For all laws other than the original social compact, the will of the majority legitimately binds all… — Jean-Jacques Rousseau

For all laws other than the original social compact, the will of the majority legitimately binds all citizens because by the very terms of the contract each citizen has consented in advance to all laws collectively—including those passed against his expressed vote and even those that punish him—since voting is not about private preference but about whether a proposal conforms to the general will, and finding oneself in the minority simply shows one was mistaken about that general will, not that one has been coerced; freedom is preserved so long as the majority still embodies the qualities of the general will.

By Jean-Jacques Rousseau, from Du contrat social

Key Arguments

Rousseau states the general rule that follows from the social contract: "Apart from this primitive contract, the vote of the majority always binds all the rest. This follows from the contract itself."
He formulates the apparent problem: "But it is asked how a man can be both free and forced to conform to wills that are not his own. How are the opponents at once free and subject to laws they have not agreed to?"
He replies that the question is misframed because citizens consent to the whole legislative system by entering the contract: "I retort that the question is wrongly put. The citizen gives his consent to all the laws, including those which are passed in spite of his opposition, and even those which punish him when he dares to break any of them."
He defines the general will as the enduring collective will that makes them citizens and free: "The constant will of all the members of the State is the general will; by virtue of it they are citizens and free."
Rousseau explains the true object of a legislative vote: "When in the popular assembly a law is proposed, what the people is asked is not exactly whether it approves or rejects the proposal, but whether it is in conformity with the general will, which is their will."
Thus an individual’s vote is an opinion on a factual question about the general will: "Each man, in giving his vote, states his opinion on that point; and the general will is found by counting votes."
If one’s view loses, this reveals an error in judgment, not oppression: "When therefore the opinion that is contrary to my own prevails, this proves neither more nor less than that I was mistaken, and that what I thought to be the general will was not so."
He adds that had his private opinion prevailed against the true general will, he would have undermined his own freedom: "If my particular opinion had carried the day I should have achieved the opposite of what was my will; and it is in that case that I should not have been free."
Rousseau notes an important condition: this reconciliation of majority rule and freedom holds only while the majority continues to embody the characteristics of the general will: "This presupposes, indeed, that all the qualities of the general will still reside in the majority: when they cease to do so, whatever side a man may take, liberty is no longer possible."

Source Quotes

When the State is instituted, residence constitutes consent; to dwell within its territory is to submit to the Sovereign. Apart from this primitive contract, the vote of the majority always binds all the rest. This follows from the contract itself. But it is asked how a man can be both free and forced to conform to wills that are not his own.

This follows from the contract itself. But it is asked how a man can be both free and forced to conform to wills that are not his own. How are the opponents at once free and subject to laws they have not agreed to?

I retort that the question is wrongly put. The citizen gives his consent to all the laws, including those which are passed in spite of his opposition, and even those which punish him when he dares to break any of them. The constant will of all the members of the State is the general will; by virtue of it they are citizens and free.

The citizen gives his consent to all the laws, including those which are passed in spite of his opposition, and even those which punish him when he dares to break any of them. The constant will of all the members of the State is the general will; by virtue of it they are citizens and free. When in the popular assembly a law is proposed, what the people is asked is not exactly whether it approves or rejects the proposal, but whether it is in conformity with the general will, which is their will.

The constant will of all the members of the State is the general will; by virtue of it they are citizens and free. When in the popular assembly a law is proposed, what the people is asked is not exactly whether it approves or rejects the proposal, but whether it is in conformity with the general will, which is their will. Each man, in giving his vote, states his opinion on that point; and the general will is found by counting votes.

When in the popular assembly a law is proposed, what the people is asked is not exactly whether it approves or rejects the proposal, but whether it is in conformity with the general will, which is their will. Each man, in giving his vote, states his opinion on that point; and the general will is found by counting votes. When therefore the opinion that is contrary to my own prevails, this proves neither more nor less than that I was mistaken, and that what I thought to be the general will was not so.

Each man, in giving his vote, states his opinion on that point; and the general will is found by counting votes. When therefore the opinion that is contrary to my own prevails, this proves neither more nor less than that I was mistaken, and that what I thought to be the general will was not so. If my particular opinion had carried the day I should have achieved the opposite of what was my will; and it is in that case that I should not have been free.

If my particular opinion had carried the day I should have achieved the opposite of what was my will; and it is in that case that I should not have been free. This presupposes, indeed, that all the qualities of the general will still reside in the majority: when they cease to do so, whatever side a man may take, liberty is no longer possible. In my earlier demonstration of how particular wills are substituted for the general will in public deliberation, I have adequately pointed out the practicable methods of avoiding this abuse; and I shall have more to say of them later on.

Key Concepts

Apart from this primitive contract, the vote of the majority always binds all the rest. This follows from the contract itself.
But it is asked how a man can be both free and forced to conform to wills that are not his own.
The citizen gives his consent to all the laws, including those which are passed in spite of his opposition, and even those which punish him when he dares to break any of them.
The constant will of all the members of the State is the general will; by virtue of it they are citizens and free.
what the people is asked is not exactly whether it approves or rejects the proposal, but whether it is in conformity with the general will, which is their will.
Each man, in giving his vote, states his opinion on that point; and the general will is found by counting votes.
this proves neither more nor less than that I was mistaken, and that what I thought to be the general will was not so.
This presupposes, indeed, that all the qualities of the general will still reside in the majority: when they cease to do so, whatever side a man may take, liberty is no longer possible.

Context

Central portion of Book IV, Chapter II, where Rousseau addresses the classic objection to majority rule and freedom, reinterprets voting as an epistemic procedure for discovering the general will, and reasserts that legitimate coercion under law is consistent with freedom so long as the majority still truly expresses the general will.