Key Arguments

• He notes that 'as soon as we introduce the idea of a moving object that remains the same throughout its movement, Zeno’s arguments again become valid,' showing that the standard conception of a persisting object occupying successive positions reproduces the ancient paradox.
• Replies that reject atomistic space and time (by saying movement is not 'a series of discontinuous positions occupied in turn in a discontinuous series of instants, or that space and time are not made up of an assemblage of discrete elements') are, he says, 'in vain,' because they still retain the notion of an identical object in determinate positions.
• Even if we approximate continuity by taking 'two limit-moments or two limit-positions whose difference could be decreased below the level of any given quantity and whose differentiation would be merely nascent,' this still 'brings with it the idea of a spatial or temporal position that is always identifiable in itself, even if it is not so for us,' and so implies 'the idea of a stone that always exists and that never passes away.'
• He insists that 'even if a mathematical technique is invented that allows for an indefinite multiplicity of positions and instants to be introduced, the act of transition itself still cannot be conceived within an identical moving object, for this transition is always between two instants or two positions,' so the dynamic passage itself is excluded.
• He concludes that, on this basis, 'if I attempt to gain a clear conception of movement, I fail to understand how it could ever begin for me or be given to me as a phenomenon,' indicating that this 'clear' objective conception destroys the phenomenon of movement.

Source Quotes

it is never moving (nor at rest, for that matter). As soon as we introduce the idea of a moving object that remains the same throughout its movement, Zeno’s arguments again become valid. The reply that movement must not be considered as a series of discontinuous positions occupied in turn in a discontinuous series of instants, or that space and time are not made up of an assemblage of discrete elements, would be in vain.

As soon as we introduce the idea of a moving object that remains the same throughout its movement, Zeno’s arguments again become valid. The reply that movement must not be considered as a series of discontinuous positions occupied in turn in a discontinuous series of instants, or that space and time are not made up of an assemblage of discrete elements, would be in vain. For even if one considers two limit-moments or two limit-positions whose difference could be decreased below the level of any given quantity and whose differentiation would be merely nascent, the idea of an identical moving object throughout the phases of the movement excluded, as a mere appearance, the phenomenon of “blur” [bougé] and brings with it the idea of a spatial or temporal position that is always identifiable in itself, even if it is not so for us, hence the idea of a stone that always exists and that never passes away.

The reply that movement must not be considered as a series of discontinuous positions occupied in turn in a discontinuous series of instants, or that space and time are not made up of an assemblage of discrete elements, would be in vain. For even if one considers two limit-moments or two limit-positions whose difference could be decreased below the level of any given quantity and whose differentiation would be merely nascent, the idea of an identical moving object throughout the phases of the movement excluded, as a mere appearance, the phenomenon of “blur” [bougé] and brings with it the idea of a spatial or temporal position that is always identifiable in itself, even if it is not so for us, hence the idea of a stone that always exists and that never passes away. Even if a mathematical technique is invented that allows for an indefinite multiplicity of positions and instants to be introduced, the act of transition itself still cannot be conceived within an identical moving object, for this transition is always between two instants or two positions, no matter how proximate the ones we choose are.

For even if one considers two limit-moments or two limit-positions whose difference could be decreased below the level of any given quantity and whose differentiation would be merely nascent, the idea of an identical moving object throughout the phases of the movement excluded, as a mere appearance, the phenomenon of “blur” [bougé] and brings with it the idea of a spatial or temporal position that is always identifiable in itself, even if it is not so for us, hence the idea of a stone that always exists and that never passes away. Even if a mathematical technique is invented that allows for an indefinite multiplicity of positions and instants to be introduced, the act of transition itself still cannot be conceived within an identical moving object, for this transition is always between two instants or two positions, no matter how proximate the ones we choose are. The result is that, if I attempt to gain a clear conception of movement, I fail to understand how it could ever begin for me or be given to me as a phenomenon. [ii.

Even if a mathematical technique is invented that allows for an indefinite multiplicity of positions and instants to be introduced, the act of transition itself still cannot be conceived within an identical moving object, for this transition is always between two instants or two positions, no matter how proximate the ones we choose are. The result is that, if I attempt to gain a clear conception of movement, I fail to understand how it could ever begin for me or be given to me as a phenomenon. [ii. The psychologists’ description of movement.] And yet I walk and I have an experience of movement despite the demands and the alternatives of clear thought, such that, against all reason, I perceive movements without an identical moving object, without an external reference point, and without any relativity.

Key Concepts

• it is never moving (nor at rest, for that matter). As soon as we introduce the idea of a moving object that remains the same throughout its movement, Zeno’s arguments again become valid.
• The reply that movement must not be considered as a series of discontinuous positions occupied in turn in a discontinuous series of instants, or that space and time are not made up of an assemblage of discrete elements, would be in vain.
• even if one considers two limit-moments or two limit-positions whose difference could be decreased below the level of any given quantity and whose differentiation would be merely nascent, the idea of an identical moving object throughout the phases of the movement excluded, as a mere appearance, the phenomenon of “blur” [bougé] and brings with it the idea of a spatial or temporal position that is always identifiable in itself, even if it is not so for us, hence the idea of a stone that always exists and that never passes away.
• Even if a mathematical technique is invented that allows for an indefinite multiplicity of positions and instants to be introduced, the act of transition itself still cannot be conceived within an identical moving object, for this transition is always between two instants or two positions, no matter how proximate the ones we choose are.
• The result is that, if I attempt to gain a clear conception of movement, I fail to understand how it could ever begin for me or be given to me as a phenomenon.

Context

Section '[C. Movement.] [i. Thinking about movement destroys movement.]' in II - SPACE, where Merleau-Ponty radicalizes his critique of the objective conception of movement by showing that conceiving movement as successive positions of an identical object in time leads to Zeno-like paradoxes and eliminates the lived phenomenon of transition.