Dreyfus argues that, unlike Phase I cognitive simulation which simulated simple mechanical aspects of intelligence, Phase II 'Semantic Information Processing' is characterized by ad hoc solutions to cleverly restricted problems that create the illusion of complex intellectual activity while leaving unresolved the very problems that stalled work in 1961, a stagnation that only an underlying faith in formalizability allows workers like Minsky to treat as progress.

By Hubert L. Dreyfus, from What Computers Can't Do

Key Arguments

  • Following Minsky’s suggested five questions for evaluating programs, Dreyfus claims that 'if, following this method, we analyze the programs which Minsky presents as the best work since 1962, we shall find that unlike work done before 1961, which tended to give the impression of intelligence by simulating simple, mechanical aspects of intelligent behavior, the current approach is characterized by ad hoc solutions of cleverly chosen problems, which give the illusion of complex intellectual activity.'
  • He emphasizes that 'problems which arrested work in 1961 still remain unsolved,' indicating lack of substantive theoretical advance despite more sophisticated demonstrations.
  • Dreyfus maintains that 'only an unquestioned underlying faith enables workers such as Minsky to find this situation encouraging,' attributing their optimism to a metaphysical commitment rather than empirical success.
  • He later generalizes this pattern beyond Bobrow to Evans and others: 'The same pattern occurs throughout Minsky's collection: an ad hoc solution of a restricted problem, first reported with caution, and then interpreted as being the first step to more general methods. Yet all the work presented in Minsky's book was completed by 1964, and although seven more years have elapsed, none of the promised generalizations has been produced.'
  • He concludes that, absent the assumption 'that whatever orderly behavior people engage in can in principle be formalized and processed by digital computers,' the limited, highly constrained successes collected by Minsky would appear as discouraging dead ends rather than grounds for optimism.

Source Quotes

How can they be extended to larger domains of competence? If, following this method, we analyze the programs which Minsky presents as the best work since 1962, we shall find that unlike work done before 1961, which tended to give the impression of intelligence by simulating simple, mechanical aspects of intelligent behavior, the current approach is characterized by ad hoc solutions of cleverly chosen problems, which give the illusion of complex intellectual activity. In fact, however, problems which arrested work in 1961 still remain unsolved.
If, following this method, we analyze the programs which Minsky presents as the best work since 1962, we shall find that unlike work done before 1961, which tended to give the impression of intelligence by simulating simple, mechanical aspects of intelligent behavior, the current approach is characterized by ad hoc solutions of cleverly chosen problems, which give the illusion of complex intellectual activity. In fact, however, problems which arrested work in 1961 still remain unsolved. We shall also find again that only an unquestioned underlying faith enables workers such as Minsky to find this situation encouraging.
In fact, however, problems which arrested work in 1961 still remain unsolved. We shall also find again that only an unquestioned underlying faith enables workers such as Minsky to find this situation encouraging. Let us look at the programs in detail.
25* Were it not for such an assumption, Bobrow's limited success, heralded by Minsky as the most promising work thus far, would be recognized as a trick which says nothing either for or against the possibility of machine understanding, and the fact that this is the best that an intelligent person like Bobrow could do would lead to discouragement as to the possibility of ever reaching the threshold of self-improving machines. Evans' Analogy Program The same pattern occurs throughout Minsky's collection: an ad hoc solution of a restricted problem, first reported with caution, and then interpreted as being the first step to more general methods. Yet all the work presented in Minsky's book was completed by 1964, and although seven more years have elapsed, none of the promised generalizations has been produced.
Evans' Analogy Program The same pattern occurs throughout Minsky's collection: an ad hoc solution of a restricted problem, first reported with caution, and then interpreted as being the first step to more general methods. Yet all the work presented in Minsky's book was completed by 1964, and although seven more years have elapsed, none of the promised generalizations has been produced. Evans' analogy-finding program, for example, is a masterful complex program for solving the sort of analogy problems used in intelligence testing.

Key Concepts

  • If, following this method, we analyze the programs which Minsky presents as the best work since 1962, we shall find that unlike work done before 1961, which tended to give the impression of intelligence by simulating simple, mechanical aspects of intelligent behavior, the current approach is characterized by ad hoc solutions of cleverly chosen problems, which give the illusion of complex intellectual activity.
  • In fact, however, problems which arrested work in 1961 still remain unsolved.
  • We shall also find again that only an unquestioned underlying faith enables workers such as Minsky to find this situation encouraging.
  • The same pattern occurs throughout Minsky's collection: an ad hoc solution of a restricted problem, first reported with caution, and then interpreted as being the first step to more general methods.
  • none of the promised generalizations has been produced.

Context

Transition from Minsky’s historical framing to Dreyfus’s global assessment of the Phase II programs presented in Semantic Information Processing.