Key Arguments

• Rousseau states, 'The legislator occupies in every respect an extraordinary position in the State,' marking his status as exceptional.
• He clarifies that this extraordinariness comes both from talent and from institutional role: 'If he should do so by reason of his genius, he does so no less by reason of his office, which is neither magistracy, nor Sovereignty,' denying that legislative founding is a standard constitutional office.
• He explains that 'This office, which sets up the Republic, nowhere enters into its constitution; it is an individual and superior function, which has nothing in common with human empire,' placing the legislator’s role prior to and above ordinary political power structures.
• He formulates a reciprocity of non‑overlap between command over men and command over laws: 'for if he who holds command over men ought not to have command over the laws, he who has command over the laws ought not any more to have it over men,' insisting that combining these authorities would corrupt law.
• Rousseau warns that if one man commands both men and laws, 'his laws would be the ministers of his passions and would often merely serve to perpetuate his injustices: his private aims would inevitably mar the sanctity of his work,' identifying the danger that legislative power becomes an instrument of personal ambition and injustice.
• He cites Lycurgus as an example: 'When Lycurgus gave laws to his country, he began by resigning the throne,' illustrating the requirement that the lawgiver renounce direct rule over persons.
• He notes that 'It was the custom of most Greek towns to entrust the establishment of their laws to foreigners. The Republics of modern Italy in many cases followed this example; Geneva did the same and profited by it,' emphasizing the historical practice of separating the law‑founding function from local rulers.
• As a negative example, he writes that Rome 'suffered a revival of all the crimes of tyranny, and was brought to the verge of destruction, because it put the legislative authority and the sovereign power into the same hands,' suggesting that concentration of legislative and sovereign power leads to tyranny and near‑ruin.

Source Quotes

The more completely these natural resources are annihilated, the greater and the more lasting are those which he acquires, and the more stable and perfect the new institutions; so that if each citizen is nothing and can do nothing without the rest, and the resources acquired by the whole are equal or superior to the aggregate of the resources of all the individuals, it may be said that legislation is at the highest possible point of perfection. The legislator occupies in every respect an extraordinary position in the State. If he should do so by reason of his genius, he does so no less by reason of his office, which is neither magistracy, nor Sovereignty.

The legislator occupies in every respect an extraordinary position in the State. If he should do so by reason of his genius, he does so no less by reason of his office, which is neither magistracy, nor Sovereignty. This office, which sets up the Republic, nowhere enters into its constitution; it is an individual and superior function, which has nothing in common with human empire; for if he who holds command over men ought not to have command over the laws, he who has command over the laws ought not any more to have it over men; or else his laws would be the ministers of his passions and would often merely serve to perpetuate his injustices: his private aims would inevitably mar the sanctity of his work.

If he should do so by reason of his genius, he does so no less by reason of his office, which is neither magistracy, nor Sovereignty. This office, which sets up the Republic, nowhere enters into its constitution; it is an individual and superior function, which has nothing in common with human empire; for if he who holds command over men ought not to have command over the laws, he who has command over the laws ought not any more to have it over men; or else his laws would be the ministers of his passions and would often merely serve to perpetuate his injustices: his private aims would inevitably mar the sanctity of his work. When Lycurgus gave laws to his country, he began by resigning the throne.

This office, which sets up the Republic, nowhere enters into its constitution; it is an individual and superior function, which has nothing in common with human empire; for if he who holds command over men ought not to have command over the laws, he who has command over the laws ought not any more to have it over men; or else his laws would be the ministers of his passions and would often merely serve to perpetuate his injustices: his private aims would inevitably mar the sanctity of his work. When Lycurgus gave laws to his country, he began by resigning the throne. It was the custom of most Greek towns to entrust the establishment of their laws to foreigners.

When Lycurgus gave laws to his country, he began by resigning the throne. It was the custom of most Greek towns to entrust the establishment of their laws to foreigners. The Republics of modern Italy in many cases followed this example; Geneva did the same and profited by it. Rome, when it was most prosperous, suffered a revival of all the crimes of tyranny, and was brought to the verge of destruction, because it put the legislative authority and the sovereign power into the same hands.

The Republics of modern Italy in many cases followed this example; Geneva did the same and profited by it. Rome, when it was most prosperous, suffered a revival of all the crimes of tyranny, and was brought to the verge of destruction, because it put the legislative authority and the sovereign power into the same hands. Nevertheless, the decemvirs themselves never claimed the right to pass any law merely on their own authority.

Key Concepts

• The legislator occupies in every respect an extraordinary position in the State.
• which is neither magistracy, nor Sovereignty.
• This office, which sets up the Republic, nowhere enters into its constitution; it is an individual and superior function, which has nothing in common with human empire;
• for if he who holds command over men ought not to have command over the laws, he who has command over the laws ought not any more to have it over men;
• or else his laws would be the ministers of his passions and would often merely serve to perpetuate his injustices: his private aims would inevitably mar the sanctity of his work.
• When Lycurgus gave laws to his country, he began by resigning the throne.
• It was the custom of most Greek towns to entrust the establishment of their laws to foreigners. The Republics of modern Italy in many cases followed this example; Geneva did the same and profited by it.
• Rome, when it was most prosperous, suffered a revival of all the crimes of tyranny, and was brought to the verge of destruction, because it put the legislative authority and the sovereign power into the same hands.

Context

Middle of Book II, Chapter VII, where Rousseau clarifies the institutional non‑location of the legislator, insisting on a strict separation between constitutional founding and ongoing sovereign or magisterial authority, and supporting this separation with historical examples.