Key Arguments

• Rawls restricts his theory to 'the special case of a nearly just society, one that is well-ordered for the most part but in which some serious violations of justice nevertheless do occur', so the context is not revolution against a thoroughly unjust order but protest within a basically legitimate system.
• He presupposes 'that a state of near justice requires a democratic regime', so the theory 'concerns the role and the appropriateness of civil disobedience to legitimately established democratic authority', explicitly excluding other forms of government and most revolutionary contexts.
• He emphasizes that he will not treat civil disobedience 'as a tactic for transforming or even overturning an unjust and corrupt system', where 'There is no difficulty about such action in this case' since 'If any means to this end are justified, then surely nonviolent opposition is justified.' The hard problem arises only where the system is 'more or less just'.
• He frames the issue as 'a conflict of duties': 'At what point does the duty to comply with laws enacted by a legislative majority (or with executive acts supported by such a majority) cease to be binding in view of the right to defend one’s liberties and the duty to oppose injustice?'
• Because the question turns on when majority-enacted law loses its moral authority in light of higher principles, he concludes: 'This question involves the nature and limits of majority rule. For this reason the problem of civil disobedience is a crucial test case for any theory of the moral basis of democracy.'

Source Quotes

I now wish to illustrate the content of the principles of natural duty and obligation by sketching a theory of civil disobedience. As I have already indicated, this theory is designed only for the special case of a nearly just society, one that is well-ordered for the most part but in which some serious violations of justice nevertheless do occur. Since I assume that a state of near justice requires a democratic regime, the theory concerns the role and the appropriateness of civil disobedience to legitimately established democratic authority.

As I have already indicated, this theory is designed only for the special case of a nearly just society, one that is well-ordered for the most part but in which some serious violations of justice nevertheless do occur. Since I assume that a state of near justice requires a democratic regime, the theory concerns the role and the appropriateness of civil disobedience to legitimately established democratic authority. It does not apply to the other forms of government nor, except incidentally, to other kinds of dissent or resistance.

It does not apply to the other forms of government nor, except incidentally, to other kinds of dissent or resistance. I shall not discuss this mode of protest, along with militant action and resistance, as a tactic for transforming or even overturning an unjust and corrupt system. There is no difficulty about such action in this case. If any means to this end are justified, then surely nonviolent opposition is justified. The problem of civil disobedience, as I shall interpret it, arises only within a more or less just democratic state for those citizens who recognize and accept the legitimacy of the constitution.

If any means to this end are justified, then surely nonviolent opposition is justified. The problem of civil disobedience, as I shall interpret it, arises only within a more or less just democratic state for those citizens who recognize and accept the legitimacy of the constitution. The difficulty is one of a conflict of duties.

The difficulty is one of a conflict of duties. At what point does the duty to comply with laws enacted by a legislative majority (or with executive acts supported by such a majority) cease to be binding in view of the right to defend one’s liberties and the duty to oppose injustice? This question involves the nature and limits of majority rule.

This question involves the nature and limits of majority rule. For this reason the problem of civil disobedience is a crucial test case for any theory of the moral basis of democracy. A constitutional theory of civil disobedience has three parts.

Key Concepts

• this theory is designed only for the special case of a nearly just society, one that is well-ordered for the most part but in which some serious violations of justice nevertheless do occur.
• Since I assume that a state of near justice requires a democratic regime, the theory concerns the role and the appropriateness of civil disobedience to legitimately established democratic authority.
• I shall not discuss this mode of protest, along with militant action and resistance, as a tactic for transforming or even overturning an unjust and corrupt system. There is no difficulty about such action in this case. If any means to this end are justified, then surely nonviolent opposition is justified.
• The problem of civil disobedience, as I shall interpret it, arises only within a more or less just democratic state for those citizens who recognize and accept the legitimacy of the constitution.
• At what point does the duty to comply with laws enacted by a legislative majority (or with executive acts supported by such a majority) cease to be binding in view of the right to defend one’s liberties and the duty to oppose injustice?
• For this reason the problem of civil disobedience is a crucial test case for any theory of the moral basis of democracy.

Context

Opening paragraphs of §55, where Rawls situates his forthcoming definition of civil disobedience within his broader theory of natural duty and obligation, restricts it to nearly just democratic regimes, and identifies it as a central problem about the moral limits of majority rule.