Key Arguments

• Husserl explicitly says that he is stepping outside the strictly transcendental sphere to make this remark, indicating that he sees a close methodological kinship between transcendental phenomenology and a certain kind of psychology: "We go outside the closed sphere of our meditations, which restricts us to transcendental phenomenology, if we cannot repress the remark".
• He claims that the "whole content" of the methodological observation just made (about eidetic transcendental phenomenology) remains valid in psychology if only "slight modifications" are made: "with only slight modifications (which, to be sure, abolish its transcendental sense), the whole content of the fundamental methodological observation that has just been made remains ours".
• He specifies the relevant psychological project as a psychology pursued "on the basis of the natural world view" and as a "positive science", making clear that this is not yet transcendental but a worldly science: "when, on the basis of the natural world view, we strive for a psychology as a positive science".
• He further narrows this to the kind of psychology that is "first in itself and necessary to any psychology", namely a "purely intentional psychology", which parallels phenomenology's focus on intentional structures: "and, in that connexion, strive primarily for the psychology that is first in itself and necessary to any psychology: purely intentional psychology."

Source Quotes

§ 35. Excursus into eidetic internal psychology We go outside the closed sphere of our meditations, which restricts us to transcendental phenomenology, if we cannot repress the remark that, with only slight modifications (which, to be sure, abolish its transcendental sense), the whole content of the fundamental methodological observation that has just been made remains ours when, on the basis of the natural world view, we strive for a psychology as a positive science and, in that connexion, strive primarily for the psychology that is first in itself and necessary to any psychology: purely intentional psychology. To the concrete transcendental ego there corresponds then the human Ego, concretely as the psyche taken purely in itself and for itself, with the psychic polarization: I as pole of my habitualities, the properties comprised in my character.

Key Concepts

• We go outside the closed sphere of our meditations, which restricts us to transcendental phenomenology, if we cannot repress the remark that, with only slight modifications (which, to be sure, abolish its transcendental sense), the whole content of the fundamental methodological observation that has just been made remains ours when, on the basis of the natural world view, we strive for a psychology as a positive science and, in that connexion, strive primarily for the psychology that is first in itself and necessary to any psychology: purely intentional psychology.
• with only slight modifications (which, to be sure, abolish its transcendental sense), the whole content of the fundamental methodological observation that has just been made remains ours
• on the basis of the natural world view, we strive for a psychology as a positive science
• primarily for the psychology that is first in itself and necessary to any psychology: purely intentional psychology.

Context

Opening sentences of §35, where Husserl momentarily steps outside the strict transcendental perspective to point out that the methodological structure of eidetic transcendental phenomenology can be reinterpreted as the basis for a purely intentional, eidetic psychology conceived within the natural attitude as a positive science, though this reinterpretation strips it of its transcendental sense.