Key Arguments

• He concedes that 'The third predictionthat most psychological theories would take the form of computer programshas indeed been partially fulfilled, although there are still plenty of behaviorists,' acknowledging that one of the early optimistic forecasts has come true to some extent.
• He insists that 'the important question here is not whether a certain task, impressive in itself like master play or original theorem proving, has been achieved, but whether what is predicted would be an achievement even if it came to pass,' shifting the focus from technical possibility to philosophical significance.
• He states that 'The substitution in psychology of computer models for behaviorist models is by no means obviously a step forward,' explicitly denying that the mere adoption of computer modeling constitutes clear scientific or philosophical progress.
• He notes that 'The issue is complicated and requires detailed discussion (see Chapter 4),' indicating that he will later examine in depth whether computer‑program models of cognition genuinely deepen our understanding or merely change the style of theorizing.

Source Quotes

49. The third predictionthat most psychological theories would take the form of computer programshas indeed been partially fulfilled, although there are still plenty of behaviorists. But the important question here is not whether a certain task, impressive in itself like master play or original theorem proving, has been achieved, but whether what is predicted would be an achievement even if it came to pass.

The third predictionthat most psychological theories would take the form of computer programshas indeed been partially fulfilled, although there are still plenty of behaviorists. But the important question here is not whether a certain task, impressive in itself like master play or original theorem proving, has been achieved, but whether what is predicted would be an achievement even if it came to pass. The substitution in psychology of computer models for behaviorist models is by no means obviously a step forward.

But the important question here is not whether a certain task, impressive in itself like master play or original theorem proving, has been achieved, but whether what is predicted would be an achievement even if it came to pass. The substitution in psychology of computer models for behaviorist models is by no means obviously a step forward. The issue is complicated and requires detailed discussion (see Chapter 4).

The substitution in psychology of computer models for behaviorist models is by no means obviously a step forward. The issue is complicated and requires detailed discussion (see Chapter 4).

Key Concepts

• The third predictionthat most psychological theories would take the form of computer programshas indeed been partially fulfilled, although there are still plenty of behaviorists.
• But the important question here is not whether a certain task, impressive in itself like master play or original theorem proving, has been achieved, but whether what is predicted would be an achievement even if it came to pass.
• The substitution in psychology of computer models for behaviorist models is by no means obviously a step forward.
• The issue is complicated and requires detailed discussion (see Chapter 4).

Context

Footnote 49 in the Introduction, where Dreyfus reflects on early AI prognostications, grants that the shift toward computer‑program models in psychology partially fulfilled one such prediction, but questions whether such developments, or even spectacular AI achievements, would necessarily constitute genuine advances in understanding intelligence.