Key Arguments

• Rawls first links justice as fairness to considered judgments by saying that “one might say that justice as fairness is the hypothesis that the principles which would be chosen in the original position are identical with those that match our considered judgments and so these principles describe our sense of justice,” but immediately calls this “clearly oversimplified.”
• He notes that “considered judgments are no doubt subject to certain irregularities and distortions” even under favorable conditions, so we must allow for revision when confronted with an “intuitively appealing account of his sense of justice.”
• He describes how a person “may well revise his judgments to conform to its principles even though the theory does not fit his existing judgments exactly,” especially if he can “find an explanation for the deviations which undermines his confidence in his original judgments.”
• He then offers his methodological claim: “From the standpoint of moral philosophy, the best account of a person’s sense of justice is not the one which fits his judgments prior to his examining any conception of justice, but rather the one which matches his judgments in reflective equilibrium.”
• He defines this state: “As we have seen, this state is one reached after a person has weighed various proposed conceptions and he has either revised his judgments to accord with one of them or held fast to his initial convictions (and the corresponding conception).”
• He emphasizes that moral philosophy is “Socratic”: “we may want to change our present considered judgments once their regulative principles are brought to light,” and that “A knowledge of these principles may suggest further reflections that lead us to revise our judgments,” even if the fit was initially perfect.

Source Quotes

The need for this idea arises as follows. According to the provisional aim of moral philosophy, one might say that justice as fairness is the hypothesis that the principles which would be chosen in the original position are identical with those that match our considered judgments and so these principles describe our sense of justice. But this interpretation is clearly oversimplified.

But this interpretation is clearly oversimplified. In describing our sense of justice an allowance must be made for the likelihood that considered judgments are no doubt subject to certain irregularities and distortions despite the fact that they are rendered under favorable circumstances. When a person is presented with an intuitively appealing account of his sense of justice (one, say, which embodies various reasonable and natural presumptions), he may well revise his judgments to conform to its principles even though the theory does not fit his existing judgments exactly.

He is especially likely to do this if he can find an explanation for the deviations which undermines his confidence in his original judgments and if the conception presented yields a judgment which he finds he can now accept. From the standpoint of moral philosophy, the best account of a person’s sense of justice is not the one which fits his judgments prior to his examining any conception of justice, but rather the one which matches his judgments in reflective equilibrium. As we have seen, this state is one reached after a person has weighed various proposed conceptions and he has either revised his judgments to accord with one of them or held fast to his initial convictions (and the corresponding conception).

From the standpoint of moral philosophy, the best account of a person’s sense of justice is not the one which fits his judgments prior to his examining any conception of justice, but rather the one which matches his judgments in reflective equilibrium. As we have seen, this state is one reached after a person has weighed various proposed conceptions and he has either revised his judgments to accord with one of them or held fast to his initial convictions (and the corresponding conception). The notion of reflective equilibrium introduces some complications that call for comment.

For one thing, it is a notion characteristic of the study of principles which govern actions shaped by self-examination. Moral philosophy is Socratic: we may want to change our present considered judgments once their regulative principles are brought to light. And we may want to do this even though these principles are a perfect fit.

Key Concepts

• justice as fairness is the hypothesis that the principles which would be chosen in the original position are identical with those that match our considered judgments
• considered judgments are no doubt subject to certain irregularities and distortions despite the fact that they are rendered under favorable circumstances.
• the best account of a person’s sense of justice is not the one which fits his judgments prior to his examining any conception of justice, but rather the one which matches his judgments in reflective equilibrium.
• this state is one reached after a person has weighed various proposed conceptions and he has either revised his judgments to accord with one of them or held fast to his initial convictions (and the corresponding conception).
• Moral philosophy is Socratic: we may want to change our present considered judgments once their regulative principles are brought to light.

Context

Central paragraphs of §9, where Rawls introduces and explains his central methodological concept of reflective equilibrium.