The basis of equal justice is the capacity for moral personality: beings are owed equal justice if they can form a rational conception of their good and acquire a sense of justice, that is, a normally effective desire to act on principles of justice, and this capacity—understood as a potentiality—is a sufficient (though not argued to be necessary) condition for equal basic rights.

By John Rawls, from A Theory of Justice

Key Arguments

  • Rawls defines 'moral persons' by two features: (1) 'they are capable of having (and are assumed to have) a conception of their good (as expressed by a rational plan of life); and second they are capable of having (and are assumed to acquire) a sense of justice'.
  • He connects this to the original position: 'We use the characterization of the persons in the original position to single out the kind of beings to whom the principles chosen apply', since the description of their nature is built into the reasoning that selects the principles.
  • Equal justice is thus 'owed to those who have the capacity to take part in and to act in accordance with the public understanding of the initial situation', which ties eligibility for equal justice to the ability to participate in hypothetical fair agreement.
  • Moral personality is 'defined as a potentiality that is ordinarily realized in due course', and 'it is this potentiality which brings the claims of justice into play', so actual full development is not required.
  • Rawls concludes: 'We see, then, that the capacity for moral personality is a sufficient condition for being entitled to equal justice. 280 Nothing beyond the essential minimum is required.'
  • He leaves open whether it is necessary but notes that 'the capacity for a sense of justice is possessed by the overwhelming majority of mankind', so the question is not practically troubling, and adds that 'even if the capacity were necessary, it would be unwise in practice to withhold justice on this ground. The risk to just institutions would be too great.'

Source Quotes

This brings us to the third level at which the question of equality arises. The natural answer seems to be that it is precisely the moral persons who are entitled to equal justice. Moral persons are distinguished by two features: first they are capable of having (and are assumed to have) a conception of their good (as expressed by a rational plan of life); and second they are capable of having (and are assumed to acquire) a sense of justice, a normally effective desire to apply and to act upon the principles of justice, at least to a certain minimum degree.
The natural answer seems to be that it is precisely the moral persons who are entitled to equal justice. Moral persons are distinguished by two features: first they are capable of having (and are assumed to have) a conception of their good (as expressed by a rational plan of life); and second they are capable of having (and are assumed to acquire) a sense of justice, a normally effective desire to apply and to act upon the principles of justice, at least to a certain minimum degree. We use the characterization of the persons in the original position to single out the kind of beings to whom the principles chosen apply.
After all, the parties are thought of as adopting these criteria to regulate their common institutions and their conduct toward one another; and the description of their nature enters into the reasoning by which these principles are selected. Thus equal justice is owed to those who have the capacity to take part in and to act in accordance with the public understanding of the initial situation. One should observe that moral personality is here defined as a potentiality that is ordinarily realized in due course.
Thus equal justice is owed to those who have the capacity to take part in and to act in accordance with the public understanding of the initial situation. One should observe that moral personality is here defined as a potentiality that is ordinarily realized in due course. It is this potentiality which brings the claims of justice into play. I shall return to this point below.
I shall return to this point below. We see, then, that the capacity for moral personality is a sufficient condition for being entitled to equal justice. 280 Nothing beyond the essential minimum is required. Whether moral personality is also a necessary condition I shall leave aside.

Key Concepts

  • The natural answer seems to be that it is precisely the moral persons who are entitled to equal justice.
  • Moral persons are distinguished by two features: first they are capable of having (and are assumed to have) a conception of their good (as expressed by a rational plan of life); and second they are capable of having (and are assumed to acquire) a sense of justice, a normally effective desire to apply and to act upon the principles of justice, at least to a certain minimum degree.
  • Thus equal justice is owed to those who have the capacity to take part in and to act in accordance with the public understanding of the initial situation.
  • One should observe that moral personality is here defined as a potentiality that is ordinarily realized in due course. It is this potentiality which brings the claims of justice into play.
  • We see, then, that the capacity for moral personality is a sufficient condition for being entitled to equal justice. 280 Nothing beyond the essential minimum is required.

Context

Central paragraphs of §77, where Rawls directly answers what beings are owed equal justice by appealing to the characterization of persons in the original position and defining 'moral personality' as the basis of equality.