Key Arguments

• A valid agreement requires that 'the parties must be able to honor it under all relevant and foreseeable circumstances. There must be a rational assurance that one can carry through,' so they must avoid principles whose demands they know human beings cannot reliably meet.
• The original agreement is 'final and made in perpetuity, there is no second chance'; since a person is 'choosing once and for all the standards which are to govern his life prospects,' the burden of commitment is especially severe and must be carefully considered.
• Rawls claims that 'when we enter an agreement we must be able to honor it even should the worst possibilities prove to be the case. Otherwise we have not acted in good faith,' so the parties must evaluate principles in light of their worst consequences.
• Given only 'a general knowledge of human psychology,' the parties can still see 'which conception of justice involves the greater stress,' and in this respect 'the two principles of justice have a definite advantage' because they protect basic rights and insure against the worst outcomes.
• Under the two principles, the parties 'run no chance of having to acquiesce in a loss of freedom over the course of their life for the sake of a greater good enjoyed by others,' whereas the principle of utility can require such sacrifices, which they may not be able to keep in practice.
• Rawls doubts whether a utility-based agreement is even bona fide: 'Compacts of this sort exceed the capacity of human nature. How can the parties possibly know, or be sufficiently sure, that they can keep such an agreement? Certainly they cannot base their confidence on a general knowledge of moral psychology.'
• Although any principle 'may require a large sacrifice for some,' Rawls distinguishes beneficiaries of 'clearly unjust institutions' (who cannot reasonably expect to keep their position) from those who, under utility, gamble away their liberties and life prospects for a chance at greater well‑being and then 'may have difficulty abiding by his undertaking.'
• He notes that such a person 'is bound to remind himself that he had the two principles of justice as an alternative,' which undermines his willingness to honor the utilitarian agreement and shows that, given a less risky alternative, accepting utility is irrational.
• Rawls concedes that if 'all involved similar risks, the problem of the strains of commitment would have to be waived,' but since 'This is not the case,' the two principles, as an 'adequate minimum conception of justice in a situation of great uncertainty,' are 'distinctly superior.'

Source Quotes

In this section my aim is to use the conditions of publicity and finality to give some of the main arguments for the two principles of justice. I shall rely upon the fact that for an agreement to be valid, the parties must be able to honor it under all relevant and foreseeable circumstances. There must be a rational assurance that one can carry through. The arguments I shall adduce fit under the heuristic schema suggested by the reasons for following the maximin rule.

Thus they consider the strains of commitment. They cannot enter into agreements that may have consequences they cannot accept. They will avoid those that they can adhere to only with great difficulty. Since the original agreement is final and made in perpetuity, there is no second chance.

They will avoid those that they can adhere to only with great difficulty. Since the original agreement is final and made in perpetuity, there is no second chance. In view of the serious nature of the possible consequences, the question of the burden of commitment is especially acute.

In view of the serious nature of the possible consequences, the question of the burden of commitment is especially acute. A person is choosing once and for all the standards which are to govern his life prospects. Moreover, when we enter an agreement we must be able to honor it even should the worst possibilities prove to be the case.

A person is choosing once and for all the standards which are to govern his life prospects. Moreover, when we enter an agreement we must be able to honor it even should the worst possibilities prove to be the case. Otherwise we have not acted in good faith. Thus the parties must weigh with care whether they will be able to stick by their commitment in all circumstances.

But this information is enough to tell which conception of justice involves the greater stress. In this respect the two principles of justice have a definite advantage. Not only do the parties protect their basic rights but they insure themselves against the worst eventualities. They run no chance of having to acquiesce in a loss of freedom over the course of their life for the sake of a greater good enjoyed by others, an undertaking that in actual circumstances they might not be able to keep.

Not only do the parties protect their basic rights but they insure themselves against the worst eventualities. They run no chance of having to acquiesce in a loss of freedom over the course of their life for the sake of a greater good enjoyed by others, an undertaking that in actual circumstances they might not be able to keep. Indeed, we might wonder whether such an agreement can be made in good faith at all.

Indeed, we might wonder whether such an agreement can be made in good faith at all. Compacts of this sort exceed the capacity of human nature. How can the parties possibly know, or be sufficiently sure, that they can keep such an agreement? Certainly they cannot base their confidence on a general knowledge of moral psychology.

But in this case they will know that they could not have maintained their position anyway. Yet should a person gamble with his liberties and substantive interests hoping that the application of the principle of utility might secure him a greater well-being, he may have difficulty abiding by his undertaking. He is bound to remind himself that he had the two principles of justice as an alternative.

He is bound to remind himself that he had the two principles of justice as an alternative. If the only possible candidates all involved similar risks, the problem of the strains of commitment would have to be waived. This is not the case, and judged in this light the two principles seem distinctly superior. A second consideration invokes the condition of publicity as well as that of the constraints on agreements.

Key Concepts

• I shall rely upon the fact that for an agreement to be valid, the parties must be able to honor it under all relevant and foreseeable circumstances. There must be a rational assurance that one can carry through.
• They cannot enter into agreements that may have consequences they cannot accept. They will avoid those that they can adhere to only with great difficulty.
• Since the original agreement is final and made in perpetuity, there is no second chance.
• A person is choosing once and for all the standards which are to govern his life prospects.
• when we enter an agreement we must be able to honor it even should the worst possibilities prove to be the case. Otherwise we have not acted in good faith.
• In this respect the two principles of justice have a definite advantage. Not only do the parties protect their basic rights but they insure themselves against the worst eventualities.
• They run no chance of having to acquiesce in a loss of freedom over the course of their life for the sake of a greater good enjoyed by others, an undertaking that in actual circumstances they might not be able to keep.
• Compacts of this sort exceed the capacity of human nature. How can the parties possibly know, or be sufficiently sure, that they can keep such an agreement?
• Yet should a person gamble with his liberties and substantive interests hoping that the application of the principle of utility might secure him a greater well-being, he may have difficulty abiding by his undertaking.
• If the only possible candidates all involved similar risks, the problem of the strains of commitment would have to be waived. This is not the case, and judged in this light the two principles seem distinctly superior.

Context

Opening part of §29 ('Some Main Grounds for the Two Principles of Justice'), where Rawls explicitly uses the 'strains of commitment' and the finality of the original agreement, under conditions of great uncertainty, as a heuristic maximin-style argument in favor of the two principles and against utilitarianism.