Key Arguments

• Rawls notes that on his contract doctrine 'the equal liberty of citizens does not presuppose that the ends of different persons have the same intrinsic value, nor that their freedom and well-being is of the same worth.'
• Rather, 'It is postulated though that the parties are moral persons, rational individuals with a coherent system of ends and a capacity for a sense of justice. Since they have the requisite defining properties, it would be superfluous to add that the parties are equally moral persons.'
• He suggests we 'can say if we wish that men have equal dignity, meaning by this simply that they all satisfy the conditions of moral personality expressed by the interpretation of the initial contractual situation', and that 'being alike in this respect, they are to be treated as the principles of justice require (§77). But none of this implies that their activities and accomplishments are of equal excellence.'
• He warns that 'To think this is to conflate the notion of moral personality with the various perfections that fall under the concept of value.'
• He then argues conversely that equality of value does not entail equal rights: 'It should also be observed that their being of equal value is not sufficient either. Sometimes it is said that equality of basic rights follows from the equal capacity of individuals for the higher forms of life; but it is not clear why this should be so. Intrinsic worth is a notion falling under the concept of value, and whether equal liberty or some other principle is appropriate depends upon the conception of right.'
• Turning to perfectionism, 'the criterion of perfection insists that rights in the basic structure be assigned so as to maximize the total of intrinsic value. Presumably the configuration of rights and opportunities enjoyed by individuals affects the degree to which they bring to fruition their latent powers and excellences. But it does not follow that an equal distribution of basic freedoms is the best solution.'
• He notes that the perfectionist situation 'resembles that of classical utilitarianism: we require postulates parallel to the standard assumptions', such as a 'principle of diminishing marginal value' of additional rights, and that 'unless there are bountiful resources, the sum of value might be best increased by very unequal rights and opportunities favoring a few.'
• On the perfectionist view 'Doing this is not unjust ... provided that it is necessary to produce a greater sum of human excellence.'
• Rawls finds these assumptions 'extremely implausible' and concludes: 'The principle of perfection provides, then, an insecure foundation for the equal liberties and it would presumably depart widely from the difference principle. The assumptions required for equality seem extremely implausible. To find a firm basis for equal liberty, it seems that we must reject the traditional teleological principles, both perfectionist and utilitarian.'

Source Quotes

Thus the social resources necessary to support associations dedicated to advancing the arts and sciences and culture generally are to be won as a fair return for services rendered, or from such voluntary contributions as citizens wish to make, all within a regime regulated by the two principles of justice. On the contract doctrine, then, the equal liberty of citizens does not presuppose that the ends of different persons have the same intrinsic value, nor that their freedom and well-being is of the same worth. It is postulated though that the parties are moral persons, rational individuals with a coherent system of ends and a capacity for a sense of justice.

Since they have the requisite defining properties, it would be superfluous to add that the parties are equally moral persons. We can say if we wish that men have equal dignity, meaning by this simply that they all satisfy the conditions of moral personality expressed by the interpretation of the initial contractual situation. And being alike in this respect, they are to be treated as the principles of justice require (§77).

And being alike in this respect, they are to be treated as the principles of justice require (§77). But none of this implies that their activities and accomplishments are of equal excellence. To think this is to conflate the notion of moral personality with the various perfections that fall under the concept of value. I have just noted that persons’ being of equal value is not necessary for equal liberty.

I have just noted that persons’ being of equal value is not necessary for equal liberty. It should also be observed that their being of equal value is not sufficient either. Sometimes it is said that equality of basic rights follows from the equal capacity of individuals for the higher forms of life; but it is not clear why this should be so. Intrinsic worth is a notion falling under the concept of value, and whether equal liberty or some other principle is appropriate depends upon the conception of right.

Intrinsic worth is a notion falling under the concept of value, and whether equal liberty or some other principle is appropriate depends upon the conception of right. Now the criterion of perfection insists that rights in the basic structure be assigned so as to maximize the total of intrinsic value. Presumably the configuration of rights and opportunities enjoyed by individuals affects the degree to which they bring to fruition their latent powers and excellences.

Thus even if the latent abilities of individuals were similar, unless the assignment of rights is governed by a principle of diminishing marginal value (estimated in this case by the criteria for excellence), equal rights would not be insured. Indeed, unless there are bountiful resources, the sum of value might be best increased by very unequal rights and opportunities favoring a few. Doing this is not unjust on the perfectionist view provided that it is necessary to produce a greater sum of human excellence.

To the contrary, this contribution may grow (or stay constant) indefinitely. The principle of perfection provides, then, an insecure foundation for the equal liberties and it would presumably depart widely from the difference principle. The assumptions required for equality seem extremely implausible.

The assumptions required for equality seem extremely implausible. To find a firm basis for equal liberty, it seems that we must reject the traditional teleological principles, both perfectionist and utilitarian. So far I have been discussing perfectionism as a single-principle teleological theory.

Key Concepts

• the equal liberty of citizens does not presuppose that the ends of different persons have the same intrinsic value, nor that their freedom and well-being is of the same worth.
• We can say if we wish that men have equal dignity, meaning by this simply that they all satisfy the conditions of moral personality expressed by the interpretation of the initial contractual situation.
• But none of this implies that their activities and accomplishments are of equal excellence. To think this is to conflate the notion of moral personality with the various perfections that fall under the concept of value.
• their being of equal value is not sufficient either. Sometimes it is said that equality of basic rights follows from the equal capacity of individuals for the higher forms of life; but it is not clear why this should be so.
• the criterion of perfection insists that rights in the basic structure be assigned so as to maximize the total of intrinsic value.
• unless there are bountiful resources, the sum of value might be best increased by very unequal rights and opportunities favoring a few.
• The principle of perfection provides, then, an insecure foundation for the equal liberties and it would presumably depart widely from the difference principle.
• To find a firm basis for equal liberty, it seems that we must reject the traditional teleological principles, both perfectionist and utilitarian.

Context

Middle-to-late part of §50, where Rawls examines whether perfectionism can ground equal basic liberties and argues that equal value neither grounds nor is required by equal rights, and that a maximizing perfectionist standard would likely support unequal liberties.