Key Arguments

• Locke distinguishes ideas of things 'as they are in themselves' from other ideas the mind gets 'from their comparison one with another', marking relation as a distinct kind of idea.
• He explains that the understanding 'is not confined to that precise object' but can 'look beyond it, to see how it stands in conformity to any other', so relation essentially involves going beyond the single object.
• He defines relation functionally: 'when the mind so considers one thing, that it does as it were bring it to, and set it by another, and carries its view from one to the other — this is, as the words import, relation and respect.'
• Relative denominations ('husband', 'whiter') are said to 'intimate that respect, and serve as marks to lead the thoughts beyond the subject itself denominated to something distinct from it', showing that relation always involves reference to something else.
• Because 'any idea, whether simple or complex, may be the occasion why the mind thus brings two things together', Locke concludes that 'any of our ideas may be the foundation of relation'.
• He illustrates this with examples: the 'contract and ceremony of marriage with Sempronia' occasions the relation and name 'husband', and the 'colour white' occasions the relation of being 'whiter than free-stone'.

Source Quotes

Relation, what. Besides the ideas, whether simple or complex, that the mind has of things as they are in themselves, there are others it gets from their comparison one with another. The understanding, in the consideration of anything, is not confined to that precise object: it can carry an idea as it were beyond itself, or at least look beyond it, to see how it stands in conformity to any other.

Besides the ideas, whether simple or complex, that the mind has of things as they are in themselves, there are others it gets from their comparison one with another. The understanding, in the consideration of anything, is not confined to that precise object: it can carry an idea as it were beyond itself, or at least look beyond it, to see how it stands in conformity to any other. When the mind so considers one thing, that it does as it were bring it to, and set it by another, and carries its view from one to the other — this is, as the words import, relation and respect; and the denominations given to positive things, intimating that respect, and serving as marks to lead the thoughts beyond the subject itself denominated to something distinct from it, are what we call relatives; and the things so brought together, related.

The understanding, in the consideration of anything, is not confined to that precise object: it can carry an idea as it were beyond itself, or at least look beyond it, to see how it stands in conformity to any other. When the mind so considers one thing, that it does as it were bring it to, and set it by another, and carries its view from one to the other — this is, as the words import, relation and respect; and the denominations given to positive things, intimating that respect, and serving as marks to lead the thoughts beyond the subject itself denominated to something distinct from it, are what we call relatives; and the things so brought together, related. Thus, when the mind considers Caius as such a positive being, it takes nothing into that idea but what really exists in Caius; e.g.. when I consider him as a man, I have nothing in my mind but the complex idea of the species, man.

But when I give Caius the name husband, I intimate some other person; and when I give him the name whiter, I intimate some other thing: in both cases my thought is led to something beyond Caius, and there are two things brought into consideration. And since any idea, whether simple or complex, may be the occasion why the mind thus brings two things together, and as it were takes a view of them at once, though still considered as distinct: therefore any of our ideas may be the foundation of relation. As in the above-mentioned instance, the contract and ceremony of marriage with Sempronia is the occasion of the denomination and relation of husband; and the colour white the occasion why he is said to be whiter than free-stone.

And since any idea, whether simple or complex, may be the occasion why the mind thus brings two things together, and as it were takes a view of them at once, though still considered as distinct: therefore any of our ideas may be the foundation of relation. As in the above-mentioned instance, the contract and ceremony of marriage with Sempronia is the occasion of the denomination and relation of husband; and the colour white the occasion why he is said to be whiter than free-stone. 2.

Key Concepts

• there are others it gets from their comparison one with another.
• it can carry an idea as it were beyond itself, or at least look beyond it, to see how it stands in conformity to any other.
• when the mind so considers one thing, that it does as it were bring it to, and set it by another, and carries its view from one to the other — this is, as the words import, relation and respect;
• the denominations given to positive things, intimating that respect, and serving as marks to lead the thoughts beyond the subject itself denominated to something distinct from it, are what we call relatives;
• therefore any of our ideas may be the foundation of relation.
• the contract and ceremony of marriage with Sempronia is the occasion of the denomination and relation of husband; and the colour white the occasion why he is said to be whiter than free-stone.

Context

Book II, chapter XXV, section 1, where Locke opens his treatment of relation by giving a general definition in terms of mental comparison and illustrating it with examples like 'husband' and 'whiter'.