Key Arguments

• Locke defines 'This wrong connexion in our minds of ideas in themselves loose and independent of one another' and asserts that it 'has such an influence, and is of so great force to set us awry in our actions, as well moral as natural, passions, reasonings, and notions themselves, that perhaps there is not any one thing that deserves more to be looked after.'
• He illustrates with the case of a 'foolish maid' who repeatedly couples the 'ideas of goblins and sprites' with 'darkness' in a child's mind, so that 'possibly he shall never be able to separate them again so long as he lives', and 'darkness shall ever afterwards bring with it those frightful ideas, and they shall be so joined, that he can no more bear the one than the other.'
• He gives the example of a man who 'receives a sensible injury from another' and, by 'ruminating on them strongly, or much, in his mind, so cements those two ideas together'—the man and the injuring action—'that he makes them almost one', never thinking of the man without 'the pain and displeasure he suffered' accompanying the idea, thereby generating enduring 'hatreds' and 'quarrels'.
• Another example is a man who 'has suffered pain or sickness in any place' or 'saw his friend die in such a room'; thereafter 'when the idea of the place occurs to his mind, it brings (the impression being once made) that of the pain and displeasure with it', so that he 'can as little bear the one as the other.'
• Locke generalizes that such associative links are often beyond the corrective power of reason 'while [the combination] lasts', because 'Ideas in our minds, when they are there, will operate according to their natures and circumstances', showing how deeply association conditions affective and practical life.

Source Quotes

Wrong connexion of ideas a great cause of errors. This wrong connexion in our minds of ideas in themselves loose and independent of one another, has such an influence, and is of so great force to set us awry in our actions, as well moral as natural, passions, reasonings, and notions themselves, that perhaps there is not any one thing that deserves more to be looked after. 10.

An instance. The ideas of goblins and sprites have really no more to do with darkness than light: yet let but a foolish maid inculcate these often on the mind of a child, and raise them there together, possibly he shall never be able to separate them again so long as he lives, but darkness shall ever afterwards bring with it those frightful ideas, and they shall be so joined, that he can no more bear the one than the other. 11.

Another instance. A man receives a sensible injury from another, thinks on the man and that action over and over, and by ruminating on them strongly, or much, in his mind, so cements those two ideas together, that he makes them almost one; never thinks on the man, but the pain and displeasure he suffered comes into his mind with it, so that he scarce distinguishes them, but has as much an aversion for the one as the other. Thus hatreds are often begotten from slight and innocent occasions, and quarrels propagated and continued in the world.

A third instance. A man has suffered pain or sickness in any place; he saw his friend die in such a room: though these have in nature nothing to do one with another, yet when the idea of the place occurs to his mind, it brings (the impression being once made) that of the pain and displeasure with it: he confounds them in his mind, and can as little bear the one as the other. 13.

Key Concepts

• This wrong connexion in our minds of ideas in themselves loose and independent of one another, has such an influence, and is of so great force to set us awry in our actions, as well moral as natural, passions, reasonings, and notions themselves
• perhaps there is not any one thing that deserves more to be looked after.
• The ideas of goblins and sprites have really no more to do with darkness than light: yet let but a foolish maid inculcate these often on the mind of a child
• he shall never be able to separate them again so long as he lives, but darkness shall ever afterwards bring with it those frightful ideas
• so cements those two ideas together, that he makes them almost one; never thinks on the man, but the pain and displeasure he suffered comes into his mind with it
• he confounds them in his mind, and can as little bear the one as the other.

Context

§§9–12 of Chapter XXXIII, where Locke explicitly identifies wrong association as a principal source of error and exemplifies its effects on fear, hatred, aversion to places, and social quarrels.