Key Arguments

• Justice and goodness each define a distinct 'point of view' with associated principles for assessing institutions, actions, and life‑plans, so the question of congruence is whether 'these two families of criteria fit together.'
• A sense of justice is defined as 'an effective desire to apply and to act from the principles of justice and so from the point of view of justice'; the issue is whether having this regulative desire is itself rational for a person when their good is assessed by the thin theory.
• The rationality of choosing the principles of justice in the original position has already been established; what remains is whether, given just institutions and others’ compliance, 'this disposition to take up and to be guided by the standpoint of justice accords with the individual’s good.'
• For any person in a well‑ordered society who knows that institutions are just and that others will continue to comply from a similar sense of justice, Rawls wants 'to show that on these suppositions it is rational for someone, as defined by the thin theory, to affirm his sense of justice.'
• If for one such person the best reply to the similar plans of associates is to affirm his sense of justice, then 'being rational for anyone, it is rational for all, and therefore no tendencies to instability exist.'

Source Quotes

Now that all the parts of the theory of justice are before us, the argument for congruence can be completed. It suffices to tie together the various aspects of a well-ordered society and to see them in the appropriate context.

It suffices to tie together the various aspects of a well-ordered society and to see them in the appropriate context. The concepts of justice and goodness are linked with distinct principles and the question of congruence is whether these two families of criteria fit together. More precisely, each concept with its associated principles defines a point of view from which institutions, actions, and plans of life can be assessed.

The concepts of justice and goodness are linked with distinct principles and the question of congruence is whether these two families of criteria fit together. More precisely, each concept with its associated principles defines a point of view from which institutions, actions, and plans of life can be assessed. A sense of justice is an effective desire to apply and to act from the principles of justice and so from the point of view of justice.

More precisely, each concept with its associated principles defines a point of view from which institutions, actions, and plans of life can be assessed. A sense of justice is an effective desire to apply and to act from the principles of justice and so from the point of view of justice. Thus what is to be established is that it is rational (as defined by the thin theory of the good) for those in a well-ordered society to affirm their sense of justice as regulative of their plan of life.

A sense of justice is an effective desire to apply and to act from the principles of justice and so from the point of view of justice. Thus what is to be established is that it is rational (as defined by the thin theory of the good) for those in a well-ordered society to affirm their sense of justice as regulative of their plan of life. It remains to be shown that this disposition to take up and to be guided by the standpoint of justice accords with the individual’s good.

Thus what is to be established is that it is rational (as defined by the thin theory of the good) for those in a well-ordered society to affirm their sense of justice as regulative of their plan of life. It remains to be shown that this disposition to take up and to be guided by the standpoint of justice accords with the individual’s good. Whether these two points of view are congruent is likely to be a crucial factor in determining stability.

We should like to know that this desire is indeed rational; being rational for one, it is rational for all, and therefore no tendencies to instability exist. More precisely, consider any given person in a well-ordered society. He knows, I assume, that institutions are just and that others have (and will continue to have) a sense of justice similar to his, and therefore that they comply (and will continue to comply) with these arrangements. We want to show that on these suppositions it is rational for someone, as defined by the thin theory, to affirm his sense of justice.

He knows, I assume, that institutions are just and that others have (and will continue to have) a sense of justice similar to his, and therefore that they comply (and will continue to comply) with these arrangements. We want to show that on these suppositions it is rational for someone, as defined by the thin theory, to affirm his sense of justice. The plan of life which does this is his best reply to the similar plans of his associates; and being rational for anyone, it is rational for all.

We want to show that on these suppositions it is rational for someone, as defined by the thin theory, to affirm his sense of justice. The plan of life which does this is his best reply to the similar plans of his associates; and being rational for anyone, it is rational for all. It is important not to confuse this problem with that of justifying being a just man to an egoist.

It remains to be shown that this disposition to take up and to be guided by the standpoint of justice accords with the individual’s good. Whether these two points of view are congruent is likely to be a crucial factor in determining stability. But congruence is not a foregone conclusion even in a well-ordered society.

Key Concepts

• Now that all the parts of the theory of justice are before us, the argument for congruence can be completed.
• The concepts of justice and goodness are linked with distinct principles and the question of congruence is whether these two families of criteria fit together.
• More precisely, each concept with its associated principles defines a point of view from which institutions, actions, and plans of life can be assessed.
• A sense of justice is an effective desire to apply and to act from the principles of justice and so from the point of view of justice.
• Thus what is to be established is that it is rational (as defined by the thin theory of the good) for those in a well-ordered society to affirm their sense of justice as regulative of their plan of life.
• It remains to be shown that this disposition to take up and to be guided by the standpoint of justice accords with the individual’s good.
• More precisely, consider any given person in a well-ordered society. He knows, I assume, that institutions are just and that others have (and will continue to have) a sense of justice similar to his, and therefore that they comply (and will continue to comply) with these arrangements.
• We want to show that on these suppositions it is rational for someone, as defined by the thin theory, to affirm his sense of justice.
• The plan of life which does this is his best reply to the similar plans of his associates; and being rational for anyone, it is rational for all.
• Whether these two points of view are congruent is likely to be a crucial factor in determining stability.

Context

Opening paragraphs of §86 ('The Good of the Sense of Justice'), where Rawls restates the structure of his theory and formulates the central 'congruence' question connecting the point of view of justice with the thin theory of the good and with the stability of a well‑ordered society.