Justice as fairness rejects the common‑sense ideal that income, wealth, and other primary goods shou… — John Rawls

Justice as fairness rejects the common‑sense ideal that income, wealth, and other primary goods should be distributed according to moral desert (virtue), insisting instead that just shares track legitimate expectations defined by just institutions, not people’s intrinsic moral worth.

By John Rawls, from A Theory of Justice

Key Arguments

Rawls notes a widespread view: 'There is a tendency for common sense to suppose that income and wealth, and the good things in life generally, should be distributed according to moral desert. Justice is happiness according to virtue', and that many think this is 'the appropriate conception of distributive justice'.
He immediately denies that his theory can endorse this: 'Now justice as fairness rejects this conception. Such a principle would not be chosen in the original position. There seems to be no way of defining the requisite criterion in that situation.'
He argues that the moral‑desert view 'fails to distinguish between moral desert and legitimate expectations', whereas justice as fairness links just shares to 'claims on one another defined by the publicly recognized rules' acquired by 'having done various things encouraged by the existing arrangements'.
He emphasizes that 'A just scheme, then, answers to what men are entitled to; it satisfies their legitimate expectations as founded upon social institutions. But what they are entitled to is not proportional to nor dependent upon their intrinsic worth.'
He states explicitly that 'The principles of justice that regulate the basic structure and specify the duties and obligations of individuals do not mention moral desert, and there is no tendency for distributive shares to correspond to it.'

Source Quotes

There is a tendency for common sense to suppose that income and wealth, and the good things in life generally, should be distributed according to moral desert. Justice is happiness according to virtue. While it is recognized that this ideal can never be fully carried out, it is the appropriate conception of distributive justice, at least as a prime facie principle, and society should try to realize it as circumstances permit.

While it is recognized that this ideal can never be fully carried out, it is the appropriate conception of distributive justice, at least as a prime facie principle, and society should try to realize it as circumstances permit. 172 Now justice as fairness rejects this conception. Such a principle would not be chosen in the original position. There seems to be no way of defining the requisite criterion in that situation.

There seems to be no way of defining the requisite criterion in that situation. Moreover, the notion of distribution according to virtue fails to distinguish between moral desert and legitimate expectations. Thus it is true that as persons and groups take part in just arrangements, they acquire claims on one another defined by the publicly recognized rules.

Having done various things encouraged by the existing arrangements, they now have certain rights, and just distributive shares honor these claims. A just scheme, then, answers to what men are entitled to; it satisfies their legitimate expectations as founded upon social institutions. But what they are entitled to is not proportional to nor dependent upon their intrinsic worth.

A just scheme, then, answers to what men are entitled to; it satisfies their legitimate expectations as founded upon social institutions. But what they are entitled to is not proportional to nor dependent upon their intrinsic worth. The principles of justice that regulate the basic structure and specify the duties and obligations of individuals do not mention moral desert, and there is no tendency for distributive shares to correspond to it.

Key Concepts

There is a tendency for common sense to suppose that income and wealth, and the good things in life generally, should be distributed according to moral desert. Justice is happiness according to virtue.
Now justice as fairness rejects this conception. Such a principle would not be chosen in the original position.
the notion of distribution according to virtue fails to distinguish between moral desert and legitimate expectations.
A just scheme, then, answers to what men are entitled to; it satisfies their legitimate expectations as founded upon social institutions.
what they are entitled to is not proportional to nor dependent upon their intrinsic worth.

Context

Opening of §48, where Rawls contrasts a traditional desert‑based conception of distributive justice with his own justice as fairness, appealing to the original position and the concept of legitimate expectations.