The hallmark of escapes from politics is the concept of rule—dividing rulers and ruled out of suspicion of action—culminating in Plato’s theoretical separation of beginning from achieving so that initiating becomes ruling and action is reduced to the execution of orders.

By Hannah Arendt, from The Human Condition

Key Arguments

  • Escapes from the 'frailty of human affairs' are marked by 'the concept of rule,' the notion that 'men can lawfully and politically live together only when some are entitled to command and the others forced to obey.'
  • The common definitions of government (monarchy/oligarchy/democracy) 'rest on a suspicion of action' and an 'earnest desire to find a substitute for action.'
  • In Plato’s version, the problem is to ensure 'that the beginner would remain the complete master of what he had begun,' transforming 'to begin ( ) and to act ( )' into 'two altogether different activities.'
  • Thus the beginner becomes a 'ruler (an in the twofold sense of the word) who “does not have to act at all ( ), but rules ( ) over those who are capable of execution.”' 'Action as such is entirely eliminated' into 'the mere “execution of orders.”'

Source Quotes

Escape from the frailty of human affairs into the solidity of quiet and order has in fact so much to recommend it that the greater part of political philosophy since Plato could easily be interpreted as various attempts to find theoretical foundations and practical ways for an escape from politics altogether. The hallmark of all such escapes is the concept of rule, that is, the notion that men can lawfully and politically live together only when some are entitled to command and the others forced to obey. The commonplace notion already to be found in Plato and Aristotle that every political community consists of those who rule and those who are ruled (on which assumption in turn are based the current definitions of forms of government—rule by one or monarchy, rule by few or oligarchy, rule by many or democracy) rests on a suspicion of action rather than on a contempt for men, and arose from the earnest desire to find a substitute for action rather than from any irresponsible or tyrannical will to power.
The hallmark of all such escapes is the concept of rule, that is, the notion that men can lawfully and politically live together only when some are entitled to command and the others forced to obey. The commonplace notion already to be found in Plato and Aristotle that every political community consists of those who rule and those who are ruled (on which assumption in turn are based the current definitions of forms of government—rule by one or monarchy, rule by few or oligarchy, rule by many or democracy) rests on a suspicion of action rather than on a contempt for men, and arose from the earnest desire to find a substitute for action rather than from any irresponsible or tyrannical will to power. Theoretically, the most brief and most fundamental version of the escape from action into rule occurs in the , where Plato opens a gulf between the two modes of action, and (“beginning” and “achieving”), which according to Greek understanding were interconnected.
In the realm of action, this isolated mastership can be achieved only if the others are no longer needed to join the enterprise of their own accord, with their own motives and aims, but are used to execute orders, and if, on the other hand, the beginner who took the initiative does not permit himself to get involved in the action itself. To begin ( ) and to act ( ) thus can become two altogether different activities, and the beginner has become a ruler (an in the twofold sense of the word) who “does not have to act at all ( ), but rules ( ) over those who are capable of execution.” Under these circumstances, the essence of politics is “to know how to begin and to rule in the gravest matters with regard to timeliness and untimeliness”; action as such is entirely eliminated and has become the mere “execution of orders.”
To begin ( ) and to act ( ) thus can become two altogether different activities, and the beginner has become a ruler (an in the twofold sense of the word) who “does not have to act at all ( ), but rules ( ) over those who are capable of execution.” Under these circumstances, the essence of politics is “to know how to begin and to rule in the gravest matters with regard to timeliness and untimeliness”; action as such is entirely eliminated and has become the mere “execution of orders.” Plato was the first to introduce the division between those who know and do not act and those who act and do not know, instead of the old articulation of action into beginning and achieving, so that knowing what to do and doing it became two altogether different performances.

Key Concepts

  • The hallmark of all such escapes is the concept of rule
  • those who rule and those who are ruled
  • to begin ( ) and to act ( ) thus can become two altogether different activities
  • does not have to act at all ( ), but rules ( ) over those who are capable of execution
  • action as such is entirely eliminated and has become the mere “execution of orders.”

Context

Section 31; analysis of rule as structural substitute for action, with Plato’s redefinition of initiating and acting.