Key Arguments

• Locke concedes that 'men’s sticking to their past judgment, and adhering firmly to conclusions formerly made, is often the cause of great obstinacy in error and mistake', but immediately adds that 'the fault is not that they rely on their memories for what they have before well judged, but because they judged before they had well examined.'
• He criticizes those who 'think they have formed right judgments of several matters; and that for no other reason, but because they never thought otherwise', and who 'imagine themselves to have judged right, only because they never questioned, never examined, their own opinions', which he equates with 'to think they judged right, because they never judged at all.'
• He observes that 'those being generally the most fierce and firm in their tenets, who have least examined them', identifying lack of examination with dogmatic rigidity.
• Locke contrasts knowledge with probability: 'What we once know, we are certain is so: and we may be secure, that there are no latent proofs undiscovered, which may overturn our knowledge, or bring it in doubt', but in matters of probability 'it is not in every case we can be sure that we have all the particulars before us' and that there is no unseen evidence that might flip the balance.
• He stresses the practical compulsion to decide: 'Who almost is there that hath the leisure, patience, and means to collect together all the proofs concerning most of the opinions he has, so as safely to conclude that he hath a clear and full view?' and yet 'we are forced to determine ourselves on the one side or other' because 'The conduct of our lives, and the management of our great concerns, will not bear delay.'

Source Quotes

The ill consequence of this, if our former judgments were not rightly made. I cannot but own, that men’s sticking to their past judgment, and adhering firmly to conclusions formerly made, is often the cause of great obstinacy in error and mistake. But the fault is not that they rely on their memories for what they have before well judged, but because they judged before they had well examined.

I cannot but own, that men’s sticking to their past judgment, and adhering firmly to conclusions formerly made, is often the cause of great obstinacy in error and mistake. But the fault is not that they rely on their memories for what they have before well judged, but because they judged before they had well examined. May we not find a great number (not to say the greatest part) of men that think they have formed right judgments of several matters; and that for no other reason, but because they never thought otherwise? that imagine themselves to have judged right, only because they never questioned, never examined, their own opinions?

But the fault is not that they rely on their memories for what they have before well judged, but because they judged before they had well examined. May we not find a great number (not to say the greatest part) of men that think they have formed right judgments of several matters; and that for no other reason, but because they never thought otherwise? that imagine themselves to have judged right, only because they never questioned, never examined, their own opinions? Which is indeed to think they judged right, because they never judged at all. And yet these, of all men, hold their opinions with the greatest stiffness; those being generally the most fierce and firm in their tenets, who have least examined them.

What we once know, we are certain is so: and we may be secure, that there are no latent proofs undiscovered, which may overturn our knowledge, or bring it in doubt. But, in matters of probability, it is not in every case we can be sure that we have all the particulars before us, that any way concern the question; and that there is no evidence behind, and yet unseen, which may cast the probability on the other side, and outweigh all that at present seems to preponderate with us. Who almost is there that hath the leisure, patience, and means to collect together all the proofs concerning most of the opinions he has, so as safely to conclude that he hath a clear and full view; and that there is no more to be alleged for his better information?

And yet we are forced to determine ourselves on the one side or other. The conduct of our lives, and the management of our great concerns, will not bear delay: for those depend, for the most part, on the determination of our judgment in points wherein we are not capable of certain and demonstrative knowledge, and wherein it is necessary for us to embrace the one side or the other. 4.

Key Concepts

• I cannot but own, that men’s sticking to their past judgment, and adhering firmly to conclusions formerly made, is often the cause of great obstinacy in error and mistake
• the fault is not that they rely on their memories for what they have before well judged, but because they judged before they had well examined
• that imagine themselves to have judged right, only because they never questioned, never examined, their own opinions? Which is indeed to think they judged right, because they never judged at all
• in matters of probability, it is not in every case we can be sure that we have all the particulars before us, that any way concern the question; and that there is no evidence behind, and yet unseen, which may cast the probability on the other side
• The conduct of our lives, and the management of our great concerns, will not bear delay: for those depend, for the most part, on the determination of our judgment in points wherein we are not capable of certain and demonstrative knowledge

Context

Book IV, Chapter XVI, §3, where Locke diagnoses the roots of obstinate error, distinguishes knowledge from probability, and explains the necessity of practical decision under uncertainty.