Key Arguments

• Dreyfus observes that 'the restricted applicability of pattern recognition programs suggests that human pattern recognition proceeds in some other way than searching through lists of traits.'
• He invokes phenomenologists and Gestalt psychologists: 'our recognition of ordinary spatial or temporal objects does not seem to operate by checking off a list of isolable, neutral, specific characteristics at all.'
• He uses melody as an example: 'in recognizing a melody, the notes get their values by being perceived as part of the melody, rather than the melody's being recognized in terms of independently identified notes.'
• He gives a perceptual object case: 'The same hazy layer which I would see as dust if I thought I was confronting a wax apple might appear as moisture if I thought I was seeing one that was fresh. The significance of the details and indeed their very took is determined by my perception of the whole.'
• He sets up his goal: 'With the aid of concepts borrowed from phenomenology, I shall try to show how pattern recognition requires a certain sort of indeterminate, global anticipation. This set or anticipation is characteristic of our body as a "machine" of nerves and muscles whose function can be studied by the anatomist, and also of our body as experienced by us, as our power to move and manipulate objects in the world.'
• He announces a negative conclusion for AI: 'I shall argue that a body in both these senses cannot be reproduced by a heuristically programmed digital computereven one on wheels which can operate manipulators, and that, therefore, by virtue of being embodied, we can perform tasks beyond the capacities of any heuristically programmed robot.'

Source Quotes

I shall argue that a body in both these senses cannot be reproduced by a heuristically programmed digital computereven one on wheels which can operate manipulators, and that, therefore, by virtue of being embodied, we can perform tasks beyond the capacities of any heuristically programmed robot. We have seen that the restricted applicability of pattern recognition programs suggests that human pattern recognition proceeds in some other way than searching through lists of traits. Indeed, phenomenologists and Gestalt psychologists have pointed out that our recognition of ordinary spatial or temporal objects does not seem to operate by checking off a list of isolable, neutral, specific characteristics at all.

We have seen that the restricted applicability of pattern recognition programs suggests that human pattern recognition proceeds in some other way than searching through lists of traits. Indeed, phenomenologists and Gestalt psychologists have pointed out that our recognition of ordinary spatial or temporal objects does not seem to operate by checking off a list of isolable, neutral, specific characteristics at all. For example, in recognizing a melody, the notes get their values by being perceived as part of the melody, rather than the melody's being recognized in terms of independently identified notes.

Indeed, phenomenologists and Gestalt psychologists have pointed out that our recognition of ordinary spatial or temporal objects does not seem to operate by checking off a list of isolable, neutral, specific characteristics at all. For example, in recognizing a melody, the notes get their values by being perceived as part of the melody, rather than the melody's being recognized in terms of independently identified notes. Likewise, in the perception of objects there are no neutral traits.

Likewise, in the perception of objects there are no neutral traits. The same hazy layer which I would see as dust if I thought I was confronting a wax apple might appear as moisture if I thought I was seeing one that was fresh. The significance of the details and indeed their very took is determined by my perception of the whole.

The same hazy layer which I would see as dust if I thought I was confronting a wax apple might appear as moisture if I thought I was seeing one that was fresh. The significance of the details and indeed their very took is determined by my perception of the whole. The recognition of spoken language offers the most striking demonstration of this global character of our experience.

To make this clear we shall first have to consider human pattern recognition in more detail. With the aid of concepts borrowed from phenomenology, I shall try to show how pattern recognition requires a certain sort of indeterminate, global anticipation. This set or anticipation is characteristic of our body as a "machine" of nerves and muscles whose function can be studied by the anatomist, and also of our body as experienced by us, as our power to move and manipulate objects in the world.

This set or anticipation is characteristic of our body as a "machine" of nerves and muscles whose function can be studied by the anatomist, and also of our body as experienced by us, as our power to move and manipulate objects in the world. I shall argue that a body in both these senses cannot be reproduced by a heuristically programmed digital computereven one on wheels which can operate manipulators, and that, therefore, by virtue of being embodied, we can perform tasks beyond the capacities of any heuristically programmed robot. We have seen that the restricted applicability of pattern recognition programs suggests that human pattern recognition proceeds in some other way than searching through lists of traits.

Key Concepts

• the restricted applicability of pattern recognition programs suggests that human pattern recognition proceeds in some other way than searching through lists of traits.
• our recognition of ordinary spatial or temporal objects does not seem to operate by checking off a list of isolable, neutral, specific characteristics at all.
• the notes get their values by being perceived as part of the melody, rather than the melody's being recognized in terms of independently identified notes.
• The same hazy layer which I would see as dust if I thought I was confronting a wax apple might appear as moisture if I thought I was seeing one that was fresh.
• The significance of the details and indeed their very took is determined by my perception of the whole.
• pattern recognition requires a certain sort of indeterminate, global anticipation.
• a body in both these senses cannot be reproduced by a heuristically programmed digital computereven one on wheels which can operate manipulators

Context

Middle of the passage, where Dreyfus shifts from AI’s failures in pattern recognition to a phenomenological account of holistic perception, linking it explicitly to embodied anticipation.