If the Platonic theory-of-practice framework has failed, any adequate alternative must involve a fundamentally different kind of explanation—or even a different question—about human intelligent behavior, one not committed in advance to precise rulelike relations between precisely defined objects, but taking the form of phenomenological description of the general structure and necessary conditions of human activities.

By Hubert L. Dreyfus, from What Computers Can't Do

Key Arguments

  • Dreyfus infers that 'If this whole approach has failed, then in proposing an alternative account we shall have to propose a different sort of explanation, a different sort of answer to the question "How does man produce intelligent behavior?" or even a different sort of question,' signaling a methodological shift.
  • He notes that even the framing of the question in terms of 'producing' behavior is already tradition-laden: 'for the notion of "producing" behavior instead of simply exhibiting it is already colored by the tradition. For a product must be produced in some way; and if it isn't produced in some definite way, the only alternative seems to be that it is produced magically.'
  • He introduces the non-Platonic option: 'There is a kind of answer to this question which is not committed beforehand to finding the precise rulelike relations between precisely defined objects. It takes the form of a phenomenological description of the behavior involved.'
  • He argues that phenomenological description can still yield understanding: 'It, too, can give us understanding if it is able to find the general characteristics of such behavior: what, if any one thing, is involved in seeing a table or a house, or, more generally, in perception, problem solving, using a language, and so forth.'
  • He even allows that such an account can be called an explanation if it identifies necessary and sufficient conditions: 'Such an account can even be called an explanation if it goes further and tries to find the fundamental features of human activity which serve as the necessary and sufficient conditions for all forms of human behavior.'

Source Quotes

It is not some specific explanation, then, that has failed, but the whole conceptual framework which assumes that an explanation of human behavior can and must take the Platonic form, successful in physical explanation; that situations can be treated like physical states; that the human world can be treated like the physical universe. If this whole approach has failed, then in proposing an alternative account we shall have to propose a different sort of explanation, a different sort of answer to the question "How does man produce intelligent behavior?" or even a different sort of question, for the notion of "producing" behavior instead of simply exhibiting it is already colored by the tradition. For a product must be produced in some way; and if it isn't produced in some definite way, the only alternative seems to be that it is produced magically.
If this whole approach has failed, then in proposing an alternative account we shall have to propose a different sort of explanation, a different sort of answer to the question "How does man produce intelligent behavior?" or even a different sort of question, for the notion of "producing" behavior instead of simply exhibiting it is already colored by the tradition. For a product must be produced in some way; and if it isn't produced in some definite way, the only alternative seems to be that it is produced magically. There is a kind of answer to this question which is not committed beforehand to finding the precise rulelike relations between precisely defined objects.
For a product must be produced in some way; and if it isn't produced in some definite way, the only alternative seems to be that it is produced magically. There is a kind of answer to this question which is not committed beforehand to finding the precise rulelike relations between precisely defined objects. It takes the form of a phenomenological description of the behavior involved. It, too, can give us understanding if it is able to find the general characteristics of such behavior: what, if any one thing, is involved in seeing a table or a house, or, more generally, in perception, problem solving, using a language, and so forth.
It takes the form of a phenomenological description of the behavior involved. It, too, can give us understanding if it is able to find the general characteristics of such behavior: what, if any one thing, is involved in seeing a table or a house, or, more generally, in perception, problem solving, using a language, and so forth. Such an account can even be called an explanation if it goes further and tries to find the fundamental features of human activity which serve as the necessary and sufficient conditions for all forms of human behavior.
It, too, can give us understanding if it is able to find the general characteristics of such behavior: what, if any one thing, is involved in seeing a table or a house, or, more generally, in perception, problem solving, using a language, and so forth. Such an account can even be called an explanation if it goes further and tries to find the fundamental features of human activity which serve as the necessary and sufficient conditions for all forms of human behavior. Such an explanation owes a debt to Aristotle's method, although not to his arguments or descriptions.

Key Concepts

  • If this whole approach has failed, then in proposing an alternative account we shall have to propose a different sort of explanation, a different sort of answer to the question "How does man produce intelligent behavior?" or even a different sort of question, for the notion of "producing" behavior instead of simply exhibiting it is already colored by the tradition.
  • For a product must be produced in some way; and if it isn't produced in some definite way, the only alternative seems to be that it is produced magically.
  • There is a kind of answer to this question which is not committed beforehand to finding the precise rulelike relations between precisely defined objects. It takes the form of a phenomenological description of the behavior involved.
  • It, too, can give us understanding if it is able to find the general characteristics of such behavior: what, if any one thing, is involved in seeing a table or a house, or, more generally, in perception, problem solving, using a language, and so forth.
  • Such an account can even be called an explanation if it goes further and tries to find the fundamental features of human activity which serve as the necessary and sufficient conditions for all forms of human behavior.

Context

Transition section where Dreyfus moves from critiquing the traditional explanatory ideal to sketching phenomenology as an alternative kind of account of intelligent behavior.