Key Arguments

• He observes that "all children and idiots have not the least apprehension or thought" of the supposed innate maxims, which suffices "to destroy that universal assent which must needs be the necessary concomitant of all innate truths."
• Locke argues conceptually that "imprinting, if it signify anything, [is] nothing else but the making certain truths to be perceived. For to imprint anything on the mind without the mind’s perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible."
• He reasons that if children and "idiots have souls, have minds, with those impressions upon them, they must unavoidably perceive them, and necessarily know and assent," yet "since they do not, it is evident that there are no such impressions."
• He develops what commentators call the transparency of the mental: "No proposition can be said to be in the mind which it never yet knew, which it was never yet conscious of."
• Locke shows that if "the capacity of knowing be the natural impression contended for, all the truths a man ever comes to know will, by this account, be every one of them innate"; we could even say truths are imprinted which a person "never did, nor ever shall know," reducing the claim of innateness "to no more, but only to a very improper way of speaking."
• He notes that "For nobody, I think, ever denied that the mind was capable of knowing several truths," so to redefine innateness as mere capacity yields no substantive thesis distinct from empiricism.
• He concludes that if "by saying, that the mind is ignorant of" an alleged innate notion and "never yet took notice of it, is to make this impression nothing," since "to be in the understanding" with any propriety "signify to be understood."

Source Quotes

Not on the mind naturally imprinted, because not known to children, idiots, &c. For, first, it is evident, that all children and idiots have not the least apprehension or thought of them. And the want of that is enough to destroy that universal assent which must needs be the necessary concomitant of all innate truths: it seeming to me near a contradiction to say, that there are truths imprinted on the soul, which it perceives or understands not: imprinting, if it signify anything, being nothing else but the making certain truths to be perceived.

For, first, it is evident, that all children and idiots have not the least apprehension or thought of them. And the want of that is enough to destroy that universal assent which must needs be the necessary concomitant of all innate truths: it seeming to me near a contradiction to say, that there are truths imprinted on the soul, which it perceives or understands not: imprinting, if it signify anything, being nothing else but the making certain truths to be perceived. For to imprint anything on the mind without the mind’s perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible.

For, first, it is evident, that all children and idiots have not the least apprehension or thought of them. And the want of that is enough to destroy that universal assent which must needs be the necessary concomitant of all innate truths: it seeming to me near a contradiction to say, that there are truths imprinted on the soul, which it perceives or understands not: imprinting, if it signify anything, being nothing else but the making certain truths to be perceived. For to imprint anything on the mind without the mind’s perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible. If therefore children and idiots have souls, have minds, with those impressions upon them, they must unavoidably perceive them, and necessarily know and assent to these truths; which since they do not, it is evident that there are no such impressions.

To say a notion is imprinted on the mind, and yet at the same time to say, that the mind is ignorant of it, and never yet took notice of it, is to make this impression nothing. No proposition can be said to be in the mind which it never yet knew, which it was never yet conscious of. For if any one may, then, by the same reason, all propositions that are true, and the mind is capable ever of assenting to, may be said to be in the mind, and to be imprinted: since, if any one can be said to be in the mind, which it never yet knew, it must be only because it is capable of knowing it; and so the mind is of all truths it ever shall know.

Nay, thus truths may be imprinted on the mind which it never did, nor ever shall know; for a man may live long, and die at last in ignorance of many truths which his mind was capable of knowing, and that with certainty. So that if the capacity of knowing be the natural impression contended for, all the truths a man ever comes to know will, by this account, be every one of them innate; and this great point will amount to no more, but only to a very improper way of speaking; which, whilst it pretends to assert the contrary, says nothing different from those who deny innate principles. For nobody, I think, ever denied that the mind was capable of knowing several truths.

He therefore that talks of innate notions in the understanding, cannot (if he intend thereby any distinct sort of truths) mean such truths to be in the understanding as it never perceived, and is yet wholly ignorant of. For if these words “to be in the understanding” have any propriety, they signify to be understood. So that to be in the understanding, and not to be understood; to be in the mind and never to be perceived, is all one as to say anything is and is not in the mind or understanding. If therefore these two propositions, “Whatsoever is, is,” and “It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,” are by nature imprinted, children cannot be ignorant of them: infants, and all that have souls, must necessarily have them in their understandings, know the truth of them, and assent to it.

Key Concepts

• all children and idiots have not the least apprehension or thought of them
• it seeming to me near a contradiction to say, that there are truths imprinted on the soul, which it perceives or understands not
• imprinting, if it signify anything, being nothing else but the making certain truths to be perceived. For to imprint anything on the mind without the mind’s perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible
• No proposition can be said to be in the mind which it never yet knew, which it was never yet conscious of
• if the capacity of knowing be the natural impression contended for, all the truths a man ever comes to know will, by this account, be every one of them innate
• this great point will amount to no more, but only to a very improper way of speaking; which, whilst it pretends to assert the contrary, says nothing different from those who deny innate principles
• For if these words “to be in the understanding” have any propriety, they signify to be understood. So that to be in the understanding, and not to be understood; to be in the mind and never to be perceived, is all one as to say anything is and is not in the mind or understanding

Context

Section 5, where Locke uses the case of children and "idiots" to argue that genuine innate impressions would necessarily be consciously known, and where he collapses dispositional innateness into trivial capacity.