Rawls extends his definition of the good to a third stage by treating a person’s rational plan of li… — John Rawls

Rawls extends his definition of the good to a third stage by treating a person’s rational plan of life as determining his good: when a life‑plan is rational (in the sense of satisfying appropriate principles of rational choice), then the person’s conception of his good, and his interests and aims, are themselves rational, so that the real and apparent good coincide for that person.

By John Rawls, from A Theory of Justice

Key Arguments

Up to this point Rawls has only defined 'a good X for K' in terms of what it is rational for K to want in an X given K’s interests and aims, with no evaluation of those ends; he now notes that 'we often assess the rationality of a person’s desires, and the definition must be ex-tended to cover this fundamental case if it is to serve the purposes of the theory of justice.'
He introduces the third stage by 'apply[ing] the definition of good to plans of life', explicitly stating: 'The rational plan for a person determines his good.'
He adapts Royce’s idea that 'a person may be regarded as a human life lived according to a plan', so that 'an individual says who he is by describing his purposes and causes, what he intends to do in his life.' If this life‑plan is rational, then so is the person’s conception of the good.
Rawls draws the key consequence: 'If this plan is a rational one, then I shall say that the person’s conception of his good is likewise rational. In his case the real and the apparent good coincide. Similarly his interests and aims are rational, and it is appropriate to take them as stopping points in making judgments that correspond to the first two stages of the definition.'
He emphasizes the centrality of rational plans for his theory of the good: 'It is fundamental for the definition of good, since a rational plan of life establishes the basic point of view from which all judgments of value relating to a particular person are to be made and finally rendered consistent.'
He connects rational plans with happiness, claiming that 'we can think of a person as being happy when he is in the way of a successful execution (more or less) of a rational plan of life drawn up under (more or less) favorable conditions, and he is reasonably confident that his plan can be carried through.'
He explains that different people’s rational plans will differ with their 'endowments and circumstances', and thus 'different individuals find their happiness in doing different things', showing that the third‑stage account accommodates pluralism in rational life‑plans and goods.

Source Quotes

To this point I have discussed only the first stages of the definition of good in which no questions are raised about the rationality of the ends taken as given. A thing’s being a good X for K is treated as equivalent to its having the properties which it is rational for K to want in an X in view of his interests and aims.

A thing’s being a good X for K is treated as equivalent to its having the properties which it is rational for K to want in an X in view of his interests and aims. Yet we often assess the rationality of a person’s desires, and the definition must be ex-tended to cover this fundamental case if it is to serve the purposes of the theory of justice. Now the basic idea at the third stage is to apply the definition of good to plans of life.

Yet we often assess the rationality of a person’s desires, and the definition must be ex-tended to cover this fundamental case if it is to serve the purposes of the theory of justice. Now the basic idea at the third stage is to apply the definition of good to plans of life. The rational plan for a person determines his good. Here I adapt Royce’s thought that a person may be regarded as a human life lived according to a plan.

The rational plan for a person determines his good. Here I adapt Royce’s thought that a person may be regarded as a human life lived according to a plan. For Royce an individual says who he is by describing his purposes and causes, what he intends to do in his life. 232 If this plan is a rational one, then I shall say that the person’s conception of his good is likewise rational.

For Royce an individual says who he is by describing his purposes and causes, what he intends to do in his life. 232 If this plan is a rational one, then I shall say that the person’s conception of his good is likewise rational. In his case the real and the apparent good coincide. Similarly his interests and aims are rational, and it is appropriate to take them as stopping points in making judgments that correspond to the first two stages of the definition. These suggestions are quite straightforward but unfortunately setting out the details is somewhat tedious.

Before illustrating the principles of rational choice, I should say a few things about the rather complex notion of a rational plan. It is fundamental for the definition of good, since a rational plan of life establishes the basic point of view from which all judgments of value relating to a particular person are to be made and finally rendered consistent. Indeed, with certain qualifications (§ 83) we can think of a person as being happy when he is in the way of a successful execution (more or less) of a rational plan of life drawn up under (more or less) favorable conditions, and he is reasonably confident that his plan can be carried through.

It is fundamental for the definition of good, since a rational plan of life establishes the basic point of view from which all judgments of value relating to a particular person are to be made and finally rendered consistent. Indeed, with certain qualifications (§ 83) we can think of a person as being happy when he is in the way of a successful execution (more or less) of a rational plan of life drawn up under (more or less) favorable conditions, and he is reasonably confident that his plan can be carried through. Someone is happy when his plans are going well, his more important aspirations being fulfilled, and he feels sure that his good fortune will endure.

Key Concepts

To this point I have discussed only the first stages of the definition of good in which no questions are raised about the rationality of the ends taken as given.
Yet we often assess the rationality of a person’s desires, and the definition must be ex-tended to cover this fundamental case if it is to serve the purposes of the theory of justice.
Now the basic idea at the third stage is to apply the definition of good to plans of life. The rational plan for a person determines his good.
Here I adapt Royce’s thought that a person may be regarded as a human life lived according to a plan. For Royce an individual says who he is by describing his purposes and causes, what he intends to do in his life.
If this plan is a rational one, then I shall say that the person’s conception of his good is likewise rational. In his case the real and the apparent good coincide. Similarly his interests and aims are rational, and it is appropriate to take them as stopping points in making judgments that correspond to the first two stages of the definition.
It is fundamental for the definition of good, since a rational plan of life establishes the basic point of view from which all judgments of value relating to a particular person are to be made and finally rendered consistent.
we can think of a person as being happy when he is in the way of a successful execution (more or less) of a rational plan of life drawn up under (more or less) favorable conditions, and he is reasonably confident that his plan can be carried through.

Context

Opening paragraphs of §63 ('The Definition of Good for Plans of Life'), where Rawls moves from the earlier two-stage definition of 'good X for K' to a third stage in which whole life‑plans are assessed for rationality, and uses this to connect rational plans, rational interests, and happiness.