Key Arguments

• Rousseau explicitly restates that government is created by law, not by contract: 'the institution of government is not a contract, but a law;'
• He insists that executive office‑holders are subordinates, not masters: 'the depositaries of the executive power are not the people’s masters, but its officers; that it can set them up and pull them down when it likes; that for them there is no question of contract, but of obedience;'
• Accepting office is framed as a civic duty, not a contractual bargain: 'in taking charge of the functions the State imposes on them they are doing no more than fulfilling their duty as citizens, without having the remotest right to argue about the conditions.'
• When a people establishes an hereditary government, Rousseau denies that this creates a binding pact; it merely gives a contingent, revisable shape to administration: 'what it enters into is not an undertaking; the administration is given a provisional form, until the people chooses to order it otherwise.'
• He acknowledges that altering established governments is dangerous and should be rare, but he carefully classifies this as a recommendation of prudence rather than a restriction of right: 'such changes are always dangerous, and that the established government should never be touched except when it comes to be incompatible with the public good; but the circumspection this involves is a maxim of policy and not a rule of right,'
• To underline the people’s continuing supremacy, he likens civil authority to military command: 'the State is no more bound to leave civil authority in the hands of its rulers than military authority in the hands of its generals.'

Source Quotes

CHAPTER XVIII: how to check the usurpations of government What we have just said confirms Chapter XVI, and makes it clear that the institution of government is not a contract, but a law; that the depositaries of the executive power are not the people’s masters, but its officers; that it can set them up and pull them down when it likes; that for them there is no question of contract, but of obedience; and that in taking charge of the functions the State imposes on them they are doing no more than fulfilling their duty as citizens, without having the remotest right to argue about the conditions. When therefore the people sets up an hereditary government, whether it be monarchical and confined to one family, or aristocratic and confined to a class, what it enters into is not an undertaking; the administration is given a provisional form, until the people chooses to order it otherwise.

CHAPTER XVIII: how to check the usurpations of government What we have just said confirms Chapter XVI, and makes it clear that the institution of government is not a contract, but a law; that the depositaries of the executive power are not the people’s masters, but its officers; that it can set them up and pull them down when it likes; that for them there is no question of contract, but of obedience; and that in taking charge of the functions the State imposes on them they are doing no more than fulfilling their duty as citizens, without having the remotest right to argue about the conditions. When therefore the people sets up an hereditary government, whether it be monarchical and confined to one family, or aristocratic and confined to a class, what it enters into is not an undertaking; the administration is given a provisional form, until the people chooses to order it otherwise. It is true that such changes are always dangerous, and that the established government should never be touched except when it comes to be incompatible with the public good; but the circumspection this involves is a maxim of policy and not a rule of right, and the State is no more bound to leave civil authority in the hands of its rulers than military authority in the hands of its generals.

When therefore the people sets up an hereditary government, whether it be monarchical and confined to one family, or aristocratic and confined to a class, what it enters into is not an undertaking; the administration is given a provisional form, until the people chooses to order it otherwise. It is true that such changes are always dangerous, and that the established government should never be touched except when it comes to be incompatible with the public good; but the circumspection this involves is a maxim of policy and not a rule of right, and the State is no more bound to leave civil authority in the hands of its rulers than military authority in the hands of its generals. It is also true that it is impossible to be too careful to observe, in such cases, all the formalities necessary to distinguish a regular and legitimate act from a seditious tumult, and the will of a whole people from the clamour of a faction.

Key Concepts

• the institution of government is not a contract, but a law; that the depositaries of the executive power are not the people’s masters, but its officers; that it can set them up and pull them down when it likes; that for them there is no question of contract, but of obedience;
• in taking charge of the functions the State imposes on them they are doing no more than fulfilling their duty as citizens, without having the remotest right to argue about the conditions.
• when therefore the people sets up an hereditary government, whether it be monarchical and confined to one family, or aristocratic and confined to a class, what it enters into is not an undertaking; the administration is given a provisional form, until the people chooses to order it otherwise.
• such changes are always dangerous, and that the established government should never be touched except when it comes to be incompatible with the public good; but the circumspection this involves is a maxim of policy and not a rule of right,
• the State is no more bound to leave civil authority in the hands of its rulers than military authority in the hands of its generals.

Context

Opening of Book III, Chapter XVIII ('how to check the usurpations of government'), where Rousseau summarizes and reinforces his earlier argument that government derives from a law of the Sovereign, not from any bilateral contract, and clarifies the revocable, provisional status of even hereditary forms of administration, distinguishing juridical right from political prudence.