality to a particular subject. In this connexion we see that the temporal community of the constitutively interrelated monads is indissoluble,

In that way the coexistence of my ‹polar› Ego and the other Ego, of my whole concrete ego and his, my intentional life and his, my “realities” and his — in short, a common time-form — is primally instituted; and thus every primordial temporality automatically acquires the significance of being merely an original mode of appearance of Objective temporality to a particular subject. In this connexion we see that the temporal community of the constitutively interrelated monads is indissoluble,

Key Concepts

• If we return now to our case, the experience of someone else, we find that, with its complicated structure, it effects a similar connexion mediated by presentiation: namely a connexion between, on the one hand, the uninterruptedly living self-experience (as purely passive original self-appearance) of the concrete ego — accordingly, his primordial sphere — and, on the other hand, the alien sphere presentiated therein.
• It effects this, first, by its identifying synthesis of the primordially given animate body of someone else and the same animate body, but appresented in other modes of appearance, and secondly, spreading out from there, by its identifying synthesis of the same Nature, given and verified primordially (with pure sensuous originality) and at the same time appresentationally.
• In that way the coexistence of my ‹polar› Ego and the other Ego, of my whole concrete ego and his, my intentional life and his, my “realities” and his — in short, a common time-form — is primally instituted;
• and thus every primordial temporality automatically acquires the significance of being merely an original mode of appearance of Objective temporality to a particular subject.
• In this connexion we see that the temporal community of the constitutively interrelated monads is indissoluble,

Context

Later part of §55 (lines 2664–2688), where, after analyzing ideal objectivities, Husserl applies an analogous structure of identifying synthesis and presentiation to the experience of someone else in order to show how a common Objective temporality and an indissoluble temporal community of monads are constituted.