Key Arguments

• The parties do not know 'what their religious or moral convictions are,' whether they have such obligations, or whether their view would be in the majority or minority; they only know that 'they have obligations which they interpret in this way,' so they must protect this sphere under maximal uncertainty.
• Rawls concludes that 'equal liberty of conscience is the only principle that the persons in the original position can acknowledge' because 'They cannot take chances with their liberty by permitting the dominant religious or moral doctrine to persecute or to suppress others if it wishes.'
• Even if it were 'more probable than not that one will turn out to belong to the majority,' Rawls argues that 'to gamble in this way would show that one did not take one’s religious or moral convictions seriously, or highly value the liberty to examine one’s beliefs,' so risk‑based arguments for unequal liberty are irrational from that standpoint.
• The parties also 'could [not] consent to the principle of utility' because 'their freedom would be subject to the calculus of social interests' and they would be 'authorizing its restriction if this would lead to a greater net balance of satisfaction,' which is incompatible with the seriousness of their obligations.
• Even if utilitarians try 'to argue from the general facts of social life' that utility calculations 'never justifies such limitations,' Rawls insists that 'they might as well guarantee their freedom straightway by adopting the principle of equal liberty,' since 'There is nothing gained by not doing so, and to the extent that the outcome of the actuarial calculation is unclear a great deal may be lost.'
• Given a 'realistic interpretation to the general knowledge available to the parties,' and 'the complexity and vagueness of these calculations (if we can so describe them) as they are bound to be made in practice,' Rawls says the parties are 'forced to reject the utilitarian principle' and choose equal liberty of conscience.

Source Quotes

Further, the parties do not know how their religious or moral view fares in their society, whether, for example, it is in the majority or the minority. All they know is that they have obligations which they interpret in this way. The question they are to decide is which principle they should adopt to regulate the liberties of citizens in regard to their fundamental religious, moral, and philosophical interests.

All they know is that they have obligations which they interpret in this way. The question they are to decide is which principle they should adopt to regulate the liberties of citizens in regard to their fundamental religious, moral, and philosophical interests. Now it seems that equal liberty of conscience is the only principle that the persons in the original position can acknowledge.

The question they are to decide is which principle they should adopt to regulate the liberties of citizens in regard to their fundamental religious, moral, and philosophical interests. Now it seems that equal liberty of conscience is the only principle that the persons in the original position can acknowledge. They cannot take chances with their liberty by permitting the dominant religious or moral doctrine to persecute or to suppress others if it wishes.

Now it seems that equal liberty of conscience is the only principle that the persons in the original position can acknowledge. They cannot take chances with their liberty by permitting the dominant religious or moral doctrine to persecute or to suppress others if it wishes. Even granting (what may be questioned) that it is more probable than not that one will turn out to belong to the majority (if a majority exists), to gamble in this way would show that one did not take one’s religious or moral convictions seriously, or highly value the liberty to examine one’s beliefs.

They cannot take chances with their liberty by permitting the dominant religious or moral doctrine to persecute or to suppress others if it wishes. Even granting (what may be questioned) that it is more probable than not that one will turn out to belong to the majority (if a majority exists), to gamble in this way would show that one did not take one’s religious or moral convictions seriously, or highly value the liberty to examine one’s beliefs. Nor on the other hand, could the parties consent to the principle of utility.

Nor on the other hand, could the parties consent to the principle of utility. In this case their freedom would be subject to the calculus of social interests and they would be authorizing its restriction if this would lead to a greater net balance of satisfaction. Of course, as we have seen, a utilitarian may try to argue from the general facts of social life that when properly carried out the computation of advantages never justifies such limitations, at least under reasonably favorable conditions of culture.

Of course, as we have seen, a utilitarian may try to argue from the general facts of social life that when properly carried out the computation of advantages never justifies such limitations, at least under reasonably favorable conditions of culture. But even if the parties were persuaded of this, they might as well guarantee their freedom straightway by adopting the principle of equal liberty. There is nothing gained by not doing so, and to the extent that the outcome of the actuarial calculation is unclear a great deal may be lost. Indeed, if we give a realistic interpretation to the general knowledge available to the parties (see the end of § 26), they are forced to reject the utilitarian principle.

There is nothing gained by not doing so, and to the extent that the outcome of the actuarial calculation is unclear a great deal may be lost. Indeed, if we give a realistic interpretation to the general knowledge available to the parties (see the end of § 26), they are forced to reject the utilitarian principle. These considerations have all the more force in view of the complexity and vagueness of these calculations (if we can so describe them) as they are bound to be made in practice.

Indeed, if we give a realistic interpretation to the general knowledge available to the parties (see the end of § 26), they are forced to reject the utilitarian principle. These considerations have all the more force in view of the complexity and vagueness of these calculations (if we can so describe them) as they are bound to be made in practice. Moreover, the initial agreement on the principle of equal liberty is final.

Key Concepts

• All they know is that they have obligations which they interpret in this way.
• the question they are to decide is which principle they should adopt to regulate the liberties of citizens in regard to their fundamental religious, moral, and philosophical interests.
• equal liberty of conscience is the only principle that the persons in the original position can acknowledge.
• They cannot take chances with their liberty by permitting the dominant religious or moral doctrine to persecute or to suppress others if it wishes.
• to gamble in this way would show that one did not take one’s religious or moral convictions seriously, or highly value the liberty to examine one’s beliefs.
• their freedom would be subject to the calculus of social interests and they would be authorizing its restriction if this would lead to a greater net balance of satisfaction.
• they might as well guarantee their freedom straightway by adopting the principle of equal liberty. There is nothing gained by not doing so, and to the extent that the outcome of the actuarial calculation is unclear a great deal may be lost.
• if we give a realistic interpretation to the general knowledge available to the parties (see the end of § 26), they are forced to reject the utilitarian principle.
• the complexity and vagueness of these calculations (if we can so describe them) as they are bound to be made in practice.

Context

Central paragraphs of §33, where Rawls directly applies the original position to the question of religious and moral liberty and argues that, under ignorance about one’s own convictions and social position, only equal liberty of conscience is a rational choice, while utilitarian and unequal-liberty principles must be rejected.