All obligations (as distinct from natural duties) arise from the principle of fairness, which states that a person is obligated to do their part as specified by an institution’s rules only when they have voluntarily accepted its benefits or opportunities and the institution is at least reasonably just according to the two principles of justice, so that consent to clearly unjust arrangements never generates obligations.
By John Rawls, from A Theory of Justice
Key Arguments
- Rawls defines the principle of fairness as holding 'that a person is under an obligation to do his part as specified by the rules of an institution whenever he has voluntarily accepted the benefits of the scheme or has taken advantage of the opportunities it offers to advance his interests, provided that this institution is just or fair, that is, satisfies the two principles of justice.'
- He explains the intuitive idea: 'when a number of persons engage in a mutually advantageous cooperative venture according to certain rules and thus voluntarily restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to these restrictions have a right to a similar acquiescence on the part of those who have benefited from their submission. 196 We are not to gain from the cooperative efforts of others without doing our fair share.'
- Rawls emphasizes that 'the principle of fairness has two parts: one which states how we acquire obligations, namely, by doing various things voluntarily; and another which lays down the condition that the institution in question be just, if not perfectly just, at least as just as it is reasonable to expect under the circumstances.'
- The second clause 'insure[s] that obligations arise only if certain background conditions are satisfied', and he insists that 'Acquiescence in, or even consent to, clearly unjust institutions does not give rise to obligations.'
- He draws an analogy with extorted promises: 'It is generally agreed that extorted promises are void ab initio. But similarly, unjust social arrangements are themselves a kind of extortion, even violence, and consent to them does not bind.'
- He grounds the just‑institution condition in the original position: 'The reason for this condition is that the parties in the original position would insist upon it.'
Source Quotes
Whereas there are various principles of natural duty, all obligations arise from the principle of fairness (as defined in §18) . It will be recalled that this principle holds that a person is under an obligation to do his part as specified by the rules of an institution whenever he has voluntarily accepted the benefits of the scheme or has taken advantage of the opportunities it offers to advance his interests, provided that this institution is just or fair, that is, satisfies the two principles of justice.
Whereas there are various principles of natural duty, all obligations arise from the principle of fairness (as defined in §18) . It will be recalled that this principle holds that a person is under an obligation to do his part as specified by the rules of an institution whenever he has voluntarily accepted the benefits of the scheme or has taken advantage of the opportunities it offers to advance his interests, provided that this institution is just or fair, that is, satisfies the two principles of justice. As noted before, the intuitive idea here is that when a number of persons engage in a mutually advantageous cooperative venture according to certain rules and thus voluntarily restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to these restrictions have a right to a similar acquiescence on the part of those who have benefited from their submission.
It will be recalled that this principle holds that a person is under an obligation to do his part as specified by the rules of an institution whenever he has voluntarily accepted the benefits of the scheme or has taken advantage of the opportunities it offers to advance his interests, provided that this institution is just or fair, that is, satisfies the two principles of justice. As noted before, the intuitive idea here is that when a number of persons engage in a mutually advantageous cooperative venture according to certain rules and thus voluntarily restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to these restrictions have a right to a similar acquiescence on the part of those who have benefited from their submission. 196 We are not to gain from the cooperative efforts of others without doing our fair share. It must not be forgotten that the principle of fairness has two parts: one which states how we acquire obligations, namely, by doing various things voluntarily; and another which lays down the condition that the institution in question be just, if not perfectly just, at least as just as it is reasonable to expect under the circumstances.
196 We are not to gain from the cooperative efforts of others without doing our fair share. It must not be forgotten that the principle of fairness has two parts: one which states how we acquire obligations, namely, by doing various things voluntarily; and another which lays down the condition that the institution in question be just, if not perfectly just, at least as just as it is reasonable to expect under the circumstances. The purpose of this second clause is to insure that obligations arise only if certain background conditions are satisfied.
The purpose of this second clause is to insure that obligations arise only if certain background conditions are satisfied. Acquiescence in, or even consent to, clearly unjust institutions does not give rise to obligations. It is generally agreed that extorted promises are void ab initio.
It is generally agreed that extorted promises are void ab initio. But similarly, unjust social arrangements are themselves a kind of extortion, even violence, and consent to them does not bind. The reason for this condition is that the parties in the original position would insist upon it.
Key Concepts
- Whereas there are various principles of natural duty, all obligations arise from the principle of fairness (as defined in §18) .
- this principle holds that a person is under an obligation to do his part as specified by the rules of an institution whenever he has voluntarily accepted the benefits of the scheme or has taken advantage of the opportunities it offers to advance his interests, provided that this institution is just or fair, that is, satisfies the two principles of justice.
- those who have submitted to these restrictions have a right to a similar acquiescence on the part of those who have benefited from their submission. 196 We are not to gain from the cooperative efforts of others without doing our fair share.
- the principle of fairness has two parts: one which states how we acquire obligations, namely, by doing various things voluntarily; and another which lays down the condition that the institution in question be just, if not perfectly just, at least as just as it is reasonable to expect under the circumstances.
- Acquiescence in, or even consent to, clearly unjust institutions does not give rise to obligations.
- unjust social arrangements are themselves a kind of extortion, even violence, and consent to them does not bind.
Context
Opening paragraphs of §52 ('The Arguments for the Principle of Fairness'), where Rawls restates and sharpens his definition of the principle of fairness, emphasizes its two-part structure (voluntariness plus just background institutions), and denies that consent to unjust schemes can bind, grounding this condition in what would be insisted upon in the original position.