Key Arguments

• Rousseau notes that the formation of factions alters the structure of political will: "when factions arise, and partial associations are formed at the expense of the great association, the will of each of these associations becomes general in relation to its members, while it remains particular in relation to the State," so each group has an internal 'general' will that is still only particular at the level of the whole.
• This associational voting reduces the effective number of independent wills: "it may then be said that there are no longer as many votes as there are men, but only as many as there are associations," meaning coalition‑building collapses many individual perspectives into a few organized blocs.
• As blocs replace individual votes, the diversity of differences decreases: "The differences become less numerous and give a less general result," so the mathematical mechanism that previously revealed the general will no longer functions properly.
• He identifies the extreme case where one association dominates: "Lastly, when one of these associations is so great as to prevail over all the rest, the result is no longer a sum of small differences, but a single difference; in this case there is no longer a general will, and the opinion which prevails is purely particular."
• Rousseau therefore states a strong institutional requirement: "It is therefore essential, if the general will is to be able to express itself, that there should be no partial society within the State, and that each citizen should think only his own thoughts:" indicating that elimination of factions and preservation of independent judgment are ideal.
• He praises Lycurgus for realizing this ideal: "which was indeed the sublime and unique system established by the great Lycurgus."
• Recognizing that partial societies often exist, he offers a second‑best solution: "But if there are partial societies, it is best to have as many as possible and to prevent them from being unequal, as was done by Solon, Numa and Servius," suggesting that a plurality of balanced groups can approximate the conditions needed for the general will.
• He concludes that these measures are crucial epistemic safeguards: "These precautions are the only ones that can guarantee that the general will shall be always enlightened," tying anti‑factional design directly to the clarity and correctness of the general will.

Source Quotes

If, when the people, being furnished with adequate information, held its deliberations, the citizens had no communication one with another, the grand total of the small differences would always give the general will, and the decision would always be good. But when factions arise, and partial associations are formed at the expense of the great association, the will of each of these associations becomes general in relation to its members, while it remains particular in relation to the State: it may then be said that there are no longer as many votes as there are men, but only as many as there are associations. The differences become less numerous and give a less general result.

But when factions arise, and partial associations are formed at the expense of the great association, the will of each of these associations becomes general in relation to its members, while it remains particular in relation to the State: it may then be said that there are no longer as many votes as there are men, but only as many as there are associations. The differences become less numerous and give a less general result. Lastly, when one of these associations is so great as to prevail over all the rest, the result is no longer a sum of small differences, but a single difference; in this case there is no longer a general will, and the opinion which prevails is purely particular.

The differences become less numerous and give a less general result. Lastly, when one of these associations is so great as to prevail over all the rest, the result is no longer a sum of small differences, but a single difference; in this case there is no longer a general will, and the opinion which prevails is purely particular. It is therefore essential, if the general will is to be able to express itself, that there should be no partial society within the State, and that each citizen should think only his own thoughts: which was indeed the sublime and unique system established by the great Lycurgus.

Lastly, when one of these associations is so great as to prevail over all the rest, the result is no longer a sum of small differences, but a single difference; in this case there is no longer a general will, and the opinion which prevails is purely particular. It is therefore essential, if the general will is to be able to express itself, that there should be no partial society within the State, and that each citizen should think only his own thoughts: which was indeed the sublime and unique system established by the great Lycurgus. But if there are partial societies, it is best to have as many as possible and to prevent them from being unequal, as was done by Solon, Numa and Servius. These precautions are the only ones that can guarantee that the general will shall be always enlightened,

Key Concepts

• But when factions arise, and partial associations are formed at the expense of the great association, the will of each of these associations becomes general in relation to its members, while it remains particular in relation to the State:
• it may then be said that there are no longer as many votes as there are men, but only as many as there are associations.
• The differences become less numerous and give a less general result.
• Lastly, when one of these associations is so great as to prevail over all the rest, the result is no longer a sum of small differences, but a single difference; in this case there is no longer a general will, and the opinion which prevails is purely particular.
• It is therefore essential, if the general will is to be able to express itself, that there should be no partial society within the State, and that each citizen should think only his own thoughts: which was indeed the sublime and unique system established by the great Lycurgus. But if there are partial societies, it is best to have as many as possible and to prevent them from being unequal, as was done by Solon, Numa and Servius. These precautions are the only ones that can guarantee that the general will shall be always enlightened,

Context

Second half and conclusion of Book II, Chapter III, where Rousseau analyzes the corrupting effects of factions on the expression of the general will and recommends specific constitutional strategies, illustrated by classical lawgivers, to preserve or approximate its enlightenment.