The first principle of justice can be violated either by giving some persons greater basic liberties than others or by making basic liberties less extensive than they should be, and, given the lexical priority of liberty, any limitation on a basic liberty is permissible only for the sake of protecting that same liberty or another basic liberty within the best overall system, as judged from the standpoint of a representative equal citizen at the constitutional and legislative stages.

By John Rawls, from A Theory of Justice

Key Arguments

  • Rawls notes 'offhand there are two ways of contravening the first principle. Liberty is unequal as when one class of persons has a greater liberty than another, or liberty is less extensive than it should be.'
  • He insists that 'all the liberties of equal citizenship must be the same for each member of society,' though 'some of the equal liberties may be more extensive than others.'
  • He explains that liberties can be 'broadened or narrowed according to how they affect one another,' reinforcing the earlier point that liberties are part of an interacting system.
  • He states the lexical‑priority restriction: 'When lexical order holds, a basic liberty covered by the first principle can be limited only for the sake of liberty itself, that is, only to insure that the same liberty or a different basic liberty is properly protected and to adjust the one system of liberties in the best way.'
  • He adds that 'The adjustment of the complete scheme of liberty depends solely upon the definition and extent of the particular liberties,' and not on non‑liberty goals like efficiency or wealth.
  • He specifies the relevant standpoint: 'Of course, this scheme is always to be assessed from the standpoint of the representative equal citizen. From the perspective of the constitutional convention or the legislative stage (as appropriate) we are to ask which system it would be rational for him to prefer.'

Source Quotes

While the equal liberties may, therefore, be restricted, these limits are subject to certain criteria expressed by the meaning of equal liberty and the serial order of the two principles of justice. Offhand there are two ways of contravening the first principle. Liberty is unequal as when one class of persons has a greater liberty than another, or liberty is less extensive than it should be. Now all the liberties of equal citizenship must be the same for each member of society.
Liberty is unequal as when one class of persons has a greater liberty than another, or liberty is less extensive than it should be. Now all the liberties of equal citizenship must be the same for each member of society. Nevertheless some of the equal liberties may be more extensive than others, assuming that their extensions can be compared.
More realistically, if it is supposed that at best each liberty can be measured on its own scale, then the various liberties can be broadened or narrowed according to how they affect one another. When lexical order holds, a basic liberty covered by the first principle can be limited only for the sake of liberty itself, that is, only to insure that the same liberty or a different basic liberty is properly protected and to adjust the one system of liberties in the best way. The adjustment of the complete scheme of liberty depends solely upon the definition and extent of the particular liberties.
The adjustment of the complete scheme of liberty depends solely upon the definition and extent of the particular liberties. Of course, this scheme is always to be assessed from the standpoint of the representative equal citizen. From the perspective of the constitutional convention or the legislative stage (as appropriate) we are to ask which system it would be rational for him to prefer.
Of course, this scheme is always to be assessed from the standpoint of the representative equal citizen. From the perspective of the constitutional convention or the legislative stage (as appropriate) we are to ask which system it would be rational for him to prefer. A final point.

Key Concepts

  • Offhand there are two ways of contravening the first principle. Liberty is unequal as when one class of persons has a greater liberty than another, or liberty is less extensive than it should be.
  • Now all the liberties of equal citizenship must be the same for each member of society.
  • When lexical order holds, a basic liberty covered by the first principle can be limited only for the sake of liberty itself, that is, only to insure that the same liberty or a different basic liberty is properly protected and to adjust the one system of liberties in the best way.
  • this scheme is always to be assessed from the standpoint of the representative equal citizen.
  • we are to ask which system it would be rational for him to prefer.

Context

Later part of §32, where Rawls links his conceptual analysis of liberty to the formal content of the first principle, its lexical priority, and the evaluative perspective of the constitutional and legislative stages in the four‑stage sequence.