Key Arguments

• Only the greatest dangers justify interrupting the normal order: "none but the greatest dangers can counter-balance that of changing the public order, and the sacred power of the laws should never be arrested save when the existence of the country is at stake."
• In such "rare and obvious cases" the people entrust public security to the most worthy by a special act: "provision is made for the public security by a particular act entrusting it to him who is most worthy."
• First mode: when mere acceleration of government suffices, power is concentrated in one or two magistrates without touching the authority of the laws: "If increasing the activity of the government is a sufficient remedy, power is concentrated in the hands of one or two of its members: in this case the change is not in the authority of the laws, but only in the form of administering them."
• Second, stronger mode: when the legal apparatus itself obstructs preservation, a supreme ruler is nominated who suspends all laws and sovereign authority for a moment: "If, on the other hand, the peril is of such a kind that the paraphernalia of the laws are an obstacle to their preservation, the method is to nominate a supreme ruler, who shall silence all the laws and suspend for a moment the sovereign authority."
• In such existential emergencies, the content of the general will is unambiguous—preservation of the State: "In such a case, there is no doubt about the general will, and it is clear that the people’s first intention is that the State shall not perish."
• Suspending legislative authority does not abolish it; the emergency ruler dominates but does not replace the Sovereign: "Thus the suspension of the legislative authority is in no sense its abolition; the magistrate who silences it cannot make it speak; he dominates it, but cannot represent it."
• The dictator’s power is maximal in execution but excluded from lawmaking: "He can do anything, except make laws."
• Rousseau illustrates the two modes with Roman practice: "The first method was used by the Roman senate when, in a consecrated formula, it charged the consuls to provide for the safety of the Republic. The second was employed when one of the two consuls nominated a dictator: a custom Rome borrowed from Alba."

Source Quotes

Even Sparta allowed its laws to lapse. However, none but the greatest dangers can counter-balance that of changing the public order, and the sacred power of the laws should never be arrested save when the existence of the country is at stake. In these rare and obvious cases, provision is made for the public security by a particular act entrusting it to him who is most worthy.

However, none but the greatest dangers can counter-balance that of changing the public order, and the sacred power of the laws should never be arrested save when the existence of the country is at stake. In these rare and obvious cases, provision is made for the public security by a particular act entrusting it to him who is most worthy. This commitment may be carried out in either of two ways, according to the nature of the danger.

This commitment may be carried out in either of two ways, according to the nature of the danger. If increasing the activity of the government is a sufficient remedy, power is concentrated in the hands of one or two of its members: in this case the change is not in the authority of the laws, but only in the form of administering them. If, on the other hand, the peril is of such a kind that the paraphernalia of the laws are an obstacle to their preservation, the method is to nominate a supreme ruler, who shall silence all the laws and suspend for a moment the sovereign authority.

If increasing the activity of the government is a sufficient remedy, power is concentrated in the hands of one or two of its members: in this case the change is not in the authority of the laws, but only in the form of administering them. If, on the other hand, the peril is of such a kind that the paraphernalia of the laws are an obstacle to their preservation, the method is to nominate a supreme ruler, who shall silence all the laws and suspend for a moment the sovereign authority. In such a case, there is no doubt about the general will, and it is clear that the people’s first intention is that the State shall not perish.

In such a case, there is no doubt about the general will, and it is clear that the people’s first intention is that the State shall not perish. Thus the suspension of the legislative authority is in no sense its abolition; the magistrate who silences it cannot make it speak; he dominates it, but cannot represent it. He can do anything, except make laws. The first method was used by the Roman senate when, in a consecrated formula, it charged the consuls to provide for the safety of the Republic.

Key Concepts

• none but the greatest dangers can counter-balance that of changing the public order, and the sacred power of the laws should never be arrested save when the existence of the country is at stake.
• In these rare and obvious cases, provision is made for the public security by a particular act entrusting it to him who is most worthy.
• If increasing the activity of the government is a sufficient remedy, power is concentrated in the hands of one or two of its members: in this case the change is not in the authority of the laws, but only in the form of administering them.
• the method is to nominate a supreme ruler, who shall silence all the laws and suspend for a moment the sovereign authority.
• Thus the suspension of the legislative authority is in no sense its abolition; the magistrate who silences it cannot make it speak; he dominates it, but cannot represent it. He can do anything, except make laws.

Context

First half of Book IV, Chapter VI, where Rousseau defines dictatorship as an exceptional constitutional device, differentiates two levels of emergency concentration of power, and insists that even the strongest dictator is an executor, not a legislator or representative of the general will.