Key Arguments

• Rousseau recalls his earlier demonstration that 'the more numerous the people, the greater should be the repressive force,' establishing that larger states require stronger governmental power to maintain order.
• He juxtaposes this with his new proof that 'the government grows remiss in proportion as the number of the magistrates increases,' so a larger governing body weakens the effective force and activity of government.
• From these two premises he infers: 'From this it follows that the relation of the magistrates to the government should vary inversely to the relation of the subjects to the Sovereign; that is to say, the larger the State, the more should the government be tightened, so that the number of the rulers diminish in proportion to the increase of that of the people.'
• He explicitly distinguishes strength from rectitude: 'It should be added that I am here speaking of the relative strength of the government, and not of its rectitude,' signaling a second dimension of evaluation.
• On the side of rectitude, he claims 'the more numerous the magistracy, the nearer the corporate will comes to the general will; while, under a single magistrate, the corporate will is, as I said, merely a particular will,' so a broader magistracy better approximates the sovereign’s general will.
• He concludes that there is a structural trade-off: 'Thus, what may be gained on one side is lost on the other,' and formulates the legislator’s task as an art: 'and the art of the legislator is to know how to fix the point at which the force and the will of the government, which are always in inverse proportion,' indicating that institutional design must balance governmental efficacy against its conformity to the general will.

Source Quotes

Moreover, it is a certainty that promptitude in execution diminishes as more people are put in charge of it: where prudence is made too much of, not enough is made of fortune; opportunity is let slip, and deliberation results in the loss of its object. I have just proved that the government grows remiss in proportion as the number of the magistrates increases; and I previously proved that, the more numerous the people, the greater should be the repressive force. From this it follows that the relation of the magistrates to the government should vary inversely to the relation of the subjects to the Sovereign; that is to say, the larger the State, the more should the government be tightened, so that the number of the rulers diminish in proportion to the increase of that of the people.

I have just proved that the government grows remiss in proportion as the number of the magistrates increases; and I previously proved that, the more numerous the people, the greater should be the repressive force. From this it follows that the relation of the magistrates to the government should vary inversely to the relation of the subjects to the Sovereign; that is to say, the larger the State, the more should the government be tightened, so that the number of the rulers diminish in proportion to the increase of that of the people. It should be added that I am here speaking of the relative strength of the government, and not of its rectitude: for, on the other hand, the more numerous the magistracy, the nearer the corporate will comes to the general will; while, under a single magistrate, the corporate will is, as I said, merely a particular will.

From this it follows that the relation of the magistrates to the government should vary inversely to the relation of the subjects to the Sovereign; that is to say, the larger the State, the more should the government be tightened, so that the number of the rulers diminish in proportion to the increase of that of the people. It should be added that I am here speaking of the relative strength of the government, and not of its rectitude: for, on the other hand, the more numerous the magistracy, the nearer the corporate will comes to the general will; while, under a single magistrate, the corporate will is, as I said, merely a particular will. Thus, what may be gained on one side is lost on the other, and the art of the legislator is to know how to fix the point at which the force and the will of the government, which are always in inverse proportion,

It should be added that I am here speaking of the relative strength of the government, and not of its rectitude: for, on the other hand, the more numerous the magistracy, the nearer the corporate will comes to the general will; while, under a single magistrate, the corporate will is, as I said, merely a particular will. Thus, what may be gained on one side is lost on the other, and the art of the legislator is to know how to fix the point at which the force and the will of the government, which are always in inverse proportion,

Key Concepts

• I have just proved that the government grows remiss in proportion as the number of the magistrates increases; and I previously proved that, the more numerous the people, the greater should be the repressive force.
• From this it follows that the relation of the magistrates to the government should vary inversely to the relation of the subjects to the Sovereign; that is to say, the larger the State, the more should the government be tightened, so that the number of the rulers diminish in proportion to the increase of that of the people.
• It should be added that I am here speaking of the relative strength of the government, and not of its rectitude:
• for, on the other hand, the more numerous the magistracy, the nearer the corporate will comes to the general will; while, under a single magistrate, the corporate will is, as I said, merely a particular will.
• Thus, what may be gained on one side is lost on the other, and the art of the legislator is to know how to fix the point at which the force and the will of the government, which are always in inverse proportion,

Context

Final paragraph of Book III, Chapter II, where Rousseau synthesizes his earlier quantitative analysis of population and repressive force with his new analysis of magistrate numbers and will, deriving an inverse relation between rulers and ruled and formulating the legislator’s problem as finding an optimal balance between governmental strength and moral alignment with the general will.