Key Arguments

• Rawls identifies a priority among natural duties: “From the standpoint of justice as fairness, a fundamental natural duty is the duty of justice,” singling it out as basic.
• He defines it in institutional terms: “This duty requires us to support and to comply with just institutions that exist and apply to us. It also constrains us to further just arrangements not yet established, at least when this can be done without too much cost to ourselves,” covering both compliance and reform.
• He stresses that this duty applies irrespective of voluntary acts: “Thus if the basic structure of society is just, or as just as it is reasonable to expect in the circumstances, everyone has a natural duty to do his part in the existing scheme. Each is bound to these institutions independent of his voluntary acts, performative or otherwise.”
• He explains that though the natural duties are “derived from a contractarian point of view,” they “do not presuppose an act of consent, express or tacit, or indeed any voluntary act, in order to apply,” indicating that contractarian derivation does not entail consent‑dependence.
• He generalizes: “The principles that hold for individuals, just as the principles for institutions, are those that would be acknowledged in the original position. These principles are understood as the outcome of a hypothetical agreement,” but adds that “If their formulation shows that no binding action, consensual or otherwise, is a presupposition of their application, then they apply unconditionally.”
• He explicitly disassociates the voluntariness condition for obligations from the contractarian method: “The reason why obligations depend upon voluntary acts is given by the second part of the principle of fairness which states this condition. It has nothing to do with the contractual nature of justice as fairness.”
• He notes that once the full set of principles is accepted, the original position is only a justificatory device: “once the full set of principles, a complete conception of right, is on hand, we can simply forget about the conception of original position and apply these principles as we would any others,” including unconditional natural duties.

Source Quotes

This is especially important in constraining the means used in war, assuming that, in certain circumstances anyway, wars of self-defense are justified (§ 58). From the standpoint of justice as fairness, a fundamental natural duty is the duty of justice. This duty requires us to support and to comply with just institutions that exist and apply to us.

From the standpoint of justice as fairness, a fundamental natural duty is the duty of justice. This duty requires us to support and to comply with just institutions that exist and apply to us. It also constrains us to further just arrangements not yet established, at least when this can be done without too much cost to ourselves. Thus if the basic structure of society is just, or as just as it is reasonable to expect in the circumstances, everyone has a natural duty to do his part in the existing scheme.

It also constrains us to further just arrangements not yet established, at least when this can be done without too much cost to ourselves. Thus if the basic structure of society is just, or as just as it is reasonable to expect in the circumstances, everyone has a natural duty to do his part in the existing scheme. Each is bound to these institutions independent of his voluntary acts, performative or otherwise. Thus even though the principles of natural duty are derived from a contractarian point of view, they do not presuppose an act of consent, express or tacit, or indeed any voluntary act, in order to apply.

Each is bound to these institutions independent of his voluntary acts, performative or otherwise. Thus even though the principles of natural duty are derived from a contractarian point of view, they do not presuppose an act of consent, express or tacit, or indeed any voluntary act, in order to apply. The principles that hold for individuals, just as the principles for institutions, are those that would be acknowledged in the original position.

Thus even though the principles of natural duty are derived from a contractarian point of view, they do not presuppose an act of consent, express or tacit, or indeed any voluntary act, in order to apply. The principles that hold for individuals, just as the principles for institutions, are those that would be acknowledged in the original position. These principles are understood as the outcome of a hypothetical agreement.

These principles are understood as the outcome of a hypothetical agreement. If their formulation shows that no binding action, consensual or otherwise, is a presupposition of their application, then they apply unconditionally. The reason why obligations depend upon voluntary acts is given by the second part of the principle of fairness which states this condition.

If their formulation shows that no binding action, consensual or otherwise, is a presupposition of their application, then they apply unconditionally. The reason why obligations depend upon voluntary acts is given by the second part of the principle of fairness which states this condition. It has nothing to do with the contractual nature of justice as fairness. 63 In fact, once the full set of principles, a complete conception of right, is on hand, we can simply forget about the conception of original position and apply these principles as we would any others.

Key Concepts

• From the standpoint of justice as fairness, a fundamental natural duty is the duty of justice.
• This duty requires us to support and to comply with just institutions that exist and apply to us. It also constrains us to further just arrangements not yet established, at least when this can be done without too much cost to ourselves.
• everyone has a natural duty to do his part in the existing scheme. Each is bound to these institutions independent of his voluntary acts, performative or otherwise.
• they do not presuppose an act of consent, express or tacit, or indeed any voluntary act, in order to apply.
• The principles that hold for individuals, just as the principles for institutions, are those that would be acknowledged in the original position.
• If their formulation shows that no binding action, consensual or otherwise, is a presupposition of their application, then they apply unconditionally.
• The reason why obligations depend upon voluntary acts is given by the second part of the principle of fairness which states this condition. It has nothing to do with the contractual nature of justice as fairness.

Context

Central part of §19, where Rawls introduces the duty of justice as the fundamental natural duty, explains its content and unconditional application, and reconciles unconditional duties with the contractarian framework of the original position.