Key Arguments

• Rousseau bluntly identifies the true nature of conquest: "The right of conquest has no foundation other than the right of the strongest," aligning it with the very 'right of the strongest' he has already rejected.
• He argues conditionally: "If war does not give the conqueror the right to massacre the conquered peoples, the right to enslave them cannot be based upon a right which does not exist," showing that a supposed derivative right collapses with its premise.
• He collapses the usual justificatory formula by reversing its logic: "No one has a right to kill an enemy except when he cannot make him a slave, and the right to enslave him cannot therefore be derived from the right to kill him," indicating that where enslavement is possible, killing is specifically not justified.
• He calls the exchange of life for liberty "unfair": "It is accordingly an unfair exchange to make him buy at the price of his liberty his life, over which the victor holds no right," since the victor has no legitimate claim to the life he 'sells back.'
• Rousseau exposes a logical fallacy at the heart of the theory: "Is it not clear that there is a vicious circle in founding the right of life and death on the right of slavery, and the right of slavery on the right of life and death?" each alleged right presupposes the other.
• Even granting the extreme hypothesis, he limits what follows: "Even if we assume this terrible right to kill everybody, I maintain that a slave made in war, or a conquered people, is under no obligation to a master, except to obey him as far as he is compelled to do so," reducing the relation to sheer coercion.
• He insists that the victor has not benefited the vanquished: "By taking an equivalent for his life, the victor has not done him a favour; instead of killing him without profit, he has killed him usefully," portraying enslavement as a utilitarian modification of killing, not a gift.
• From this, he concludes that the state of war persists: "So far then is he from acquiring over him any authority in addition to that of force, that the state of war continues to subsist between them: their mutual relation is the effect of it, and the usage of the right of war does not imply a treaty of peace."
• He clarifies that any 'convention' in which the conquered 'accepts' slavery does not create peace: "A convention has indeed been made; but this convention, so far from destroying the state of war, presupposes its continuance," so no genuine political right arises from it.

Source Quotes

These principles are not those of Grotius: they are not based on the authority of poets, but derived from the nature of reality and based on reason. The right of conquest has no foundation other than the right of the strongest. If war does not give the conqueror the right to massacre the conquered peoples, the right to enslave them cannot be based upon a right which does not exist.

The right of conquest has no foundation other than the right of the strongest. If war does not give the conqueror the right to massacre the conquered peoples, the right to enslave them cannot be based upon a right which does not exist. No one has a right to kill an enemy except when he cannot make him a slave, and the right to enslave him cannot therefore be derived from the right to kill him.

If war does not give the conqueror the right to massacre the conquered peoples, the right to enslave them cannot be based upon a right which does not exist. No one has a right to kill an enemy except when he cannot make him a slave, and the right to enslave him cannot therefore be derived from the right to kill him. It is accordingly an unfair exchange to make him buy at the price of his liberty his life, over which the victor holds no right.

It is accordingly an unfair exchange to make him buy at the price of his liberty his life, over which the victor holds no right. Is it not clear that there is a vicious circle in founding the right of life and death on the right of slavery, and the right of slavery on the right of life and death? Even if we assume this terrible right to kill everybody, I maintain that a slave made in war, or a conquered people, is under no obligation to a master, except to obey him as far as he is compelled to do so.

Is it not clear that there is a vicious circle in founding the right of life and death on the right of slavery, and the right of slavery on the right of life and death? Even if we assume this terrible right to kill everybody, I maintain that a slave made in war, or a conquered people, is under no obligation to a master, except to obey him as far as he is compelled to do so. By taking an equivalent for his life, the victor has not done him a favour; instead of killing him without profit, he has killed him usefully.

By taking an equivalent for his life, the victor has not done him a favour; instead of killing him without profit, he has killed him usefully. So far then is he from acquiring over him any authority in addition to that of force, that the state of war continues to subsist between them: their mutual relation is the effect of it, and the usage of the right of war does not imply a treaty of peace. A convention has indeed been made; but this convention, so far from destroying the state of war, presupposes its continuance.

So far then is he from acquiring over him any authority in addition to that of force, that the state of war continues to subsist between them: their mutual relation is the effect of it, and the usage of the right of war does not imply a treaty of peace. A convention has indeed been made; but this convention, so far from destroying the state of war, presupposes its continuance. So, from whatever aspect we regard the question, the right of slavery is null and void, not only as being illegitimate, but also because it is absurd and meaningless.

Key Concepts

• The right of conquest has no foundation other than the right of the strongest.
• If war does not give the conqueror the right to massacre the conquered peoples, the right to enslave them cannot be based upon a right which does not exist.
• No one has a right to kill an enemy except when he cannot make him a slave, and the right to enslave him cannot therefore be derived from the right to kill him.
• Is it not clear that there is a vicious circle in founding the right of life and death on the right of slavery, and the right of slavery on the right of life and death?
• a slave made in war, or a conquered people, is under no obligation to a master, except to obey him as far as he is compelled to do so.
• the state of war continues to subsist between them: their mutual relation is the effect of it, and the usage of the right of war does not imply a treaty of peace.
• A convention has indeed been made; but this convention, so far from destroying the state of war, presupposes its continuance.

Context

Later in Chapter IV, Rousseau moves from redefining war to dismantling the 'right of conquest' and the contractual form of war‑based slavery, arguing that such arrangements express only continuing force relations, not legitimate authority.