Key Arguments

• He begins from the claim that 'the field of experience is structured in terms of our tasks. These are linked to goals, and these in turn correspond to the social and individual needs of those whose activity has produced the world', emphasizing that structuring is rooted in lived tasks and needs, not in abstract objective lists.
• He notes that if 'the data which are to be stored and accessed are normally organized in terms of specific goals', one might think the AI 'large data base problem' could be solved by 'a list of objectives and their priorities—what computer workers dealing with decision-making programs call a utility function—and programm[ing] it into the computer along with the facts.'
• He immediately rejects this: 'We have seen, however, that explicit objectives do not work, even for organizing simple problem-solving programs.'
• He recalls the failure of naive means‑ends analysis: 'The difficulties of simple means-ends analysis suggest that in order for the computer to solve even well-structured problems, it is not sufficient for the machine to have an objective and to measure its progress toward this preset end.'
• He stresses that human‑like planning requires picking out 'the essential operations', which in practice have had to be 'surreptitiously supplied by the programmers themselves before the logic program could begin', indicating that the crucial pragmatic structuring is not captured by the explicit goals or utility measures.
• He frames the core question as describing 'how this pragmatic structuring differs from means-ends analysis, ultimately asking, of course, whether this human capacity for purposive organization is in principle programmable on digital machines', signaling that the difference is deep and potentially unprogrammable.

Source Quotes

The Situation as a Function of Human Needs We are at home in the world and can find our way about in it because it is our world produced by us as the context of our pragmatic activity. So far we have been describing this world or situation and how it enables us to zero in on significant objects in it.

So far we have been describing this world or situation and how it enables us to zero in on significant objects in it. We have also suggested that this field of experience is structured in terms of our tasks. These are linked to goals, and these in turn correspond to the social and individual needs of those whose activity has produced the world. What does this tell us about the possibility of AI?

What does this tell us about the possibility of AI? If the data which are to be stored and accessed are normally organized in terms of specific goals, then it would seem that the large data base problem confronting AI could be solved if one just constructed a list of objectives and their prioritieswhat computer workers dealing with decision-making programs call a utility functionand programmed it into the computer along with the facts. We have seen, however, that explicit objectives do not work, even for organizing simple problem-solving programs.

If the data which are to be stored and accessed are normally organized in terms of specific goals, then it would seem that the large data base problem confronting AI could be solved if one just constructed a list of objectives and their prioritieswhat computer workers dealing with decision-making programs call a utility functionand programmed it into the computer along with the facts. We have seen, however, that explicit objectives do not work, even for organizing simple problem-solving programs. The difficulties of simple means-ends analysis suggest that in order for the computer to solve even well-structured problems, it is not sufficient for the machine to have an objective and to measure its progress toward this preset end.

We have seen, however, that explicit objectives do not work, even for organizing simple problem-solving programs. The difficulties of simple means-ends analysis suggest that in order for the computer to solve even well-structured problems, it is not sufficient for the machine to have an objective and to measure its progress toward this preset end. Planning requires finding the essential operations, so ''pragmatic considerations," for example, the relative importance of logical operations had to be surreptitiously supplied by the programmers themselves before the logic program could begin.

The difficulties of simple means-ends analysis suggest that in order for the computer to solve even well-structured problems, it is not sufficient for the machine to have an objective and to measure its progress toward this preset end. Planning requires finding the essential operations, so ''pragmatic considerations," for example, the relative importance of logical operations had to be surreptitiously supplied by the programmers themselves before the logic program could begin. We must now try to describe in more detail how this pragmatic structuring differs from means-ends analysis, ultimately asking, of course, whether this human capacity for purposive organization is in principle programmable on digital machines.

Key Concepts

• We are at home in the world and can find our way about in it because it is our world produced by us as the context of our pragmatic activity.
• this field of experience is structured in terms of our tasks. These are linked to goals, and these in turn correspond to the social and individual needs of those whose activity has produced the world.
• it would seem that the large data base problem confronting AI could be solved if one just constructed a list of objectives and their prioritieswhat computer workers dealing with decision-making programs call a utility functionand programmed it into the computer along with the facts.
• We have seen, however, that explicit objectives do not work, even for organizing simple problem-solving programs.
• The difficulties of simple means-ends analysis suggest that in order for the computer to solve even well-structured problems, it is not sufficient for the machine to have an objective and to measure its progress toward this preset end.
• pragmatic considerations," for example, the relative importance of logical operations had to be surreptitiously supplied by the programmers themselves before the logic program could begin.

Context

Opening of 'The Situation as a Function of Human Needs', where Dreyfus links his earlier account of task‑structured experience to AI, arguing that merely encoding objectives and a utility function cannot reproduce the human, pragmatically organized situation.