Key Arguments

• Merleau-Ponty argues that 'Attention, then, must be conceived on the model of these originary acts,' since any 'second-order attention that limited itself to recalling an already acquired knowledge would refer us back to the acquisition itself,' so the fundamental structure of attention is constitutive rather than reproductive.
• He maintains that the items to which attention is directed are not pre‑given objects but 'only pre-formed as horizons, they truly constitute new regions in the total world,' so attention discloses and articulates previously indeterminate horizons into explicit objects.
• He describes the temporal linking of acts: 'The act of attention is linked to previous acts precisely by overthrowing the givens, and the unity of consciousness is gradually constructed in this way through a “transition synthesis.”'
• In this process, consciousness accomplishes a paradoxical task: 'The miracle of consciousness is to make phenomena appear through attention that reestablish the object’s unity in a new dimension at the very moment they destroy that unity,' i.e., the object’s previous unity is broken but a richer unity is instituted.
• Thus, 'attention, then, is neither an association of ideas nor the return to itself of a thought that is already the master of its objects; rather, attention is the active constitution of a new object that develops and thematizes what was until then only offered as an indeterminate horizon.'
• He emphasizes that the object’s role is motivational, not causal: 'The object only gives rise to the “knowing event” that will transform it through the still ambiguous sense that it offers to attention as needing-to-be-determined, such that the object is the “motive” [motif] of and not the cause of this event.'
• From the side of consciousness, this process is identical with thinking: 'This passage from the indeterminate to the determinate, this continuous taking up again of its own history in the unity of a new sense, is thought itself. “The work of the mind exists only in act.”18 The result of the act of attention does not exist in its beginnings.'

Source Quotes

We cannot compare these phenomena occupying the place of color for the child to any determinate quality, and likewise the patient’s “strange” colors cannot be identified with any colors of the spectrum.13 The first perception of colors, properly so called, is thus a change in the structure of consciousness,14 the institution of a new dimension of experience, and the deployment of an a priori. Attention, then, must be conceived on the model of these originary acts, since a second-order attention that limited itself to recalling an already acquired knowledge would refer us back to the acquisition itself. To pay attention is not merely to further clarify some preexisting givens; rather, it is to realize in them a new articulation by taking them as figures.15 They are only pre-formed as horizons, they truly constitute new regions in the total world.

Attention, then, must be conceived on the model of these originary acts, since a second-order attention that limited itself to recalling an already acquired knowledge would refer us back to the acquisition itself. To pay attention is not merely to further clarify some preexisting givens; rather, it is to realize in them a new articulation by taking them as figures.15 They are only pre-formed as horizons, they truly constitute new regions in the total world. The original structure that they introduce is precisely what makes the identity of the object before and after the act of attention appear.

Once the idea of an equation is acquired, arithmetical identities appear as varieties of the same equation. The act of attention is linked to previous acts precisely by overthrowing the givens, and the unity of consciousness is gradually constructed in this way through a “transition synthesis.”16 The miracle of consciousness is to make phenomena appear through attention that reestablish the object’s unity in a new dimension at the very moment they destroy that unity. Attention, then, is neither an association of ideas nor the return to itself of a thought that is already the master of its objects; rather, attention is the active constitution of a new object that develops and thematizes what was until then only offered as an indeterminate horizon.

The act of attention is linked to previous acts precisely by overthrowing the givens, and the unity of consciousness is gradually constructed in this way through a “transition synthesis.”16 The miracle of consciousness is to make phenomena appear through attention that reestablish the object’s unity in a new dimension at the very moment they destroy that unity. Attention, then, is neither an association of ideas nor the return to itself of a thought that is already the master of its objects; rather, attention is the active constitution of a new object that develops and thematizes what was until then only offered as an indeterminate horizon. At the same time that it sets attention to work, the object is continuously recaptured by attention, and reestablished as subordinate to it.

At the same time that it sets attention to work, the object is continuously recaptured by attention, and reestablished as subordinate to it. The object only gives rise to the “knowing event” that will transform it through the still ambiguous sense that it offers to attention as needing-to-be-determined, such that the object is the “motive” [motif]17 of and not the cause of this event. The act of attention is, however, at least rooted in the life of consciousness, and we can finally understand that it emerges from its indifferent freedom to give itself a present object.

The act of attention is, however, at least rooted in the life of consciousness, and we can finally understand that it emerges from its indifferent freedom to give itself a present object. This passage from the indeterminate to the determinate, this continuous taking up again of its own history in the unity of a new sense, is thought itself. “The work of the mind exists only in act.”18 The result of the act of attention does not exist in its beginnings. If the moon viewed through a telescope or a cardboard tube appears no larger at the horizon than at its zenith, it cannot be concluded from this19 that the appearance is also invariable in free vision.

Key Concepts

• Attention, then, must be conceived on the model of these originary acts, since a second-order attention that limited itself to recalling an already acquired knowledge would refer us back to the acquisition itself.
• They are only pre-formed as horizons, they truly constitute new regions in the total world.
• The act of attention is linked to previous acts precisely by overthrowing the givens, and the unity of consciousness is gradually constructed in this way through a “transition synthesis.”16
• The miracle of consciousness is to make phenomena appear through attention that reestablish the object’s unity in a new dimension at the very moment they destroy that unity.
• attention, then, is neither an association of ideas nor the return to itself of a thought that is already the master of its objects; rather, attention is the active constitution of a new object that develops and thematizes what was until then only offered as an indeterminate horizon.
• the object is the “motive” [motif]17 of and not the cause of this event.
• This passage from the indeterminate to the determinate, this continuous taking up again of its own history in the unity of a new sense, is thought itself. “The work of the mind exists only in act.”18 The result of the act of attention does not exist in its beginnings.

Context

Continuation of the positive phenomenology of attention after the color‑perception example, where Merleau-Ponty generalizes to a theory of attention as a constitutive 'transition synthesis' that builds up the unity of consciousness and its objects through learning.