Key Arguments

• The 'use men have of these marks' is either to 'record their own thoughts' or to 'lay them before the view of others', so 'words, in their primary or immediate signification, stand for nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them'.
• Speaking aims at being understood; 'the end of speech is, that those sounds, as marks, may make known his ideas to the hearer', which presupposes that what the words immediately mark are the speaker’s own ideas.
• If someone tried to apply words immediately to anything other than his own ideas, this would make them at once 'signs and not signs of his ideas', which would 'in effect' deprive them of any signification.
• Because words are 'voluntary signs', they cannot be 'imposed by him on things he knows not'; otherwise they would be 'sounds without signification'.
• A man 'cannot make his words the signs either of qualities in things, or of conceptions in the mind of another, whereof he has none in his own', since without his own ideas he would be making signs 'of he knows not what'.
• Even when he represents other men’s ideas, he does so only 'by some of his own', and if he gives them the same names, it is still 'to his own ideas; to ideas that he has, and not to ideas that he has not.'

Source Quotes

Words, in their immediate signification, are the sensible signs of his ideas who uses them. The use men have of these marks being either to record their own thoughts, for the assistance of their own memory or, as it were, to bring out their ideas, and lay them before the view of others: words, in their primary or immediate signification, stand for nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them, how imperfectly soever or carelessly those ideas are collected from the things which they are supposed to represent. When a man speaks to another, it is that he may be understood: and the end of speech is, that those sounds, as marks, may make known his ideas to the hearer.

When a man speaks to another, it is that he may be understood: and the end of speech is, that those sounds, as marks, may make known his ideas to the hearer. That then which words are the marks of are the ideas of the speaker: nor can any one apply them as marks, immediately, to anything else but the ideas that he himself hath: for this would be to make them signs of his own conceptions, and yet apply them to other ideas; which would be to make them signs and not signs of his ideas at the same time, and so in effect to have no signification at all. Words being voluntary signs, they cannot be voluntary signs imposed by him on things he knows not.

That then which words are the marks of are the ideas of the speaker: nor can any one apply them as marks, immediately, to anything else but the ideas that he himself hath: for this would be to make them signs of his own conceptions, and yet apply them to other ideas; which would be to make them signs and not signs of his ideas at the same time, and so in effect to have no signification at all. Words being voluntary signs, they cannot be voluntary signs imposed by him on things he knows not. That would be to make them signs of nothing, sounds without signification. A man cannot make his words the signs either of qualities in things, or of conceptions in the mind of another, whereof he has none in his own.

That would be to make them signs of nothing, sounds without signification. A man cannot make his words the signs either of qualities in things, or of conceptions in the mind of another, whereof he has none in his own. Till he has some ideas of his own, he cannot suppose them to correspond with the conceptions of another man; nor can he use any signs for them of another man; nor can he use any signs for them: for thus they would be the signs of he knows not what, which is in truth to be the signs of nothing.

Till he has some ideas of his own, he cannot suppose them to correspond with the conceptions of another man; nor can he use any signs for them of another man; nor can he use any signs for them: for thus they would be the signs of he knows not what, which is in truth to be the signs of nothing. But when he represents to himself other men’s ideas by some of his own, if he consent to give them the same names that other men do, it is still to his own ideas; to ideas that he has, and not to ideas that he has not. 3.

Key Concepts

• words, in their primary or immediate signification, stand for nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them, how imperfectly soever or carelessly those ideas are collected from the things which they are supposed to represent.
• That then which words are the marks of are the ideas of the speaker: nor can any one apply them as marks, immediately, to anything else but the ideas that he himself hath:
• for this would be to make them signs of his own conceptions, and yet apply them to other ideas; which would be to make them signs and not signs of his ideas at the same time, and so in effect to have no signification at all.
• Words being voluntary signs, they cannot be voluntary signs imposed by him on things he knows not. That would be to make them signs of nothing, sounds without signification.
• A man cannot make his words the signs either of qualities in things, or of conceptions in the mind of another, whereof he has none in his own.
• if he consent to give them the same names that other men do, it is still to his own ideas; to ideas that he has, and not to ideas that he has not.

Context

Book III, Chapter II, §2, where Locke lays down his central semantic thesis that words immediately signify only the speaker’s ideas and cannot directly signify unknown external qualities or others’ conceptions.