Key Arguments

• Locke begins from reflection: 'When the mind turns its view inwards upon itself, and contemplates its own actions, thinking is the first that occurs. In it the mind observes a great variety of modifications, and from thence receives distinct ideas.'
• He defines sensation as a specific mode: 'the perception or thought which actually accompanies, and is annexed to, any impression on the body, made by an external object, being distinct from all other modifications of thinking, furnishes the mind with a distinct idea, which we call sensation; — which is, as it were, the actual entrance of any idea into the understanding by the senses.'
• He distinguishes remembrance: 'The same idea, when it again recurs without the operation of the like object on the external sensory, is remembrance.'
• He further distinguishes recollection as a more effortful retrieval: 'if it be sought after by the mind, and with pain and endeavour found, and brought again in view, it is recollection.'
• Contemplation is defined by sustained attention: 'if it be held there long under attentive consideration, it is contemplation.'
• He characterizes reverie as unregulated mental flow: 'when ideas float in our mind, without any reflection or regard of the understanding, it is that which the French call reverie; our language has scarce a name for it.'
• Attention is the registering of ideas in memory: 'when the ideas that offer themselves ... are taken notice of, and, as it were, registered in the memory, it is attention.'
• Intention or study is intense, voluntary fixation: 'when the mind with great earnestness, and of choice, fixes its view on any idea, considers it on all sides, and will not be called off by the ordinary solicitation of other ideas, it is that we call intention or study.'
• Sleep without dreaming is the suspension of these modes: 'sleep, without dreaming, is rest from all these.'
• Dreaming is thinking without current sensory input or rational control: 'dreaming itself is the having of ideas (whilst the outward senses are stopped, so that they receive not outward objects with their usual quickness) in the mind, not suggested by any external objects, or known occasion; nor under any choice or conduct of the understanding at all.'
• He tentatively suggests a further mode, ecstasy: 'and whether that which we call ecstasy be not dreaming with the eyes open, I leave to be examined.'

Source Quotes

Sensation, remembrance, contemplation, &c., modes of thinking. When the mind turns its view inwards upon itself, and contemplates its own actions, thinking is the first that occurs. In it the mind observes a great variety of modifications, and from thence receives distinct ideas.

In it the mind observes a great variety of modifications, and from thence receives distinct ideas. Thus the perception or thought which actually accompanies, and is annexed to, any impression on the body, made by an external object, being distinct from all other modifications of thinking, furnishes the mind with a distinct idea, which we call sensation; — which is, as it were, the actual entrance of any idea into the understanding by the senses. The same idea, when it again recurs without the operation of the like object on the external sensory, is remembrance: if it be sought after by the mind, and with pain and endeavour found, and brought again in view, it is recollection: if it be held there long under attentive consideration, it is contemplation: when ideas float in our mind, without any reflection or regard of the understanding, it is that which the French call reverie; our language has scarce a name for it: when the ideas that offer themselves (for, as I have observed in another place, whilst we are awake, there will always be a train of ideas succeeding one another in our minds) are taken notice of, and, as it were, registered in the memory, it is attention: when the mind with great earnestness, and of choice, fixes its view on any idea, considers it on all sides, and will not be called off by the ordinary solicitation of other ideas, it is that we call intention or study: sleep, without dreaming, is rest from all these: and dreaming itself is the having of ideas (whilst the outward senses are stopped, so that they receive not outward objects with their usual quickness) in the mind, not suggested by any external objects, or known occasion; nor under any choice or conduct of the understanding at all: and whether that which we call ecstasy be not dreaming with the eyes open, I leave to be examined.

Thus the perception or thought which actually accompanies, and is annexed to, any impression on the body, made by an external object, being distinct from all other modifications of thinking, furnishes the mind with a distinct idea, which we call sensation; — which is, as it were, the actual entrance of any idea into the understanding by the senses. The same idea, when it again recurs without the operation of the like object on the external sensory, is remembrance: if it be sought after by the mind, and with pain and endeavour found, and brought again in view, it is recollection: if it be held there long under attentive consideration, it is contemplation: when ideas float in our mind, without any reflection or regard of the understanding, it is that which the French call reverie; our language has scarce a name for it: when the ideas that offer themselves (for, as I have observed in another place, whilst we are awake, there will always be a train of ideas succeeding one another in our minds) are taken notice of, and, as it were, registered in the memory, it is attention: when the mind with great earnestness, and of choice, fixes its view on any idea, considers it on all sides, and will not be called off by the ordinary solicitation of other ideas, it is that we call intention or study: sleep, without dreaming, is rest from all these: and dreaming itself is the having of ideas (whilst the outward senses are stopped, so that they receive not outward objects with their usual quickness) in the mind, not suggested by any external objects, or known occasion; nor under any choice or conduct of the understanding at all: and whether that which we call ecstasy be not dreaming with the eyes open, I leave to be examined. 2.

Key Concepts

• When the mind turns its view inwards upon itself, and contemplates its own actions, thinking is the first that occurs.
• the perception or thought which actually accompanies, and is annexed to, any impression on the body, made by an external object, being distinct from all other modifications of thinking, furnishes the mind with a distinct idea, which we call sensation
• The same idea, when it again recurs without the operation of the like object on the external sensory, is remembrance
• if it be sought after by the mind, and with pain and endeavour found, and brought again in view, it is recollection
• if it be held there long under attentive consideration, it is contemplation
• when ideas float in our mind, without any reflection or regard of the understanding, it is that which the French call reverie; our language has scarce a name for it
• when the ideas that offer themselves (for, as I have observed in another place, whilst we are awake, there will always be a train of ideas succeeding one another in our minds) are taken notice of, and, as it were, registered in the memory, it is attention
• when the mind with great earnestness, and of choice, fixes its view on any idea, considers it on all sides, and will not be called off by the ordinary solicitation of other ideas, it is that we call intention or study
• sleep, without dreaming, is rest from all these
• dreaming itself is the having of ideas (whilst the outward senses are stopped, so that they receive not outward objects with their usual quickness) in the mind, not suggested by any external objects, or known occasion; nor under any choice or conduct of the understanding at all
• whether that which we call ecstasy be not dreaming with the eyes open, I leave to be examined

Context

Book II, chapter XIX, section 1, where Locke systematically introduces several distinct modes of thinking as examples of ideas gained by reflection on the mind’s own operations.