Key Arguments

• Rawls has so far used 'the concept of goodness' only in a 'rather thin sense'—mainly as 'what is for him the most rational plan of life given reasonably favorable circumstances' and as underlying citizens’ conceptions of their good and the role of primary goods in a well-ordered society.
• He explicitly states: 'I shall distinguish between two theories of the good. The reason for doing this is that in justice as fairness the concept of right is prior to that of the good.'
• Unlike teleological theories that define the right by the good, Rawls insists: 'In contrast with teleological theories, something is good only if it fits into ways of life consistent with the principles of right already on hand.'
• However, to establish the principles of right in the original position, some assumptions about goodness and the parties’ motives are unavoidable; but these 'must not jeopardize the prior place of the concept of right', so 'the theory of the good used in arguing for the principles of justice is restricted to the bare essentials.'
• He calls this restricted account 'the thin theory', whose 'purpose is to secure the premises about primary goods required to arrive at the principles of justice.'
• Once this thin theory is 'worked out and the primary goods accounted for', Rawls says 'we are free to use the principles of justice in the further development of what I shall call the full theory of the good', which builds other moral notions using those already-established principles.

Source Quotes

So far I have said very little about the concept of goodness. It was briefly mentioned earlier when I suggested that a person’s good is determined by what is for him the most rational plan of life given reasonably favorable circumstances (§15).

It was briefly mentioned earlier when I suggested that a person’s good is determined by what is for him the most rational plan of life given reasonably favorable circumstances (§15). All along I have assumed that in a well-ordered society citizens’ conceptions of their good conform to the principles of right publicly recognized and include an appropriate place for the various primary goods. But the concept of goodness has been used only in a rather thin sense.

But the concept of goodness has been used only in a rather thin sense. And in fact I shall distinguish between two theories of the good. The reason for doing this is that in justice as fairness the concept of right is prior to that of the good. In contrast with teleological theories, something is good only if it fits into ways of life consistent with the principles of right already on hand.

The reason for doing this is that in justice as fairness the concept of right is prior to that of the good. In contrast with teleological theories, something is good only if it fits into ways of life consistent with the principles of right already on hand. But to establish these principles it is necessary to rely on some notion of goodness, for we need assumptions about the parties’ motives in the original position.

But to establish these principles it is necessary to rely on some notion of goodness, for we need assumptions about the parties’ motives in the original position. Since these assumptions must not jeopardize the prior place of the concept of right, the theory of the good used in arguing for the principles of justice is restricted to the bare essentials. This account of the good I call the thin theory: its purpose is to secure the premises about primary goods required to arrive at the principles of justice.

Since these assumptions must not jeopardize the prior place of the concept of right, the theory of the good used in arguing for the principles of justice is restricted to the bare essentials. This account of the good I call the thin theory: its purpose is to secure the premises about primary goods required to arrive at the principles of justice. Once this theory is worked out and the primary goods accounted for, we are free to use the principles of justice in the further development of what I shall call the full theory of the good.

This account of the good I call the thin theory: its purpose is to secure the premises about primary goods required to arrive at the principles of justice. Once this theory is worked out and the primary goods accounted for, we are free to use the principles of justice in the further development of what I shall call the full theory of the good. In order to clarify these matters, let us recall where a theory of the good has already played a role.

Key Concepts

• So far I have said very little about the concept of goodness.
• All along I have assumed that in a well-ordered society citizens’ conceptions of their good conform to the principles of right publicly recognized and include an appropriate place for the various primary goods.
• And in fact I shall distinguish between two theories of the good. The reason for doing this is that in justice as fairness the concept of right is prior to that of the good.
• In contrast with teleological theories, something is good only if it fits into ways of life consistent with the principles of right already on hand.
• Since these assumptions must not jeopardize the prior place of the concept of right, the theory of the good used in arguing for the principles of justice is restricted to the bare essentials.
• This account of the good I call the thin theory: its purpose is to secure the premises about primary goods required to arrive at the principles of justice.
• Once this theory is worked out and the primary goods accounted for, we are free to use the principles of justice in the further development of what I shall call the full theory of the good.

Context

Opening of §60 ('The Need for a Theory of the Good'), where Rawls motivates and defines the distinction between a thin theory of the good, suitable for the original position, and a fuller theory that presupposes the already derived principles of justice.