Key Arguments

• Dreyfus recalls that in 1957 'Simon predicted that within ten years psychological theories would take the form of computer programs, and he set out to fulfill this prediction by writing a series of programs which were meant to simulate human cognition by simulating the conscious and unconscious steps a person goes through to arrive at a specific cognitive performance.'
• He notes that 'despite the general inadequacy of such programs, admitted even by enthusiasts such as Minsky, all those involved in the general area of artificial intelligence (Minsky included) share the assumption that human beings, when behaving intelligently, are following heuristic rules similar to those which would be necessary to enable a digital computer to produce the same behavior.'
• He observes a broader disciplinary shift: 'There has been a general swing from behaviorism to mentalism in psychology. Many influential psychologists and philosophers of psychology have jumped on Simon's bandwagon and begun to pose their problems in terms of computer analogies.'
• He quotes Ulric Neisser: 'the task of a psychologist trying to understand human cognition is analogous to that of a man trying to discover how a computer has been programmed.'
• He cites George Miller speaking of 'recent developments in our understanding of man viewed as a system for processing information.'
• Dreyfus emphasizes the dogmatic character: 'Usually no argument is given for this new dogma that man is an information-processing system functioning like a heuristically programmed digital computer. It seems rather to be an unquestioned axiom underlying otherwise careful and critical analysis.'
• He diagnoses part of the temptation as a slide from physical talk about the brain to psychological talk: 'There is no doubt some temptation to suppose that since the brain is a physical thing and can be metaphorically described as "processing information," there must be an information-processing level, a sort of flow chart of its operations, in which its information-processing activity can be described.'

Source Quotes

In 1957 Simon predicted that within ten years psychological theories would take the form of computer programs, and he set out to fulfill this prediction by writing a series of programs which were meant to simulate human cognition by simulating the conscious and unconscious steps a person goes through to arrive at a specific cognitive performance. And we have seen that despite the general inadequacy of such programs, admitted even by enthusiasts such as Minsky, all those involved in the general area of artificial intelligence (Minsky included) share the assumption that human beings, when behaving intelligently, are following heuristic rules similar to those which would be necessary to enable a digital computer to produce the same behavior. Moreover, despite meager results, Simon's prediction has nonetheless been partially fulfilled.

Moreover, despite meager results, Simon's prediction has nonetheless been partially fulfilled. There has been a general swing from behaviorism to mentalism in psychology. Many influential psychologists and philosophers of psychology have jumped on Simon's bandwagon and begun to pose their problems in terms of computer analogies.

There has been a general swing from behaviorism to mentalism in psychology. Many influential psychologists and philosophers of psychology have jumped on Simon's bandwagon and begun to pose their problems in terms of computer analogies. Ulric Neisser assumes that "the task of a psychologist trying to understand human cognition is analogous to that of a man trying to discover how a computer has been programmed."

Many influential psychologists and philosophers of psychology have jumped on Simon's bandwagon and begun to pose their problems in terms of computer analogies. Ulric Neisser assumes that "the task of a psychologist trying to understand human cognition is analogous to that of a man trying to discover how a computer has been programmed." 1 And George Miller of Harvard now speaks of "recent developments in our understanding of man viewed as a system for processing information."2 Usually no argument is given for this new dogma that man is an information-processing system functioning like a heuristically programmed digital computer.

Ulric Neisser assumes that "the task of a psychologist trying to understand human cognition is analogous to that of a man trying to discover how a computer has been programmed." 1 And George Miller of Harvard now speaks of "recent developments in our understanding of man viewed as a system for processing information."2 Usually no argument is given for this new dogma that man is an information-processing system functioning like a heuristically programmed digital computer. It seems rather to be an unquestioned axiom underlying otherwise careful and critical analysis.

Key Concepts

• despite the general inadequacy of such programs, admitted even by enthusiasts such as Minsky, all those involved in the general area of artificial intelligence (Minsky included) share the assumption that human beings, when behaving intelligently, are following heuristic rules similar to those which would be necessary to enable a digital computer to produce the same behavior.
• There has been a general swing from behaviorism to mentalism in psychology.
• Many influential psychologists and philosophers of psychology have jumped on Simon's bandwagon and begun to pose their problems in terms of computer analogies.
• the task of a psychologist trying to understand human cognition is analogous to that of a man trying to discover how a computer has been programmed.
• Usually no argument is given for this new dogma that man is an information-processing system functioning like a heuristically programmed digital computer.

Context

Still in the setup to the Psychological Assumption section, Dreyfus surveys how leading cognitive psychologists and AI figures have embraced the computer analogy and heuristic‑rule model of mind without offering substantial argument.