Key Arguments

• Dreyfus cites Newell and Simon’s statement that both computers and brains are 'general-purpose symbol-manipulating devices' and that 'the computer can be programmed to execute elementary information processes functionally quite like those executed by the brain', then immediately challenges this as 'no innocent and empty assumption.'
• He asks what a 'general-purpose symbol-manipulating device' is and what these 'elementary information processes' are, indicating that unpacking the phrase reveals substantial commitments.
• He emphasizes that all AI work is done on digital computers, 'the only general-purpose information-processing devices which we know how to design or even conceive of at present', so whatever is meant by 'general-purpose symbol manipulation' is constrained by the architecture of such machines.
• He describes that 'All information with which these computers operate must be represented in terms of discrete elements' (binary digits, 'yeses and noes'), and that 'The machine must operate on finite strings of these determinate elements as a series of objects related to each other only by rules', showing how the abstract characterization translates into a specific, discrete, rule-governed processing regime.
• On this basis, he concludes that assuming man functions like such a device amounts to endorsing four substantive assumptions—biological, psychological, epistemological, and ontological—which he then enumerates.

Source Quotes

Underlying their optimism is the conviction that human intelligent behavior is the result of information processing by a digital computer, and, since nature has produced intelligent behavior with this form of processing, proper programming should be able to elicit such behavior from digital machines, either by imitating nature or by out-programming her. This assumption, that human and mechanical information processing ultimately involve the same elementary processes, is sometimes made naïvely explicit. Newell and Simon introduce one of their papers with the following remark: It can be seen that this approach makes no assumption that the "hardware" of computers and brains are similar, beyond the assumptions that both are general-purpose symbol-manipulating devices, and that the computer can be programmed to execute elementary information processes functionally quite like those executed by the brain.

This assumption, that human and mechanical information processing ultimately involve the same elementary processes, is sometimes made naïvely explicit. Newell and Simon introduce one of their papers with the following remark: It can be seen that this approach makes no assumption that the "hardware" of computers and brains are similar, beyond the assumptions that both are general-purpose symbol-manipulating devices, and that the computer can be programmed to execute elementary information processes functionally quite like those executed by the brain. 1 But this its no innocent and empty assumption.

Newell and Simon introduce one of their papers with the following remark: It can be seen that this approach makes no assumption that the "hardware" of computers and brains are similar, beyond the assumptions that both are general-purpose symbol-manipulating devices, and that the computer can be programmed to execute elementary information processes functionally quite like those executed by the brain. 1 But this its no innocent and empty assumption. What is a general-purpose symbol-manipulating device?

What are these "elementary information processes" allegedly shared by man and machine? All artificial intelligence work is done on digital computers because they are the only general-purpose information-processing devices which we know how to design or even conceive of at present. All information with which these computers operate must be represented in terms of discrete elements.

In the case of present computers the information is represented by binary digits, that is, in terms of a series of yeses and noes, of switches being open or closed. The machine must operate on finite strings of these determinate elements as a series of objects related to each other only by rules. Thus the assumption that man functions like a general-purpose symbol-manipulating device amounts to 1.

Key Concepts

• This assumption, that human and mechanical information processing ultimately involve the same elementary processes, is sometimes made naïvely explicit.
• both are general-purpose symbol-manipulating devices, and that the computer can be programmed to execute elementary information processes functionally quite like those executed by the brain.
• But this its no innocent and empty assumption.
• All artificial intelligence work is done on digital computers because they are the only general-purpose information-processing devices which we know how to design or even conceive of at present.
• The machine must operate on finite strings of these determinate elements as a series of objects related to each other only by rules.

Context

Immediately after quoting Newell and Simon’s 'hardware' remark, Dreyfus analyzes what 'general-purpose symbol-manipulating device' concretely entails given the nature of digital computers, preparing the ground for his breakdown of four underlying assumptions.