Key Arguments

• Dreyfus notes a 'recurrent pattern': each assumption 'was taken to be self-evident—an axiom seldom articulated and never called into question', yet turned out to be 'only one alternative hypothesis, and a questionable one at that.'
• He states that 'The biological assumption that the brain must function like a digital computer no longer fits the evidence.'
• He claims 'The others lead to conceptual difficulties.', indicating that the psychological, epistemological, and ontological assumptions generate internal contradictions and puzzles rather than clarity.
• He later summarizes that 'the conceptual difficulties introduced by these assumptions are even more serious than those introduced by the psychological one,' stressing the depth of the problems with epistemological and ontological atomism.

Source Quotes

Conclusion In surveying the four assumptions underlying the optimistic interpretation of results in AI we have observed a recurrent pattern: In each case the assumption was taken to be self-evidentan axiom seldom articulated and never called into question. In fact, the assumption turned out to be only one alternative hypothesis, and a questionable one at that.

Conclusion In surveying the four assumptions underlying the optimistic interpretation of results in AI we have observed a recurrent pattern: In each case the assumption was taken to be self-evidentan axiom seldom articulated and never called into question. In fact, the assumption turned out to be only one alternative hypothesis, and a questionable one at that. The biological assumption that the brain must function like a digital computer no longer fits the evidence.

In fact, the assumption turned out to be only one alternative hypothesis, and a questionable one at that. The biological assumption that the brain must function like a digital computer no longer fits the evidence. The others lead to conceptual difficulties.

The biological assumption that the brain must function like a digital computer no longer fits the evidence. The others lead to conceptual difficulties. The psychological assumption that the mind must obey a heuristic program cannot be defended on empirical grounds, and a priori arguments in its defense fail to introduce a coherent level of discourse between the physical and the phenomenological.

This fundamental difficulty is hidden by the epistemological and ontological assumptions that all human behavior must be analyzable in terms of rules relating atomic facts. But the conceptual difficulties introduced by these assumptions are even more serious than those introduced by the psychological one. The inevitable appeal to these assumptions as a final basis for a theory of practice leads to a regress of more and more specific rules for applying rules or of more and more general contexts for recognizing contexts.

Key Concepts

• In surveying the four assumptions underlying the optimistic interpretation of results in AI we have observed a recurrent pattern: In each case the assumption was taken to be self-evidentan axiom seldom articulated and never called into question.
• In fact, the assumption turned out to be only one alternative hypothesis, and a questionable one at that.
• The biological assumption that the brain must function like a digital computer no longer fits the evidence.
• The others lead to conceptual difficulties.
• the conceptual difficulties introduced by these assumptions are even more serious than those introduced by the psychological one.

Context

Opening of the Conclusion of Part II, summing up the critique of the four assumptions that have underpinned AI optimism throughout the book.