Key Arguments

• He explicitly frames these as the principles that "would be chosen in the original position," indicating they are the outcome of his central contractual device rather than mere moral intuitions.
• He stresses that this statement is "provisional" and "tentative," and that he will "run through several formulations and approximate step by step the final statement," suggesting a method of progressive refinement rather than dogmatic assertion.
• The first principle is formulated to guarantee basic rights for all: "each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others," emphasizing both maximal liberty and mutual compatibility.
• The second principle explicitly addresses "social and economic inequalities" and constrains them via two conditions: they must be "reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage" and "attached to positions and offices open to all," thereby integrating both welfare and fair opportunity requirements.
• He later notes that these principles will be "arranged in a serial order with the first principle prior to the second," showing they are not merely co‑equal but ordered, with liberty having priority over distributive considerations.

Source Quotes

I shall now state in a provisional form the two principles of justice that I believe would be chosen in the original position. In this section I wish to make only the most general comments, and therefore the first formulation of these principles is tentative.

I shall now state in a provisional form the two principles of justice that I believe would be chosen in the original position. In this section I wish to make only the most general comments, and therefore the first formulation of these principles is tentative. As we go on I shall run through several formulations and approximate step by step the final statement to be given much later.

The first statement of the two principles reads as follows. First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others. Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all.

First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others. Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all. There are two ambiguous phrases in the second principle, namely “everyone’s advantage” and “open to all.”

One applies the second principle by holding positions open, and then, subject to this constraint, arranges social and economic inequalities so that everyone benefits. These principles are to be arranged in a serial order with the first principle prior to the second. This ordering means that a departure from the institutions of equal liberty required by the first principle cannot be justified by, or compensated for, by greater social and economic advantages.

Key Concepts

• I shall now state in a provisional form the two principles of justice that I believe would be chosen in the original position.
• the first formulation of these principles is tentative.
• First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.
• Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all.
• These principles are to be arranged in a serial order with the first principle prior to the second.

Context

Opening of §11 where Rawls gives the initial, explicitly provisional statement of his two principles of justice that are to emerge from the original position.