Key Arguments

• He insists that “It is essential to observe that the intuitionist does not deny that we can describe how we balance competing principles, or how any one man does so,” and “grants the possibility that these weights can be depicted by indifference curves,” admitting systematic description.
• He notes that “Knowing the description of these weights, the judgments which will be made can be foreseen. In this sense these judgments have a consistent and definite structure,” acknowledging that intuitionist judgments are not chaotic.
• He allows that “any given balancing of principles is subject to interpretation” as if guided by further standards or by the pursuit of some end, and that “Perhaps the weights we assign are those which would result if we were to apply these standards or to pursue this end.”
• However, he stresses that “the intuitionist claims that, in fact, there is no such interpretation. He contends that there exists no expressible ethical conception which underlies these weights,” denying an underlying coherent moral theory.
• He adds that “A geometrical figure or a mathematical function may describe them, but there are no constructive moral criteria that establish their reasonableness,” drawing a sharp line between descriptive representation and justificatory criteria.
• Summarizing, he writes that “Intuitionism holds that in our judgments of social justice we must eventually reach a plurality of first principles in regard to which we can only say that it seems to us more correct to balance them this way rather than that,” emphasizing the ultimate reliance on ‘seems right’.
• He concedes that “there is nothing intrinsically irrational about this intuitionist doctrine. Indeed, it may be true,” and that “We cannot take for granted that there must be a complete derivation of our judgments of social justice from recognizably ethical principles,” acknowledging its prima facie plausibility.
• He characterizes the intuitionist’s positive contention: “the complexity of the moral facts defies our efforts to give a full account of our judgments and necessitates a plurality of competing principles,” and that attempts to go beyond them either reduce to triviality (“give every man his due”) or “lead to falsehood and oversimplification” (“settles everything by the principle of utility”).
• He then specifies what a refutation must look like: “The only way therefore to dispute intuitionism is to set forth the recognizably ethical criteria that account for the weights which, in our considered judgments, we think appropriate to give to the plurality of principles. A refutation of intuitionism consists in presenting the sort of constructive criteria that are said not to exist.”
• He remarks that the notion of a ‘recognizably ethical principle’ is vague but insists that debating it in the abstract is “pointless”; instead, “The intuitionist and his critic will have to settle this question once the latter has put forward his more systematic account,” indicating that anti‑intuitionist theories (like his own) must be concretely presented to test this claim.

Source Quotes

Or if this is not so, then at least they can agree to some scheme whereby their assignment of weights can be compromised. It is essential to observe that the intuitionist does not deny that we can describe how we balance competing principles, or how any one man does so, supposing that we weigh them differently. The intuitionist grants the possibility that these weights can be depicted by indifference curves.

It is essential to observe that the intuitionist does not deny that we can describe how we balance competing principles, or how any one man does so, supposing that we weigh them differently. The intuitionist grants the possibility that these weights can be depicted by indifference curves. Knowing the description of these weights, the judgments which will be made can be foreseen.

The intuitionist grants the possibility that these weights can be depicted by indifference curves. Knowing the description of these weights, the judgments which will be made can be foreseen. In this sense these judgments have a consistent and definite structure. Of course, it may be claimed that in the assignment of weights we are guided, without being aware of it, by certain further standards or by how best to realize a certain end.

Admittedly any given balancing of principles is subject to interpretation in this way. But the intuitionist claims that, in fact, there is no such interpretation. He contends that there exists no expressible ethical conception which underlies these weights. A geometrical figure or a mathematical function may describe them, but there are no constructive moral criteria that establish their reasonableness.

He contends that there exists no expressible ethical conception which underlies these weights. A geometrical figure or a mathematical function may describe them, but there are no constructive moral criteria that establish their reasonableness. Intuitionism holds that in our judgments of social justice we must eventually reach a plurality of first principles in regard to which we can only say that it seems to us more correct to balance them this way rather than that.

A geometrical figure or a mathematical function may describe them, but there are no constructive moral criteria that establish their reasonableness. Intuitionism holds that in our judgments of social justice we must eventually reach a plurality of first principles in regard to which we can only say that it seems to us more correct to balance them this way rather than that. Now there is nothing intrinsically irrational about this intuitionist doctrine.

Intuitionism holds that in our judgments of social justice we must eventually reach a plurality of first principles in regard to which we can only say that it seems to us more correct to balance them this way rather than that. Now there is nothing intrinsically irrational about this intuitionist doctrine. Indeed, it may be true. We cannot take for granted that there must be a complete derivation of our judgments of social justice from recognizably ethical principles.

Indeed, it may be true. We cannot take for granted that there must be a complete derivation of our judgments of social justice from recognizably ethical principles. The intuitionist believes to the contrary that the complexity of the moral facts defies our efforts to give a full account of our judgments and necessitates a plurality of competing principles.

We cannot take for granted that there must be a complete derivation of our judgments of social justice from recognizably ethical principles. The intuitionist believes to the contrary that the complexity of the moral facts defies our efforts to give a full account of our judgments and necessitates a plurality of competing principles. He contends that attempts to go beyond these principles either reduce to triviality, as when it is said that social justice is to give every man his due, or else lead to falsehood and oversimplification, as when one settles everything by the principle of utility.

The intuitionist believes to the contrary that the complexity of the moral facts defies our efforts to give a full account of our judgments and necessitates a plurality of competing principles. He contends that attempts to go beyond these principles either reduce to triviality, as when it is said that social justice is to give every man his due, or else lead to falsehood and oversimplification, as when one settles everything by the principle of utility. The only way therefore to dispute intuitionism is to set forth the recognizably ethical criteria that account for the weights which, in our considered judgments, we think appropriate to give to the plurality of principles.

He contends that attempts to go beyond these principles either reduce to triviality, as when it is said that social justice is to give every man his due, or else lead to falsehood and oversimplification, as when one settles everything by the principle of utility. The only way therefore to dispute intuitionism is to set forth the recognizably ethical criteria that account for the weights which, in our considered judgments, we think appropriate to give to the plurality of principles. A refutation of intuitionism consists in presenting the sort of constructive criteria that are said not to exist.

The only way therefore to dispute intuitionism is to set forth the recognizably ethical criteria that account for the weights which, in our considered judgments, we think appropriate to give to the plurality of principles. A refutation of intuitionism consists in presenting the sort of constructive criteria that are said not to exist. To be sure, the notion of a recognizably ethical principle is vague, although it is easy to give many examples drawn from tradition and common sense.

A refutation of intuitionism consists in presenting the sort of constructive criteria that are said not to exist. To be sure, the notion of a recognizably ethical principle is vague, although it is easy to give many examples drawn from tradition and common sense. But it is pointless to discuss this matter in the abstract.

To be sure, the notion of a recognizably ethical principle is vague, although it is easy to give many examples drawn from tradition and common sense. But it is pointless to discuss this matter in the abstract. The intuitionist and his critic will have to settle this question once the latter has put forward his more systematic account. It may be asked whether intuitionistic theories are teleological or deontological.

Key Concepts

• It is essential to observe that the intuitionist does not deny that we can describe how we balance competing principles, or how any one man does so, supposing that we weigh them differently.
• The intuitionist grants the possibility that these weights can be depicted by indifference curves.
• Knowing the description of these weights, the judgments which will be made can be foreseen. In this sense these judgments have a consistent and definite structure.
• But the intuitionist claims that, in fact, there is no such interpretation. He contends that there exists no expressible ethical conception which underlies these weights.
• A geometrical figure or a mathematical function may describe them, but there are no constructive moral criteria that establish their reasonableness.
• Intuitionism holds that in our judgments of social justice we must eventually reach a plurality of first principles in regard to which we can only say that it seems to us more correct to balance them this way rather than that.
• Now there is nothing intrinsically irrational about this intuitionist doctrine. Indeed, it may be true.
• We cannot take for granted that there must be a complete derivation of our judgments of social justice from recognizably ethical principles.
• The intuitionist believes to the contrary that the complexity of the moral facts defies our efforts to give a full account of our judgments and necessitates a plurality of competing principles.
• He contends that attempts to go beyond these principles either reduce to triviality, as when it is said that social justice is to give every man his due, or else lead to falsehood and oversimplification, as when one settles everything by the principle of utility.
• The only way therefore to dispute intuitionism is to set forth the recognizably ethical criteria that account for the weights which, in our considered judgments, we think appropriate to give to the plurality of principles.
• A refutation of intuitionism consists in presenting the sort of constructive criteria that are said not to exist.
• To be sure, the notion of a recognizably ethical principle is vague, although it is easy to give many examples drawn from tradition and common sense.
• But it is pointless to discuss this matter in the abstract. The intuitionist and his critic will have to settle this question once the latter has put forward his more systematic account.

Context

Later part of §7, where Rawls clarifies that intuitionism is compatible with structural description of our judgments but denies underlying constructive criteria, and he outlines what a successful non‑intuitionist theory must provide to count as a refutation.