Key Arguments

• Dreyfus writes, 'This same sort of change of world can take place on a conceptual level. Then it is called a conceptual revolution. Thomas Kuhn in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions has studied this sort of transforma- tion.'
• He quotes Kuhn: 'As he puts it: "Insofar as their only recourse to that world is through what they see and do, we may want to say that after a revolution scientists are responding to a different world." 11'
• He emphasizes that 'The conceptual framework determines what counts as a fact. Thus during a revolution there are no facts to which scientists can appeal to decide which view is correct.'
• Citing Kuhn again: '"The data themselves [have] changed. This is the [sense] in which we may want to say that after a revolution scientists work in a different world."12'
• He contrasts this with Minsky’s presupposition: 'The idea that knowledge consists of a large store of neutral data, taken for granted by Minsky, is inadequate to account for these moments of profound change.'
• Quoting Kuhn, he notes that '"there can be no scientifically or empirically neutral system of language or concepts."13'
• He concludes that 'What occurs during a scientific revolution is not fully reducible to a reinterpretation of individual and stable data. In the first place the data are not unequivocally stable. A pendulum is not a falling stone, nor is oxygen dephlogisticated air.14'
• From this, he says, 'This leads Kuhn to a rejection of the whole philosophical tradition which has culminated in the notion of reason as based on the storage and processing of "data."'

Source Quotes

Since such a change, by modifying a person's concerns, changes the whole field of interest in terms of which everything gets its significance, Kierkegaard speaks of these fundamental changes as changes in our sphere of existence. And because such a change cannot be predicted on the basis of our previous concerns, yet once it has taken place is so pervasive that we cannot imagine how it could have been otherwise, Kierkegaard speaks of a change of sphere of existence as a leap.10 This same sort of change of world can take place on a conceptual level. Then it is called a conceptual revolution. Thomas Kuhn in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions has studied this sort of transforma- tion.

Thomas Kuhn in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions has studied this sort of transforma- tion. As he puts it: "Insofar as their only recourse to that world is through what they see and do, we may want to say that after a revolution scientists are responding to a different world." 11 The conceptual framework determines what counts as a fact.

As he puts it: "Insofar as their only recourse to that world is through what they see and do, we may want to say that after a revolution scientists are responding to a different world." 11 The conceptual framework determines what counts as a fact. Thus during a revolution there are no facts to which scientists can appeal to decide which view is correct.

11 The conceptual framework determines what counts as a fact. Thus during a revolution there are no facts to which scientists can appeal to decide which view is correct. "The data themselves [have] changed.

Thus during a revolution there are no facts to which scientists can appeal to decide which view is correct. "The data themselves [have] changed. This is the [sense] in which we may want to say that after a revolution scientists work in a different world."12 The idea that knowledge consists of a large store of neutral data, taken for granted by Minsky, is inadequate to account for these moments of profound change. According to Kuhn, "there can be no scientifically or empirically neutral system of language or concepts."13 What occurs during a scientific revolution is not fully reducible to a reinterpretation of individual and stable data.

"The data themselves [have] changed. This is the [sense] in which we may want to say that after a revolution scientists work in a different world."12 The idea that knowledge consists of a large store of neutral data, taken for granted by Minsky, is inadequate to account for these moments of profound change. According to Kuhn, "there can be no scientifically or empirically neutral system of language or concepts."13 What occurs during a scientific revolution is not fully reducible to a reinterpretation of individual and stable data.

This is the [sense] in which we may want to say that after a revolution scientists work in a different world."12 The idea that knowledge consists of a large store of neutral data, taken for granted by Minsky, is inadequate to account for these moments of profound change. According to Kuhn, "there can be no scientifically or empirically neutral system of language or concepts."13 What occurs during a scientific revolution is not fully reducible to a reinterpretation of individual and stable data. In the first place the data are not unequivocally stable.

In the first place the data are not unequivocally stable. A pendulum is not a falling stone, nor is oxygen dephlogisticated air.14 This leads Kuhn to a rejection of the whole philosophical tradition which has culminated in the notion of reason as based on the storage and processing of "data." On the basis of his research Kuhn sees both the inadequacy of this tradition and why it nonetheless continues to seem self-evident.

Key Concepts

• This same sort of change of world can take place on a conceptual level. Then it is called a conceptual revolution.
• we may want to say that after a revolution scientists are responding to a different world.
• The conceptual framework determines what counts as a fact.
• Thus during a revolution there are no facts to which scientists can appeal to decide which view is correct.
• The data themselves [have] changed. This is the [sense] in which we may want to say that after a revolution scientists work in a different world.
• The idea that knowledge consists of a large store of neutral data, taken for granted by Minsky, is inadequate to account for these moments of profound change.
• there can be no scientifically or empirically neutral system of language or concepts.
• A pendulum is not a falling stone, nor is oxygen dephlogisticated air.

Context

Near the end of the passage, Dreyfus invokes Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions as a conceptual analogue to existential leaps, using it to attack the data‑store model of knowledge presupposed by classical AI and much of the philosophical tradition.