Key Arguments

• Rawls says “the last contrast” is that “utilitarianism is a teleological theory whereas justice as fairness is not. By definition, then, the latter is a deontological theory, one that either does not specify the good independently from the right, or does not interpret the right as maximizing the good.”
• He clarifies that deontological theories are simply “defined as non-teleological ones, not as views that characterize the rightness of institutions and acts independently from their consequences,” insisting that “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account… One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.”
• He classifies justice as fairness as deontological “in the second way”: assuming the original position selects “a principle of equal liberty and restrict economic and social inequalities to those in everyone’s interests, there is no reason to think that just institutions will maximize the good,” and any such maximization would be “a coincidence.”
• He emphasizes that “The question of attaining the greatest net balance of satisfaction never arises in justice as fairness; this maximum principle is not used at all,” distinguishing its decision procedure from utilitarian maximization.
• He draws a further contrast: “In utilitarianism the satisfaction of any desire has some value in itself which must be taken into account… In calculating the greatest balance of satisfaction it does not matter, except indirectly, what the desires are for… we ask no questions about their source or quality but only how their satisfaction would affect the total of well-being.”
• By contrast, “In justice as fairness… persons accept in advance a principle of equal liberty and they do this without a knowledge of their more particular ends,” thus “implicitly agree[ing]… to conform their conceptions of their good to what the principles of justice require, or at least not to press claims which directly violate them.”
• Rawls illustrates with the case of someone who enjoys domination: “An individual who finds that he enjoys seeing others in positions of lesser liberty understands that he has no claim whatever to this enjoyment. The pleasure he takes in other’s deprivations is wrong in itself: it is a satisfaction which requires the violation of a principle to which he would agree in the original position.”
• He then generalizes: “The principles of right, and so of justice, put limits on which satisfactions have value; they impose restrictions on what are reasonable conceptions of one’s good… their desires and aspirations are restricted from the outset by the principles of justice which specify the boundaries that men’s systems of ends must respect.”
• He encapsulates the structural point: “We can express this by saying that in justice as fairness the concept of right is prior to that of the good. A just social system defines the scope within which individuals must develop their aims… The priority of justice is accounted for, in part, by holding that the interests requiring the violation of justice have no value.”
• Thus, unlike utilitarianism, which “excludes those desires and propensities which if encouraged or permitted would… lead to a lesser net balance of satisfaction” in a largely formal way dependent on empirical contingencies, justice as fairness builds its moral ideal “more deeply… in the first principles of the ethical theory,” fixing substantive limits on valuable desires and character from the outset.

Source Quotes

And thus we see that the second contrast is related to the first, since it is this conflation, and the principle based upon it, which subjects the rights secured by justice to the calculus of social interests. The last contrast that I shall mention now is that utilitarianism is a teleological theory whereas justice as fairness is not. By definition, then, the latter is a deontological theory, one that either does not specify the good independently from the right, or does not interpret the right as maximizing the good.

The last contrast that I shall mention now is that utilitarianism is a teleological theory whereas justice as fairness is not. By definition, then, the latter is a deontological theory, one that either does not specify the good independently from the right, or does not interpret the right as maximizing the good. (It should be noted that deontological theories are defined as non-teleological ones, not as views that characterize the rightness of institutions and acts independently from their consequences.

All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.) Justice as fairness is a deontological theory in the second way. For if it is assumed that the persons in the original position would choose a principle of equal liberty and restrict economic and social inequalities to those in everyone’s interests, there is no reason to think that just institutions will maximize the good.

One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.) Justice as fairness is a deontological theory in the second way. For if it is assumed that the persons in the original position would choose a principle of equal liberty and restrict economic and social inequalities to those in everyone’s interests, there is no reason to think that just institutions will maximize the good. (Here I suppose with utilitarianism that the good is defined as the satisfaction of rational desire.) Of course, it is not impossible that the most good is produced but it would be a coincidence. The question of attaining the greatest net balance of satisfaction never arises in justice as fairness; this maximum principle is not used at all.

(Here I suppose with utilitarianism that the good is defined as the satisfaction of rational desire.) Of course, it is not impossible that the most good is produced but it would be a coincidence. The question of attaining the greatest net balance of satisfaction never arises in justice as fairness; this maximum principle is not used at all. There is a further point in this connection.

There is a further point in this connection. In utilitarianism the satisfaction of any desire has some value in itself which must be taken into account in deciding what is right. In calculating the greatest balance of satisfaction it does not matter, except indirectly, what the desires are for.

If society decides to deny them fulfillment, or to suppress them, it is because they tend to be socially destructive and a greater welfare can be achieved in other ways. In justice as fairness, on the other hand, persons accept in advance a principle of equal liberty and they do this without a knowledge of their more particular ends. They implicitly agree, therefore, to conform their conceptions of their good to what the principles of justice require, or at least not to press claims which directly violate them.

The pleasure he takes in other’s deprivations is wrong in itself: it is a satisfaction which requires the violation of a principle to which he would agree in the original position. The principles of right, and so of justice, put limits on which satisfactions have value; they impose restrictions on what are reasonable conceptions of one’s good. In drawing up plans and in deciding on aspirations men are to take these constraints into account.

Rather, their desires and aspirations are restricted from the outset by the principles of justice which specify the boundaries that men’s systems of ends must respect. We can express this by saying that in justice as fairness the concept of right is prior to that of the good. A just social system defines the scope within which individuals must develop their aims, and it provides a framework of rights and opportunities and the means of satisfaction within and by the use of which these ends may be equitably pursued.

A just social system defines the scope within which individuals must develop their aims, and it provides a framework of rights and opportunities and the means of satisfaction within and by the use of which these ends may be equitably pursued. The priority of justice is accounted for, in part, by holding that the interests requiring the violation of justice have no value. Having no merit in the first place, they cannot override its claims.

Key Concepts

• The last contrast that I shall mention now is that utilitarianism is a teleological theory whereas justice as fairness is not.
• By definition, then, the latter is a deontological theory, one that either does not specify the good independently from the right, or does not interpret the right as maximizing the good.
• Justice as fairness is a deontological theory in the second way.
• there is no reason to think that just institutions will maximize the good. (Here I suppose with utilitarianism that the good is defined as the satisfaction of rational desire.)
• The question of attaining the greatest net balance of satisfaction never arises in justice as fairness; this maximum principle is not used at all.
• In utilitarianism the satisfaction of any desire has some value in itself which must be taken into account in deciding what is right.
• In justice as fairness, on the other hand, persons accept in advance a principle of equal liberty and they do this without a knowledge of their more particular ends.
• The principles of right, and so of justice, put limits on which satisfactions have value; they impose restrictions on what are reasonable conceptions of one’s good.
• We can express this by saying that in justice as fairness the concept of right is prior to that of the good.
• The priority of justice is accounted for, in part, by holding that the interests requiring the violation of justice have no value.

Context

Central and later parts of §6, where Rawls introduces the teleological vs. deontological contrast and uses it to explain how justice as fairness structurally prioritizes right over good by regulating which desires and ends are admissible.