Dreyfus concludes Phase I by arguing that the fundamental limitation of Cognitive Simulation is the need to make all alternatives explicit: in game playing, problem solving, language translation, and pattern recognition this leads to combinatorial explosion, structuring problems, and unresolved ambiguity, so that early successes have been followed by failure on more complex tasks, Simon’s grand predictions have not been fulfilled, and his optimism exemplifies Bar‑Hillel’s 'fallacy of the successful first step.'

By Hubert L. Dreyfus, from What Computers Can't Do

Key Arguments

  • He states that 'The basic problem facing workers attempting to use computers in the simulation of human intelligent behavior should now be clear: all alternatives must be made explicit,' which he then applies across domains.
  • In game playing, 'the exponential growth of the tree of these alternative paths requires a restriction on the paths which can be followed out; in complicated games such as chess, programs cannot now select the most promising paths,' illustrating the combinatorial explosion inherent in explicit alternatives.
  • In problem solving, 'the issue is not only how to direct a selective search among the explicit alternatives, but how to structure the problem so as to begin the search process,' pointing back to his critique of GPS and the need for programmer-supplied insight.
  • In language translation, 'even the elements to be manipulated are not clear due to the intrinsic ambiguities of a natural language'; and 'in pattern recognition, all three difficulties are inextricably intertwined, as well as the fact that similarity and typicality seem to be irreducible characteristics of perception,' underscoring that explicit representation fails in the face of ambiguity, similarity, and typicality.
  • He claims that 'These difficulties have brought to a standstill the first five years of work on Cognitive Simulation' and asserts that 'None of Simon's predictions has been fulfilled,' directly challenging Simon’s earlier optimism about chess, theorem-proving, and psychological theory.
  • The unfulfilled predictions—'how well machines could do in chess and mathematics'—'gave the lie to Simon's third prediction concerning a psychological theory of human behavior,' since psychology has not in fact been largely recast as computer programs.
  • Instead of triumphs, 'an overall pattern has emerged: success with simple mechanical forms of information processing, great expectations, and then failure when confronted with more complicated forms of behavior,' which Dreyfus identifies with Bar-Hillel’s 'fallacy of the successful first step.'
  • He notes that 'Simon himself, however, has drawn no such sobering conclusions' and cites Simon’s new 1965 prediction that 'machines will be capable, within twenty years, of doing any work that a man can do,' presenting this as further unwarranted extrapolation from limited early successes.

Source Quotes

Moreover, it is generally acknowledged that further progress in game playing, language translation, and problem solving awaits a breakthrough in pattern recognition research. Conclusion The basic problem facing workers attempting to use computers in the simulation of human intelligent behavior should now be clear: all alternatives must be made explicit. In game playing, the exponential growth of the tree of these alternative paths requires a restriction on the paths which can be followed out; in complicated games such as chess, programs cannot now select the most promising paths.
Conclusion The basic problem facing workers attempting to use computers in the simulation of human intelligent behavior should now be clear: all alternatives must be made explicit. In game playing, the exponential growth of the tree of these alternative paths requires a restriction on the paths which can be followed out; in complicated games such as chess, programs cannot now select the most promising paths. In problem solving, the issue is not only how to direct a selective search among the explicit alternatives, but how to structure the problem so as to begin the search process.
In game playing, the exponential growth of the tree of these alternative paths requires a restriction on the paths which can be followed out; in complicated games such as chess, programs cannot now select the most promising paths. In problem solving, the issue is not only how to direct a selective search among the explicit alternatives, but how to structure the problem so as to begin the search process. In language translation, even the elements to be manipulated are not clear due to the intrinsic ambiguities of a natural language; in pattern recognition, all three difficulties are inextricably intertwined, as well as the fact that similarity and typicality seem to be irreducible characteristics of perception.
In problem solving, the issue is not only how to direct a selective search among the explicit alternatives, but how to structure the problem so as to begin the search process. In language translation, even the elements to be manipulated are not clear due to the intrinsic ambiguities of a natural language; in pattern recognition, all three difficulties are inextricably intertwined, as well as the fact that similarity and typicality seem to be irreducible characteristics of perception. These difficulties have brought to a standstill the first five years of work on Cognitive Simulation.
In language translation, even the elements to be manipulated are not clear due to the intrinsic ambiguities of a natural language; in pattern recognition, all three difficulties are inextricably intertwined, as well as the fact that similarity and typicality seem to be irreducible characteristics of perception. These difficulties have brought to a standstill the first five years of work on Cognitive Simulation. None of Simon's predictions has been fulfilled.

Key Concepts

  • The basic problem facing workers attempting to use computers in the simulation of human intelligent behavior should now be clear: all alternatives must be made explicit.
  • In game playing, the exponential growth of the tree of these alternative paths requires a restriction on the paths which can be followed out; in complicated games such as chess, programs cannot now select the most promising paths.
  • In problem solving, the issue is not only how to direct a selective search among the explicit alternatives, but how to structure the problem so as to begin the search process.
  • in pattern recognition, all three difficulties are inextricably intertwined, as well as the fact that similarity and typicality seem to be irreducible characteristics of perception.
  • These difficulties have brought to a standstill the first five years of work on Cognitive Simulation.

Context

In the 'Conclusion' to Phase I (1957–1962) on Cognitive Simulation, Dreyfus synthesizes his case studies in game playing, problem solving, language translation, and pattern recognition into a general diagnosis about the explicit-alternative requirement of digital computation, relates this to the empirical stagnation of CS, and critiques Herbert Simon’s unfulfilled and continuing predictions as instances of overgeneralizing from early 'successful first steps.'