Liberty is the power in any agent to do or forbear a particular action according to the determination of its own mind; freedom requires that both doing and not doing lie within the agent’s power, and thus liberty presupposes thought and volition but can fail to be present even where there is willing.
By John Locke, from An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
Key Arguments
- Locke first reduces actions to two kinds: 'All the actions that we have any idea of reducing themselves, as has been said, to these two, viz. thinking and motion.'
- He defines freedom conditionally: 'so far as a man has power to think or not to think, to move or not to move, according to the preference or direction of his own mind, so far is a man free.'
- He contrasts liberty with cases where alternatives are not equally possible: 'Wherever any performance or forbearance are not equally in a man’s power; wherever doing or not doing will not equally follow upon the preference of his mind directing it, there he is not free, though perhaps the action may be voluntary.'
- His general definition: 'So that the idea of liberty is, the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other.'
- He adds the necessity condition: 'where either of them is not in the power of the agent to be produced by him according to his volition, there he is not at liberty; that agent is under necessity.'
- He concludes: 'So that liberty cannot be where there is no thought, no volition, no will; but there may be thought, there may be will, there may be volition, where there is no liberty.'
- He proposes that 'A little consideration of an obvious instance or two may make this clear,' preparing for his later examples.
Source Quotes
Liberty, what. All the actions that we have any idea of reducing themselves, as has been said, to these two, viz. thinking and motion; so far as a man has power to think or not to think, to move or not to move, according to the preference or direction of his own mind, so far is a man free. Wherever any performance or forbearance are not equally in a man’s power; wherever doing or not doing will not equally follow upon the preference of his mind directing it, there he is not free, though perhaps the action may be voluntary.
All the actions that we have any idea of reducing themselves, as has been said, to these two, viz. thinking and motion; so far as a man has power to think or not to think, to move or not to move, according to the preference or direction of his own mind, so far is a man free. Wherever any performance or forbearance are not equally in a man’s power; wherever doing or not doing will not equally follow upon the preference of his mind directing it, there he is not free, though perhaps the action may be voluntary. So that the idea of liberty is, the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other: where either of them is not in the power of the agent to be produced by him according to his volition, there he is not at liberty; that agent is under necessity.
Wherever any performance or forbearance are not equally in a man’s power; wherever doing or not doing will not equally follow upon the preference of his mind directing it, there he is not free, though perhaps the action may be voluntary. So that the idea of liberty is, the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other: where either of them is not in the power of the agent to be produced by him according to his volition, there he is not at liberty; that agent is under necessity. So that liberty cannot be where there is no thought, no volition, no will; but there may be thought, there may be will, there may be volition, where there is no liberty.
So that the idea of liberty is, the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other: where either of them is not in the power of the agent to be produced by him according to his volition, there he is not at liberty; that agent is under necessity. So that liberty cannot be where there is no thought, no volition, no will; but there may be thought, there may be will, there may be volition, where there is no liberty. A little consideration of an obvious instance or two may make this clear.
Key Concepts
- so far as a man has power to think or not to think, to move or not to move, according to the preference or direction of his own mind, so far is a man free.
- Wherever any performance or forbearance are not equally in a man’s power; wherever doing or not doing will not equally follow upon the preference of his mind directing it, there he is not free, though perhaps the action may be voluntary.
- the idea of liberty is, the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other
- where either of them is not in the power of the agent to be produced by him according to his volition, there he is not at liberty; that agent is under necessity.
- liberty cannot be where there is no thought, no volition, no will; but there may be thought, there may be will, there may be volition, where there is no liberty.
Context
Book II, chapter XXI, section 8, where Locke offers his precise definition of liberty in terms of the agent’s power relative to its own volitions and distinguishes liberty from mere voluntariness.