In Rawls’s account, the natural duty of justice—not the principle of fairness—is the primary basis o… — John Rawls

In Rawls’s account, the natural duty of justice—not the principle of fairness—is the primary basis of citizens’ political ties and duties to a just constitutional regime; only the more favored members of society typically incur a genuine political obligation to uphold the constitution through the principle of fairness, whereas oppressed minorities who justifiably practice civil disobedience usually lack such an obligation to the regime as a whole but do acquire important fairness-based obligations of loyalty and fidelity to one another through their voluntary political associations.

By John Rawls, from A Theory of Justice

Key Arguments

Rawls explicitly notes that in his justification of civil disobedience he 'ha[s] not mentioned the principle of fairness', and immediately affirms that 'The natural duty of justice is the primary basis of our political ties to a constitutional regime.'
Recalling his earlier discussion, he says that 'only the more favored members of society are likely to have a clear political obligation as opposed to a political duty', since 'They are better situated to win public office and find it easier to take advantage of the political system. And having done so, they have acquired an obligation owed to citizens generally to uphold the just constitution.'
By contrast, 'members of subjected minorities, say, who have a strong case for civil disobedience will not generally have a political obligation of this sort', indicating that their duty to the regime is limited to the natural duty of justice, not a stronger fairness-based obligation.
However, he denies that 'the principle of fairness will not give rise to important obligations in their case'; on the contrary, 'many of the requirements of private life derive from this principle, but it comes into force when persons or groups come together for common political purposes.'
He draws a parallel between private and political associations: 'Just as we acquire obligations to others with whom we have joined in various private associations, those who engage in political action assume obligatory ties to one another.'
Consequently, 'while the political obligation of dissenters to citizens generally is problematical, bonds of loyalty and fidelity still develop between them as they seek to advance their cause.' These are obligations of immense significance that 'constrain in many ways what individuals can do.'
He generalizes that 'In general, free association under a just constitution gives rise to obligations provided that the ends of the group are legitimate and its arrangements fair. This is as true of political as it is of other associations.'
Finally, he stresses that these group‑based obligations 'are distinct from an obligation to comply with a just constitution', thereby preserving the conceptual difference between natural duty‑based political ties to the regime and fairness‑based obligations within voluntary associations.

Source Quotes

But the theory of justice should say at what point these matters are properly raised. Now in this account of the justification of civil disobedience I have not mentioned the principle of fairness. The natural duty of justice is the primary basis of our political ties to a constitutional regime.

Now in this account of the justification of civil disobedience I have not mentioned the principle of fairness. The natural duty of justice is the primary basis of our political ties to a constitutional regime. As we noted before (§52), only the more favored members of society are likely to have a clear political obligation as opposed to a political duty.

The natural duty of justice is the primary basis of our political ties to a constitutional regime. As we noted before (§52), only the more favored members of society are likely to have a clear political obligation as opposed to a political duty. They are better situated to win public office and find it easier to take advantage of the political system.

And having done so, they have acquired an obligation owed to citizens generally to uphold the just constitution. But members of subjected minorities, say, who have a strong case for civil disobedience will not generally have a political obligation of this sort. This does not mean, however, that the principle of fairness will not give rise to important obligations in their case.

This does not mean, however, that the principle of fairness will not give rise to important obligations in their case. 214 For not only do many of the requirements of private life derive from this principle, but it comes into force when persons or groups come together for common political purposes. Just as we acquire obligations to others with whom we have joined in various private associations, those who engage in political action assume obligatory ties to one another.

214 For not only do many of the requirements of private life derive from this principle, but it comes into force when persons or groups come together for common political purposes. Just as we acquire obligations to others with whom we have joined in various private associations, those who engage in political action assume obligatory ties to one another. Thus while the political obligation of dissenters to citizens generally is problematical, bonds of loyalty and fidelity still develop between them as they seek to advance their cause.

Just as we acquire obligations to others with whom we have joined in various private associations, those who engage in political action assume obligatory ties to one another. Thus while the political obligation of dissenters to citizens generally is problematical, bonds of loyalty and fidelity still develop between them as they seek to advance their cause. In general, free association under a just constitution gives rise to obligations provided that the ends of the group are legitimate and its arrangements fair.

This is as true of political as it is of other associations. These obligations are of immense significance and they constrain in many ways what individuals can do. But they are distinct from an obligation to comply with a just constitution. My discussion of civil disobedience

Key Concepts

Now in this account of the justification of civil disobedience I have not mentioned the principle of fairness.
The natural duty of justice is the primary basis of our political ties to a constitutional regime.
only the more favored members of society are likely to have a clear political obligation as opposed to a political duty.
But members of subjected minorities, say, who have a strong case for civil disobedience will not generally have a political obligation of this sort.
For not only do many of the requirements of private life derive from this principle, but it comes into force when persons or groups come together for common political purposes.
those who engage in political action assume obligatory ties to one another.
while the political obligation of dissenters to citizens generally is problematical, bonds of loyalty and fidelity still develop between them as they seek to advance their cause.
These obligations are of immense significance and they constrain in many ways what individuals can do. But they are distinct from an obligation to comply with a just constitution.

Context

Concluding portion of §57, where Rawls reflects on the basis of political duty in his theory of justice, clarifying the relative roles of the natural duty of justice and the principle of fairness in grounding citizens’ obligations to a just constitution and to one another, with special attention to the situation of dissenting minorities engaged in civil disobedience.